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ABSTRACT
Sri Lanka's economy began developing rapidly after the introduction an open economic policy in
1977. The country's growth rate of around 6 percent has been accompanied by a even higher growth in
demand for electricity of 8 percent. It is crucial that the government carefully plans to meet this demand,
because the provision of necessary infrastructure (power in particular) is vital for the country's continued
economic progress. Government budgetary difficulties, combined with scarcity of funds available
through international lending agencies, has made raising the US$ 1100 million required for investment in
new power generating capacity before the year 2000, a monumental task for Sri Lanka's policy makers.
The means used to finance required investments in power generation will depend on the future
organization and ownership of the power sector. If the government continues to own and operate the
sector it may be forced to obtain the required funds directly from international capital markets.
Alternatively, Sri Lanka could turn to the private sector for infrastructure provision. Currently, its
government is considering schemes such as Build Operate Transfer (BOT), which have been introduced in
rapidly growing countries in the Asian region. The eventual reversion of the assets to state control in
these models for privatization increase their political feasibility. The complex risk relationships between
government, lenders, investors, and contractors form the crux all BOT projects, and the state must
incorporate them into a workable formula that satisfies all involved parties.
I examined the viability of several projects that can be built and financed using the BOT method
(diesel 40 MW, hydro 70 MW, and coal 300 MW) from the investors' perspective. The crucial figure
associated with each viable project is the "selling price" or the price at which the state would have to
purchase the privately generated electricity; this value should be compared with 2.89 Rs./kWh-the long-
term average price calculated by the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) for its own 20-year generation plan.
At a discount rate of 15% only the diesel plants are viable at a selling prices of around 3.50-4.00 Rs./kWh.
The hydro and coal plants are not viable at even 5.00 Rs./kWh.
Therefore, my analysis suggests that for private generation by the BOT method to be viable in Sri
Lanka, the government should either be prepared to pay vastly increased prices for electricity, or take
active measures to reduce the required ROE for projects in the country. Since the former strategy alone
would adversely affect the economy, because electricity is a vital input in most forms of production, and
rapid increases in its price will contribute to domestic inflation, the state should actively pursue the latter.
As the required ROE for a project is directly tied its riskiness, the government should implement
measures to mitigate the financial, political, and technical risks associated with doing business in Sri
Lanka. An important first step is to bring peace and stability to the country, because the current high
levels of domestic government borrowing (to finance its defense expenditure) have pushed up interest
rates. The ROE is usually set at 10 percentage points above the prime lending rate; therefore, reducing
interest rates will lower required ROEs. The government should also institute a comprehensive legal and
regulatory framework in order to increase investor confidence in the country, thus reducing the required
ROE for domestic projects.
A reliable and adequate supply of electricity is an important requirement for making Sri Lanka
attractive to potential investors in other sectors of its economy. It is crucial, therefore, that the country
develops a flexible, realistic generation expansion plan which will meet future requirements, while
securing the capital necessary to implement it.
Thesis Advisor: Richard D. Tabors, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Technology, Management and Policy
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INTRODUCTION
The governments of the newly developing nations in Asia are faced with a
formidable challenge - how to construct and finance crucial infrastructure at a pace
which will meet rapidly growing demand. In many Asian cities, there is evidence of
their partial failure to meet this challenge. With auto use increasing at a frenzied
pace, capital cities from Beijing to Bangkok are paralyzed by traffic jams. Airports
are overwhelmed by long lines of travelers. Energy needs are growing
exponentially, and the demand for mobile phones, faxes, and new television services
are severely taxing existing telecommunications infrastructure. It is evident that if
these vital infrastructure needs are not met quickly, the entire development process
in these countries will be jeopardized.
Electricity, as an especially high grade of energy, plays an important role in
economic development. Its correlation with economic growth is illustrated by the
fact that between 1970 and 1980, gross domestic product (GDP) in developing
countries grew at 5.5 percent per year, while their electricity consumption increased
at an annual rate of over 7 percent. Therefore, many Asian nations have been
grappling with the problem of supplying a rapidly growing demand for power.
Sri Lanka, a small Asian nation, is faced with this common problem. Its
government has been forced to address this issue immediately, because of the
widespread public dismay regarding the recent power cuts which were instituted in
April 1996 because of the delayed arrival of the seasonal monsoon rains (the country
generates 80% of its electricity by hydro stations). Among the many options being
considered, the partial privatization of the generating sector has been given much
attention, partly because the government already faces a substantial budget deficit
(and therefore lacks the funds to build the needed generating capacity). In this thesis
I will look at the problems in the Sri Lankan power sector within the context of the
general situation of this sector in other countries in the region, and explore possible
measures to alleviate these problems. I have concentrated mainly on how the state
will fund the needed power generation infrastructure, and have not addressed
several other measures that can be taken to reduce power needs or to generate
power more efficiently, because even if such methods are used widely, a substantial
amount of generating capacity will still have to be added to the national grid to meet
the rapidly growing power needs of the country. However, in order to give the
reader an idea of some approaches that are being considered, I have presented a few
of these other measures in Appendix 5.
Chapter 1 looks at the importance of infrastructure in the development
process, and explore the changing role of government in its provision. I will also
address the current trend of privatizing many infrastructure sectors, and then look
at the more specific case of how this action may apply to the current power crisis in
the developing world.
In Chapter 2, I will give an overview of Sri Lanka in order to establish the
political, social and economic context in which policy makers in the power sector
have to operate. This backdrop will enable the reader to evaluate the feasibility of
specific policies proposed by international development agencies such as the World
Bank and USAID. In the second part of the chapter, I will give a brief overview of Sri
Lanka's energy sector, so as to illustrate how electric power fits into the overall
energy framework of the country.
In Chapter 3, I will give an overview of the current state of the present power
generating system and describe some of its main characteristics. I will also present
the long term generation plan of the Ceylon Electricity Board - the body involved in
planning for future generation. This foundation will enable me to estimate the
investment needed for additional generating capacity scheduled to be constructed
up to the year 2000.
I will explore possible ways in which the government can finance the above
required investments in the power sector in Chapter 4. I will then discuss the
possible consequences of the two main options -retaining state control of the sector,
or privatizing portions of it. For the latter scenario, I will specifically discuss the
modes of private sector participation, the pros and cons of privatization, variants of
the privatized approach, and risk allocation issues.
In Chapter 5, I will discuss the Build, Operate Transfer (BOT) method of
privatization - the approach which has gained most attention in the Asian region.
Topics I will address include contractual agreements, the required legal framework,
risks and their mitigation, and measures of project viability. I will then examine the
feasibility of this scheme's use to the Sri Lankan power sector. For this purpose I
have constructed spread sheet models of the cash flows of three proposed additions
to the country's grid - a 40 MW diesel plant, a 70 MW hydro plant, and a 300 MW
coal plant, and have determined the effect of the discount rate, the selling price of
electricity, and the proportion of equity disbursement on performance indicators
such as return on equity (ROE) and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR).
Chapter 6 presents some recommendations to the Sri Lanka. Here, I have
discussed the barriers to private sector participation in Sri Lanka, the need to
balance costs and benefits of private power generation, current government efforts
to facilitate foreign investment, and further steps required to encourage private
generation.
In the final "conclusions" chapter, I highlight the main findings of my thesis,
and briefly discuss Sri Lanka's outlook for the concluding decade of the century.
CHAPTER 1
Infrastructure: Its Importance and Provision
Infrastructure services, which include power, transport, telecommunications,
provision of water and sanitation, and safe disposal of wastes, are central to
economic production in a modern economy. Major infrastructure failures during
civil disturbances and natural disasters quickly and radically reduce communities'
quality of life and productivity. Conversely, improving infrastructure services
enhances welfare and fosters economic growth. Therefore, providing infrastructure
services to meet the demands of businesses, households, and other users is one of
the major challenges of economic development.
Developing countries invest $200 billion a year in new infrastructure-4
percent of their national output and a fifth of their total investment. This
expenditure has resulted in a dramatic increase in infrastructure services: for
transport, power, water, sanitation, telecommunications, and irrigation. During the
past fifteen years, the share of households with access to clean water has increased
by half, and power production and telephone lines per capita have doubled. These
increases contributed a great deal toward increasing productivity and improving
living standards'.
In spite of these significant accomplishments, much more needs to be done.
One billion people in the developing world still lack access to clean water, and
nearly 2 billion lack adequate sanitation. Already-inadequate transport networks are
deteriorating rapidly in many countries. Electric power has yet to reach 2 billion
people, and in many countries unreliable power constrains economic output. The
1 World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, (Washington D.C.,
USA: 1994), p. 1
demands for telecommunications, essential to modernize production and enhance
international competitiveness far outstrip existing capacity. These existing
deficiencies are further worsened by population growth and increased
urbanization.
1.1 Infrastructure's Impact on Development
World Bank studies, and other similar works have illustrated infrastructure's
links to three main components of development: economic growth, reduction of
poverty, and the improvement of the environment2.
1.1.1 Economic Growth
Input-output tables for the economies of Japan and the United States show
that telecommunications, electricity and water are used in the production process of
nearly every sector, and that transport is an input for every commodity. Users
demand infrastructure services not only for direct consumption but also for raising
their productivity by, for example, reducing the time and effort needed to secure
safe drinking water, to bring crops to market, or to commute to work.
Much research in recent years has been devoted to estimating the
productivity of infrastructure investments. Studies attempting to link aggregate
infrastructure spending to GDP show very high returns in a time-series analysis.
Cross-national studies of economic growth and infrastructure also show that
infrastructure variables are positively and significantly correlated with growth in
developing countries. In both types of studies, however, whether infrastructure
investment causes growth or growth causes infrastructure investment is not fully
established. Moreover, there may be other factors driving the growth of both GDP
and infrastructure that are not fully accounted for. Furthermore, neither the time-
series nor the cross-sectional studies satisfactorily explain the mechanisms through
which infrastructure may affect growth.
2 World Development Report 1994, p.14
It is evident, however, that a strong association exists between the availability
of certain key infrastructure services (telecommunications, power, paved roads, and
access to safe water) and per capita GDP. An analysis of the value of infrastructure
stocks indicates that their composition changes significantly as incomes rise. For
low-income countries, more basic infrastructure such as water, irrigation, and (to a
lesser extent) transport are important. As economies mature into the middle-income
stage, most of the basic consumption demands for water are met, the share of
agriculture in the economy shrinks, and more transport infrastructure is provided.
The share of power and telecommunications in investment and infrastructure stocks
becomes more significant as these in turn move to the high-income category. Data
for 1990 indicate that, while total infrastructure stocks increase by 1 percent with
each 1 percent increment in per capita GDP, household access to safe water increases
by 0.3 percent, paved roads increase by 0.8 percent, power by 1.5 percent, and
telecommunications by 1.7 percent.
Although the above relationships suggest that infrastructure (especially those
which are energy-related), has a high potential payoff in terms of economic growth,
they do not provide a basis for prescribing appropriate levels, or sectoral allocations,
for infrastructure investment. They also do not give a mechanism for predicting
returns for a particular nation. Other evidence confirms that investment in
infrastructure alone does not guarantee economic development and that actual
returns for infrastructure are small, close to the return on private investments. This
phenomenon may be due to the differences in the efficiency of investment across
countries and over time. For example, a study of the economic returns to individual
World Bank projects shows that, when overall economic policy conditions are poor,
the returns to infrastructure investments decline. Some of the results of this study
are presented in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1
Average economic rates of return on World Bank supported proiects, 1974-923
Irrigation and drainage
Telecommunications
Transport
Airports
Highways
Ports
Railways
Power
Urban development
Water and sanitation
Water supply
Sewerage
Infrastructure projects
All Bank operations
20
18
17
20
19
16
12
7
8
12
18
17
13
19
21
13
29
20
12
11
23
9
6
8
16
15
The average economic return on infrastructure projects, reestimated after loan
disbursement (completion of project construction), has been 16 percent over the past
decade-just above the World Bank average of 15 percent. Returns have been lowest
(and declining) for irrigation and drainage, airports (for a very small sample),
railways, power, water supply, and sewerage. Possible reasons for this phenomenon
will be discussed later in the chapter.
1.1.2 Reducing Poverty
Infrastructure is important for ensuring that growth is consistent with
poverty reduction, and access to at least minimal infrastructure services is one of the
essential criteria for defining welfare. To a great extent, the poor can be identified as
those who are unable to consume a basic quantity of clean water, are subject to
3 World Development Report 1994, p.17
__.____
I., Sctor1974-2 -183-9
unsanitary surroundings, have limited mobility beyond their immediate settlement
and have extremely limited access to modern communications systems. Therefore,
they have more health problems and fewer employment opportunities4 .
The construction and maintenance of some infrastructure - especially roads
and waterworks - can contribute to poverty reduction by providing direct
employment. Civil works programs (as carried out in Botswana, Cape Verde, and
India), which often involve the provision of infrastructure, have also been important
in strengthening famine prevention and providing income.
1.1.3 Improving the Environment
Infrastructure provision results from the efforts of individuals and
communities to modify their surroundings or habitat in order to improve their
comfort, productivity, and protection from the elements. Each sector-water, power,
transport, sanitation, irrigation- raises issues concerning the interaction between
artificial structures (and the activities they generate) and the natural environment.
Environment-friendly infrastructure services are essential for improving living
standards and offering public health protection. With sufficient care, providing the
infrastructure necessary for growth and poverty reduction can be consistent with
concern for natural resources and the global environment. At the same time, well-
designed and -managed infrastructure can promote the environmental sustainability
of human settlements.
The relationship between each infrastructure sector and the environment is
complex. Power plant emissions are important contributors to air pollution, so their
air quality impacts deserve careful analysis when facilities are expanded. In
developing countries almost one-third of commercial energy is devoted to electricity
generation- the fastest-growing component of the energy sector. By the year 2000
Asia may surpass all of Europe in sulfur dioxide emissions, and by 2005 it may
surpass Europe and the United States combined in power plant emissions.
4 World Development Report 1994, p.20
Reservoirs associated with hydroelectric projects, flood control, or irrigation can
give rise to environmental problems, both upstream (inundation of land) and
downstream (sedimentation).
1.2 The Traditional Role of the Government in Infrastructure Provision
Many of the newly independent developing countries at the end of the
Second World War displayed a fierce desire for economic independence5 . They
believed that rapid industrialization of the domestic economy was the key to
development, and viewed planning and public ownership in key sectors as more
effective ways to achieve this political and economic independence. Both
macroeconomic and microeconomic justifications were given for this perspective:
1.2.1 Macroeconomic arguments for Government Provision
* Government planning was essential to ensure that capital formation proceeded
at the desired rate and that such capital was allocated in a manner commensurate
with the development objectives of the country. Government planning, control,
and direction came to mean centralized, physical planning of the economy in
which the concept of market-determined prices was accorded secondary
importance.
* Domestic resources had to be mobilized to overcome the saving constraint. Two
methods of mobilizing domestic saving -taxation and financial intermediation -
were widely exercised. Weak financial markets necessitated government
intervention.
* Industrialization was seen to be the key to development because of empirical
evidence on the historical economic development of the now-industrial
countries. Developing countries felt that they had to nurture their infant
5 Naya, Seiji, Private Sector Development and Enterprise Reforms in Growing Asian Economies,
Institute for Contemporary Studies Press (San Francisco, USA: 1990). p.7
industries against competition at the early stages of development to support
long-term development goals.
In conjunction with the infant industry argument, "import substitution" was
seen as a means for accelerating industrialization. This inward-looking strategy
called for strong government intervention in erecting and maintaining
projectionist barriers.
1.2.2 Microeconomic Arguments for Government Provision
The micro foundations for government involvement are generally
characterized as "market failures". Externalities, increasing returns to scale, and
public goods are examples of these.
Externalities
An externality is said to exist when a third party not directly involved in the
production or consumption of the output is either positively or negatively affected
by the exchange. In developing countries, congestion in cities can be seen as an
example of a negative externality. Such situations give rise to a divergence between
private and social costs and benefits. Price theory predicts that, in the absence of
government intervention, goods and services with negative external effects would
be overproduced, and those with positive external effects will be underproduced.
Increasing returns to scale
A "natural" monopoly may arise because of the existence of increasing
returns to scale, in which a given increase in all inputs produces a more than equi-
proportional increase in output. This situation can lead to a firm's undercutting
smaller firms, becoming a monopoly, and then setting its price above marginal cost.
Water, electricity, telephone services and transportation are a few examples in which
increasing returns to scale provide a strong case for public regulation or ownership.
Public Goods
Public goods are those goods that, once produced, are available for
consumption by all; consumption of a public good by one individual does not
reduce the availability of the good to others. Because of these characteristics, the
producer of a public good cannot exclude nonpaying users and thus cannot fully
collect fees for the sale or use of the good. As a result, private producers may not
find it profitable to produce the public good, and the government becomes
responsible for the provision of these goods.
Other considerations
In addition to the macroeconomic and microeconomic concerns, other
objectives were also considered to be important to the country's long-run
development. Many policy-makers in the developing world argued that the
attainment of these goals required specific government action. Some of these
include:
* Many governments viewed the fair distribution of income and the elimination of
poverty and unemployment as critical goals of development. Governments
responded in a variety of ways to reduce poverty, stimulate employment, and
achieve a fairer distribution of income, each of which implied an increased role of
the government in the economy.
* The private sector cannot be relied on to ensure balanced regional development
because private capital generally seeks out investment in areas and markets
nearer to ports and big cities. Therefore, government action is essential to invest
in areas ignored by the private sector.
* National security considerations also provide a rationale for governments to
intervene in the control over and production of "strategic" goods and services
such as heavy and chemical industries, transportation, and communications.
State-owned enterprises are the principal means through which governments
gain and exercise control over these areas of their economies.
1.2.3 The Government Record of Performance
Achievements 6
There has been impressive expansion within infrastructure in recent decades,
as measured by stocks and production of services. In low-income economies,
telecommunications, sanitation, and water supply registered the highest rates of
increase in availability between 1975 and 1990, starting from a very low base in each
sector. In middle-income economies, growth in this period was concentrated mainly
in the power and telecommunications sectors, where capacity more than doubled
between 1975 and 1990. The above trends are illustrated in the table below:
6 World Development Report 1994, p.25
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1.2.4 Problems
A survey of forty-four countries with World Bank-financed projects designed
to improve infrastructure performance revealed some of the most common
problems in six infrastructure sectors. The results are presented in Table 1.3.
Although each sector has special problems, there are common patterns--
operational inefficiencies, inadequate maintenance, excessive dependence on fiscal
resources, lack of responsiveness to users' needs, limited benefits to the poor, and
insufficient environmental responsibility9.
Operational Inefficiencies
The broadest indicator of inefficient performance by an infrastructure system
is the extent of output lost in delivery. In 1987 25 percent of the power utilities in
developing countries had losses of electricity in transmission and distribution that
were twice those in efficiently operated systems. The World Bank estimated that in
some African countries, spending $1 million to reduce losses could save $12 million
in generating capacity.
Inefficient use of labor is especially common and costly in infrastructure. At
various periods, two thirds of the labor in railways in Tanzania and Zaire, 80% of
port staff in Argentina (before recent privatizations), and one-quarter of highway
department staff in Brazil have been redundant, according to World Bank estimates.
Overstaffing is also common in water, power and telecommunications.
Inadequate maintenance
Closely related to operating inefficiencies is lack of maintenance, which
causes loss of capacity and subsequent decline of output. Therefore, substantial
additional investment is needed simply to sustain existing levels of service.
Poor maintenance practices account for some of the low availability of power
generating capacity, which averages less than 60% for thermal plants in many
9 World Development Report 1994, p.27
developing countries, compared with more than 80% in systems operated at best-
practice standards.
Fiscal Inefficiency and Fiscal Drain
Poor infrastructure policies and inefficient provision absorb scarce fiscal
resources and damage macroeconomic stability. Because prices are often held well
below costs, the subsidies flowing into public infrastructure enterprises and agencies
have been enormous in many countries. During the 1980s, power tariffs in
developing countries were well below the costs of operation and maintenance.
Unresponsiveness to User Demand
The result of inefficiency and poor maintenance is low-quality, unreliable
service, which alienates users. Reliability is a critical aspect of user satisfaction that is
often ignored by many state-owned enterprises. In Indonesia and Nigeria, private
businesses incur heavy costs in order to guarantee power supply: 92 percent of firms
sampled in Nigeria and 64 percent in Indonesia have installed private generating
capacity, in contrast to Thailand, where only 6 percent of companies needed
generators. These large differences in self-provision reflect the performance of the
formal suppliers. In Nigeria, only 43 percent of installed capacity was in service by
1990 (despite massive over-investment in public power-generating capacity
throughout the 1980s); in Thailand, the power utility is efficiently run.
Neglect of the Poor
The poor typically use fewer infrastructure services than the non-poor, not
only because of low income, but also because they have very low access. Many
countries have introduced subsidies through low tariffs with the aim of improving
the poor's access to infrastructure services, yet most of these hand-outs have been
captured by the middle- and high-income households. For example, flat-rate
electricity charges in rural India have benefited mainly rich households, because the
poor lack the income to purchase the pumps and consumer appliances that account
for most electricity use.
Neglect of the Environment
The process of extracting energy resources and converting them into
electricity has often led to environmental degradation. One of the first motivations
for an energy conservation movement in the US was a concern that energy
production was leading to environmental problems: air pollution from coal-fired
power plants, water pollution from mine drainage, oil spills, threats to scenic
landscapes and endangered species, and similar consequences'o.
USAID projections of power supply capacity in developing nations by the
year 2008 show large increases in hydropower and steam thermal (mainly coal)
facilities, when these particular options are likely to have serious environmental
consequences". Hydropower developments on a relatively large scale often require
the relocation of sizable populations and change river basin ecologies dramatically:
careful studies of environmental impacts and risks in the more affluent countries
have sharply reduced the use of this alternative. Coal-fired power generation has
historically been associated with emissions of particulate materials, sulfur dioxide,
oxides and nitrogen, and other substances that eventually cause undesirable
environmental and health impacts-- not only air emissions from the power plants
themselves but water emissions from mining, cleaning, and storage facilities. The
problem of global climactic change is serious: a rise in temperature, shifts in climatic
zones, a rise in the sea level, and other disruptive impacts that may result from
growing concentrations in the earth's atmosphere of carbon dioxide and other by-
products of fossil fuel use.
10 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages in Developing Countries: Magnitudes,
Impacts, Solutions, and the Role of the Private Sector, (Washington D.C., USA: March 1988), p.15
11 USAID, Power Shortages......, p.15
If developing nations do not use extensive use of state-of-the-art technologies
to control sulfur dioxide emissions, their total emissions are expected to at triple
over the next 20 years (according to USAID figures). This figure could be even
higher because some of the larger developing countries, such as India and China, are
planning a major commitment to coal.
However, it must be kept in mind that, at present, developing countries enjoy
extremely limited access to electric power, and their contributions to wide-scale
environmental problems is small relative to those of more developed nations. The
US alone has over 650 GW of installed capacity compared with 450 GW in the entire
developing world, and industrialized countries produce 70 percent of the world's
energy-related carbon dioxide. Yet, since the projected increases in emissions from
the poorer countries are high, addressing the problem of global environmental
pollution requires a concerted effort by all nations.
1.3 The Power Crisis in the Developing World
The problems with state sponsored infrastructure provision outlined above
are especially acute in the power sector of developing nations. In this section I will
describe the current situation in these nations, and the possible costs of the severe
electricity shortage they are currently facing.
1.3.1 Electric Power and Economic Development
As a country develops economically, it consumes increasing amounts of
energy per capita. Furthermore, diverse activities such as agricultural development,
improvements in health services, and industrial expansion are closely tied to
changes in the quality and form of energy consumed. Therefore, prospects for a
country's growth are closely linked to its ability to provide an adequate and reliable
supply of energy to its population12.
12 USAID, Power Shortages......, p.2
Electricity, as a especially high grade of energy, plays an important role in the
development process. World Bank studies of which review the previous patterns of
electricity consumption in developed and developing countries indicate that
electricity use and GDP have been, and probably will be, strongly correlated. The
fact that, between 1970 and 1980, annual GDP growth rates of developing countries
were accompanied by an electricity consumption growth of 7 percent an year,
illustrates the strong link between increased power consumption and economic
growth.
In spite of the high annual growth rate of electricity demand in developing
countries, these nations, which over 75 percent of the world population, consume
only 18 percent of all the electricity used in the world. On average, they use only 500
kWh of electricity per capita per year, compared with over 10,500 kWh per capita in
the US and over 5,000 kWh per capita in Europe and Japan. The lowest income
countries, use on average only 250 kWh per capita per year.
1.3.2 The Impact of Power Shortages in Developing Nations
A sizable imbalance between the supply and demand of electric power in
developing countries is constraining their efforts to achieve sustainable social and
economic growth. Faced with high demand growth rates, many countries now
experience power shortages of over 10 percent of their generation capability. In
Pakistan, for example, during the past five years, power shortages have been over 25
percent of demand. The corresponding figures for India and the Dominican
Republic are 10 and 15 percent respectively. The impact of these shortages on the
growing economies of developing countries has been tremendous. In Pakistan, for
example, load shedding has resulted in an estimated 1.8 percent decrease in GDP
and a 4.2 percent decrease in the country's foreign exchange earnings (according to
USAID estimates. The poor quality and reliability of existing electricity services in
the country has significantly impaired industrial, agricultural, and commercial
productivity, and diverted much needed investment capital for redundant, standby
electrical generating capacity.
The following table gives USAID estimates' 3 of the costs of power shortages
in some developing countries:
13 USAID, Power Shortages......, p.21
Table 1.4
Costs of Power Shortages in Selected Developing Countries (1988 US$)14
Bangladesh
Brazil
Chile
Costa Rica
Egypt
India
Jamaica
Pakistan
Paraguay
Taiwan
Tanzania
All Unplanned Outages 1.00 5 /kvh
Households Unplanned outages 1.95-03.00 $/kWh
Households Unplanned outages 0.53 S /kWh
Industry Unplanned outages Range: 0.25-12.00 $/kWh
Central Tendency: 1.50-6.00
$/kWh
Households Unplanned outages ---
Industry Unplanned outages 0.40 S/kWh
Industry Controlled load shedding Annual cost ranges from 1 to 3% of
GDP (1.5 to 3 billion dollars
annually)
Industry Unplanned outages 1.25 S/kWh
Industry Controlled load shedding Range: 0.26-1.77 $/kWh
Average: 0.46 $/kWh
Unplanned outages Range: 0.36-2.54 $/kWh
Average: 0.46 $/kWh
Controlled and uncontrolled load $350 million in 1984-85
Shedding
Residential Unplanned outages
Industry Unplanned outages 0.06-2.16 $/kWh
Households Unplanned outages 0.50 5/kWh
Industry Unplanned outages 0.07-1.40 $/kWh
Commercial Unplanned outages 1.00 S/kWh
All Sectors Unplanned outages 0.07-1.10 $/kWh
Many governments in developing nations have found it increasingly difficult
to allocate sufficient resources to the power sector. In many countries this sector
accounts for more than 20 percent of the government's total development budget,
'4 USAID, Power Shortages....... p.21
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and foreign borrowing for the power sector is greater than 40 percent of their total
foreign debt. Low development growth rates, very low per capita incomes,
substantial debt servicing problems, and political instability in these nations restrict
their ability to procure investment capital from domestic and foreign sources.
1.4 The changing role of the government
The traditional role of the government in infrastructure provision, which was
outlined above, began to change gradually. Since the 1980s, this process has speeded
up due to changes both in the external global economy, as well as internal changes.
External Changes
The 1980s were generally difficult years for most developing countries, as
they had to contend with a rapidly changing world economy. Exports of developing
countries as a whole fluctuated widely, declining in the first half of the 1980s but
recovering in 1987. Two oil shocks and prolonged recessions led to balance-of-
payments problems for oil-importing countries, and the softening of the oil market
in the 1980s even created difficulties for the oil-rich countries. For commodity-
exporting countries, the prolonged period of low commodity prices resulted in low
or drastically reduced export earnings' 5.
At the same time, flows of external capital into developing countries have
slowed. The high interest rates in the early 1980s increased the debt-servicing
burden and caused repayment difficulties for many developing countries.
Concurrently, problems in industrialized countries led to a stagnation in aid and
other official bilateral flows. Thus, despite falling interest rates in the mid-1980s,
external sources of funds were not readily available to most developing countries.
15 Naya, p. 15
As a result of the above external factors, many governments have begun to
look more to the private sector to share the responsibility of the provision of
infrastructure in many sectors.
Internal Factors
Uncertain external conditions have also contributed to a more circumspect
view of public finances. Rising debt and growing budget deficits of many countries
have caused them to look more carefully into their expenditure patterns. Most
developing countries suffered overall budget deficits for most of the 1980s.
Because of these budgetary problems, several governments have become
more cost-conscious. They are reassessing government's traditional role in the
economy and are preparing to withdraw from activities deemed more suited for
private initiative.
1.5 Worldwide Privatization
During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s governments worldwide have been selling
off state-owned assets, primarily as an additional source of revenue. In 1988-92 the
UK government led the privatization league accruing some US$ 44 billion. But, if
assets sales were expressed relative to GDP, the governments of New Zealand,
Mexico, Argentina, Malaysia and Portugal sold larger proportions of their economy,
as shown in Table 1.416:
16 Smith, A.J. and C. Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach,
Thomas Telford Publications Ltd (London, United Kingdom: 1995), p.12
Table 1.4: Privatization Proceeds relative to GDP 1988-92 Average' 7
New Zealand 7.6 3.60
Mexico 20.2 1.70
Argentina 9.3 1.40
Malaysia 2.7 1.25
Portugal 3.3 1.10
Britain 44.4 0.95
Germany 27.3 0.50
Sweden 4.1 0.45
Australia 4.5 0.40
South Africa 1.4 0.40
Ireland 0.5 0.30
Brazil 4.6 0.25
Canada 5.7 0.25
Holland 2.4 0.20
Austria 1.1 0.20
Japan 22.8 0.20
Spain 2.7 0.15
Denmark 0.7 0.15
Italy 3.4 0.10
France 2.1 0.10
In New Zealand, sales of state assets were equivalent to an average of 3.6% of
GDP in the five-year period, compared with just under 1% in the UK. Another
country which is preparing for large scale privatization is India, which plans to sell
US$ 1.3 billion worth of public assets between 1994 and 1996. The assets targeted for
sale include over 200 state-sector companies in mining, oil, telecommunications,
steel, aviation, ports, shipbuilding, railways, bus transport, and hotels. The demise
of communism in the East European countries triggered off a tidal wave of mass
privatization. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
with Germany's 'Trenchant' privatization agency in partnership with the World
Bank led the financing of this thrust.
All countries have their own public/private mix, which allied to their
political ethos, determines the extent and nature of privatization. Therefore,
governments have to address their own unique political climate. Privatization might
7 Smith and Walker, p.13
reverse previous nationalizations which could upset those who advocated that
policy in the first place. In non-democratic regimes, where the military is often close
to nationalist activists and supposed defenders of the poor and under-privileged, as
in some Central African states, private sector involvement is generally resisted.
In democratic countries opposition can be expressed by casting votes in favor
of the opposing political party, and state officials therefore can regularly gauge
satisfaction with the process by following periodic election results. Political
opposition to the private sector is often based on ideological grounds or driven by
self-interest considerations, but also arises from government departments fearing
that privatization will lessen their power.
Reservations that privatization is not a panacea are also voiced by agencies
such as the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) which has monitored its
overall consequences in 80 countries18 . Its 1993 report states that "markets are, after
all, not an end in themselves, they are a means to human development". To keep
human development and the market in balance it warns of the "seven deadly sins of
privatization":
a) The wrong reason, such as the short-term revenue for the national treasury
b) The wrong environment; for instance, the government either continues to
interfere with efficiency or provides inadequate anti-trust regulation.
c) Cronyism and corruption by disposing of assets in secrecy or without
competitive bidding.
d) Financing budget deficits by selling public enterprises. Instead, a government
must retire its national debt and face up to the painful choice of raising taxes or
cutting public spending to balance its budget.
e) A poor financial strategy. Government should take care to achieve widespread
distribution of shares to nationals and foreigners alike in a way that maximizes
revenue and protects the national interest.
's Smith and Walker, p.14
f) Poor labor strategies, such as buying labor cooperation with unrealistic hiring
promises. Instead, governments should invite pre-sale labor dialogue and
participation in management, in retraining, and in lay-off policies and action.
g) No political consensus. Privatization is a political as well as an economic act and
should not be forced through by edict.
"The enumeration of these sins," say the report's authors, "is a caution not
against privatization, but against privatizing within the wrong framework and
without a human development purpose in mind"19.
1.6 The Power Shortage in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka, a developing nation in Asia, faces many of the infrastructural
problems outlined above, especially those related to electricity generation. In the
next few chapters I will provide a general background on the country and its power
sector, and indicate some of the specific problems faced by its power planners. I will
then provide some possible measures (including the privatization options outlined
above), that the government can undertake to meet the country's rapidly growing
demand for electricity.
'9 Smith and Walker, p.14
CHAPTER 2
Sri Lanka: Background, Economy, Government Policy,
Energy Sector
2.1 Country Overview
Sri Lanka is an island to the south of the Indian subcontinent which is
separated from the mainland by a narrow strip of ocean- the Palk Strait- which, at
its narrowest point is only 22 miles wide. The island is located between 6 and 10
degrees North latitude and 79 and 82 degrees East longitudes. Sri Lanka is a pear
shaped island, 270 miles (430 km) long at its longest point and 140 miles (220 km)
wide at the widest point. It covers an area of 25,332 square miles (65,610 square
kilometers), is comparable in size to Ireland or the state of West Virginia, and carries
the population of Australial.
Sri Lanka received independence in 1948, after three centuries of Western rule
by the Portuguese, Dutch, and the British. The nation's capital, Colombo, is situated
on the West coast, and has a population of 615,000.
2.1.1 Basic Facts
Population
Sri Lanka's population, which was 14,988,000 at the 1981 census (the
decennial census was not carried out in 1991), was officially estimated at 17.9 million
in mid-1994. The annual growth rate over the period 1981-91 was 1.4% and was
estimated at 1.4% in 19942.
1 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: An Economic, Financial and Investment Guide (Colombo, Sri
Lanka: June 1992), p. 3
2 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, Electronic Publishing Services
(London, United Kingdom: 1995), p.1 1
About 70% of the population live in the island's south-western area (the so-
called wet zone), which accounts for about three-quarters of the cultivated land and
most of the country's industry. In 1991 only 21% of the population was urban, a
proportion little changed from 15 years earlier.
The fertility rate (average number of children born per woman) is estimated
at 2.4. Contraceptive use is relatively high (practiced by around 62% of married
women of childbearing age) and the fertility rate is expected to fall to the population
replacement level before the end of the century. About 30% of the population are
under 15 and 6% over 65.
Ethnic Makeup
Ethnicity has played a major role in Sri Lankan politics since independence.
The majority Sinhalese account for nearly three-quarters of the population; they
speak Sinhala (an Indo-Aryan language), and are mainly Buddhist3 .
The Sri Lankan Tamils account for 13% of the population. By majority Hindu,
with a substantial Christian minority, they speak Tamil, a Dravidian language,
which is based on a different rootstock from Sinhala. Upcountry, or "Indian" Tamils
form 5-6% of the population. They are descendants of laborers brought over by the
British to work the tea plantations at the beginning of the century, and many were
denied voting rights or citizenship after independence. Although a 1964 Treaty with
India sought to regularize their status, all those remaining in Sri Lanka (some
returned to India) were finally granted citizenship only in 1988.
The Muslims, or Moors, constitute around 7% of the population and are
concentrated in the Eastern Province and in Colombo. Descendants of Arab traders
who settled in the island, they are Tamil-speaking, but remain apart from the Tamil
community and are not involved in Tamil causes.
3 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.4
Finally, there are small groups of "Burghers" (Eurasians of mixed descent),
Malays, and a tiny handful of Veddahs (descendants of the original inhabitants of
the island before Sinhalese settlement).
Table 2.1
Percentage Distribution of Population by Religion and Ethnicity4
Percentage by Ethnicity Percentage by Religion
Sinhalese 74.0 Buddhists 69.3
Sri Lankan Tamils 12.7 Hindus 15.5
Indian Tamils 5.5 Muslims 7.6
Moors 7.0 Christians 7.5
Burghers 0.3 Others 0.1
Malays 0.3
Others 0.2
(1981 Census; Total Population: 14,850,000)
Tensions between the majority Sinhalese, and minority Tamils escalated into
a bloody ethnic conflict in 1983. Fighting between government forces and a group of
militants known as the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), who are seeking a
separate state in the North and East of the island, has claimed over 50,000 lives and
caused immense damage to public and private property.
Government
Despite its problems, Sri Lanka has managed to maintain an unbroken record
of democracy since independence. Elections have been held regularly and they have
been in general freely and fairly contested, (in spite of some abuses). The country
passes the critical test of any democracy in that elections have on several occasions
resulted in a peaceful change of government.
4 Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Statistics Department, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka
(Colombo, Sri Lanka: December 1994), p.9
Initially, as Ceylon, the country had a Westminister-style constitution with
the British monarch as head of state, executive power in the hands of a prime
minister, and a bicameral legislature. In 1972 the country became a republic,
although remaining within the Commonwealth. Its name was changed from Ceylon
to Sri Lanka and the bicameral legislature became unicameral. Although it had a
president as head of state, executive power remained vested in the prime minister
and cabinet.
Sweeping changes were instituted in 1978 after J.R. Jayawardene became
prime minister in 1977. The new constitution introduced a presidential system of
government with the president becoming head of state, head of government, and
head of the armed forces. The powers of the prime minister and the cabinet were
drastically reduced. The previous first-past-the-post system of voting in elections
was replaced by a system of modified proportional representation (modeled after
portions of the French and German political systems). Both presidential and
parliamentary elections are held every six years. Mr. Jayawardene became the first
president under the 1978 constitution and held this position for two six-year terms
until the end of 1988.
A two-thirds parliamentary majority is required for the removal of the
president or for an amendment to the constitution. The judiciary is independent and
the Supreme Court has sole jurisdiction over interpretation of the constitution.
Freedom of thought, conscience, and worship, as well as equal access before
the law, are guaranteed by the constitution. Sinhala and Tamil are official languages,
and English, widely used and understood in business circles, has a high status as a
link language.
Social Indicators
The education system, which was targeted as a high priority by the
government after independence, is highly advanced by developing country
standards. The government spent 11% of its total expenditure on education in 1994,
an increase of 26% from the 1993 level. The pupil to teacher ratio was 22:1 in 1994,
down from 24:1 in 1991. Primary schooling is universal. Secondary school
enrollment was 74% in 1991 and 5% of the eligible population was receiving higher
education. In 1990, 88% of the population was literate, the highest rate in South Asia.
The health service is also impressive for a country of Sri Lanka's per capita
GDP. Medical treatment is free. Life expectancy, which was 72 years at birth in 1992,
is higher than in any other country in the subcontinent. Infant mortality, at 18 per
1,000 live births in 1992, is comparable to that of a West European country in the
1960s.
For a relatively poor country Sri Lanka's record on both education and health
is exceptional. The UN's human development index, which combines real GDP
increase with indicators such as life expectancy, literacy, and schooling data, puts Sri
Lanka at 0.704. This ranks five places above the country's ranking in terms of GDP
per capita.
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2.1.2 The Economy
Sri Lanka's economy is still largely agricultural. A quarter of GDP is generated
by this sector, and about 44% of its labor force employed by it6 . In recent years, in
response to government efforts to diversify the economic base and generate new
sources of foreign exchange, industry (manufacturing in particular), and services
(tourism and banking) have grown in importance. In 1986 the textiles and clothing
sector became the leading foreign exchange earner, while the three main traditional
exports - tea, rubber, and coconut - now accounted for less than one-fifth of earnings.
Real GDP growth has averaged 4.8% in the last five years. A growth rate of 4.3%
was achieved in 1992 despite a severe drought which caused a drop in agricultural
output. The beneficial impact of economic reforms, along with growing foreign
investment, enabled the rest of the economy, notably manufacturing, to offset poor
agricultural performance. In 1993 agricultural recovery helped push economic growth
to 6.9%. Agricultural growth slowed to 3.3% in 1994, but overall economic growth to a
still respectable 5.6%7. These impressive rates were achieved in spite of the ongoing
civil war which has had an extremely adverse impact on the economy.
6 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.13
7 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.13
Table 2.3: Composition of GDP in real terms8
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 22.7 23.2 22.6 21.3 20.9 20.5
Mining and quarrying 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.5
Manufacturing 16.8 17.4 17.7 18.5 19.1 19.7
Construction 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.9 6.9 6.9
Utilities 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5
Transport & communications 11.4 11.1 11.5 11.8 11.5 11.2
Internal Trade 21.0 20.5 21.1 21.3 21.6 21.8
Banking, insurance & real estate 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.5
Ownership of dwellings 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4
Public administration & defense 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.3
Other services 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.8
GDP at factor cost 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net factor income from abroad -2.3 -2.2 -2.2 -2.1 -1.5 -1.6
GNP 97.7 97.8 97.8 97.9 98.5 98.4
Table 2.4
Growth in Output9
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing -1.1 8.5 1.9 -1.6 4.9 3.3
Mining and quarrying 5.4 9.1 -10.0 -6.0 11.9 6.0
Manufacturing 4.4 9.5 6.8 8.8 10.5 9.1
Construction 0.6 2.9 3.1 8.1 6.5 6.0
Services 3.2 4.3 6.2 5.3 6.3 5.2
GDP at factor cost 2.3 6.2 4.6 4.3 6.9 5.6
GNP 2.3 6.4 4.6 4.4 7.7 5.3
There has been a slow but steady decline in agriculture's importance in the
composition of GDP. Manufacturing has performed exceptionally well in recent years,
its growth becoming more impressive as the relative size of the sluggish public sector
has declined, enabling private industry to predominate. Banking, insurance, and real
estate have been the other buoyant sectors. The share of mining and quarrying has
fluctuated.
8 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.16
9 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.16
Employment
The total labor force, excluding the Northern and Eastern provinces, has risen
from 5.8 million in 1992 to 6.17 million in 1994, of whom 5.4 million were employed. At
the end of 1994 employment in the public sector was 1.32 million, of whom around
625,000 were in semi-government institutions (including state-owned plantations) 10.
A survey of the labor force carried out by the Department of Census and
Statistics in 1994 (other than in the Northern and Eastern Provinces) suggested that the
agricultural sector accounted for around 42% of total employment, manufacturing for
about 14%, and the services sector (including hotels and distribution) for 40%. Over the
past few years there has been a slow decline in the share of agriculture and an increase
in the shares of manufacturing and services.
Unemployment, particularly among the educated young, has been a problem for
many years in Sri Lanka, although the rapid economic growth of recent years has
alleviated the problem to some extent. There is little reliable data on unemployment,
but the Central Bank estimates that unemployment fell slightly from 13.5% of the
workforce in 1993 to 13.1% in 1994.
Currency
The unit of currency is the rupee, which is divided into 100 cents. The entire
exchange system was fundamentally reorganized as part of the economic reforms
introduced in November 1977. The currency was allowed to float against a basket of
currencies, with the Central Bank daily announcing new exchange rates against major
currencies. The value of the rupee has fluctuated since 1978 but its overall trend has
been downwards, reflecting the country's persistent current account deficit and
relatively high inflation rates. After a sharp fall against the dollar in 1989 the rupee
remained around SLRs.40:$1 until early 1991, after which it steadily lost until mid-1993.
10 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.17
From mid-1993 to mid-1994 it fluctuated between SLRs.49.0:$1 and SLRs.49.7:$1, and
dipped below the SLRs.50:$1 barrier in February 199511.
Table 2.5: Exchange Rates12
......... ... 
Dollar
Sterling
D-mark
French Franc
Yen (rupees per 100 yen)
Indian rupee
SDR
40.00
65.00
23.701
6.94
28.20
2.36
52.6
40.20
75.60
26.20
7.71
29.40
2.23
57.20
42.60
79.60
28.0
8.19
33.90
1.64
60.80
46.00 49.60 1 50.00i
69.40 73.50 1 78.10
28.60 28.70 1 32.20
8.39 8.471 9.32
37.00 44.30 1 50.00
1.75 1.58 I 1.59
63.30 68.10 73.00
Table 2.6: Average exchange rate (SLRs.:$) 13
36.05 40.06 41.37 43.83 148.32 149.42
11Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.1212 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.12
13 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.12
Interest Rates
Short term interest rates fluctuated widely during 1994. Continued high
liquidity conditions in the economy within the context of a depleted stock of
treasury bills in the Central Bank portfolio led to a sharp fall in short term interest
rates during the first two months of 1994. With the tightening of liquidity
conditions through the issues of treasury bills and Central Bank securities during
the following months , short term interest rates moved in an upward direction
until May 1994. This temporary upward trend was followed by another fall that
continued until October due to increased liquidity following a rise in foreign
inflows. A slowing down in foreign inflows and increased government borrowing
caused short term interest rates to rise sharply in the last two months of the year.
However, medium and long term rates remained at levels lower than the rates in
1993.
Inter-Bank call Loans
Treasury Bill Yield
Rates
3 Months
6 Months
9 Months
Commercial Bank
Deposit Rates
NSB Deposits Rates
Commercial Bank
Advance Rates
Prime Lending Rate
Loans Secured by
Government Securities
Unsecured Loans
Bills purchased and
discounted
12-12.75
11.31
6-12
12
14.8
12-26
9.8-30
11-22
11-14
11.31
6-11
12
14.2
9.8-26
9.8-33
11-22
16-21
19.32
5-11
12
16.9
9.8-26
13-33
10-25
13-25
18.10
18.20
19.10
5-14
14
18
9.8-25
13-33
7-25
14-19
17.41
18.02
19.10
5-14
16.2
18.6
9.8-25
13-35
10-25
13-27
16.33
16.38
17.43
6.5-14
14
19.6
11.8-28
13-33
10-30
10-32
17.67
18.05
18.99
6.5-14
14
20.2
11.8-26
13-32
14.5-30
16.5-28
18.09
19.47
19.38
6-15
14
20.4
16-26
16.5-36
14.5-30
4" Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Statistics Deparmnent. Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka. p.77
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Table 2.8
Summary of Government Fiscal Operations 15
Total Revenue (Ks. million)
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Total Expenditure & Net Lending
Recurrent
Capital & Net Lending
Current Account Surplus/Deficit (-)
Deficit (before grants)
Financing
Foreign Grants
Foreign Borrowings
Domestic Financing
Non Bank
Bank
67,964
61,206
6,758
99,814
71,771
28,043
-3,807
-31,850
31,850
6,697
11,645
13,508
13,521
257
76,179
68,157
8,022
119,527
83,756
35,771
-7,577
-43,348
43,348
7,870
19,329
16,149
16,114
35
15 Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Statistics Department, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka, p.19
85,781
76,353
9,428
116,973
89,639
27,334
-3,858
-31,192
31,192
8,280
7,361
15,551
17,873
-2,322
98,339
87,891
12,448
140,460
102,288
38,172
-3,949
-42,121
42,121
8,025
9,855
24,241
30,320
-6,079
110,038
99,417
10,621
167,768
127,084
40,684
-17,046
-57,730
57,730
8,257
11,778
37,696
36,539
1,157
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Table 2.9
GDP Ratios16
Total Revenue (Rs. million)
Tax Revenue
Non Tax Revenue
Total Expenditure & Net Lending
Recurrent
Capital & Net Lending
Current Account Surplus/Deficit (-)
Deficit (before grants)
Financing
Foreign Grants
Foreign Borrowings
Domestic Financing
Non Bank
Bank
16 Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Statistics Department, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka, p.19
21.1
19.0
2.1
31.0
22.3
8.7
-1.2
-9.9
9.9
2.1
3.6
4.2
4.1
0.1
20.4
18.3
2.2
32.1
22.5
9.6
-2.0
-11.6
11.6
2.1
5.2
4.3
4.3
20.2
17.9
2.2
27.5
21.1
6.4
-0.9
-7.3
7.3
1.9
1.7
3.7
4.2
-0.5
19.7
17.2
2.5
28.1
20.5
7.6
-0.8
-8.4
8.4
1.6
2.0
4.9
6.1
-1.2
19.0
17.2
1.8
29.0
22.0
7.0
-2.9
-10.0
10.0
1.4
2.0
6.5
6.3
0.2
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2.1.3 Economic Policy
Sri Lanka's economic performance was mediocre in the decades after
independence. Growth was modest, the unemployment rate was high and the balance
of payments weak. Emphasis was laid on social programs-health and education-
which, while desirable, diverted resources from the encouragement of productive
activity. Little progress was made towards reducing dependence on the three
traditional exports"7.
The situation worsened during the 1970-77 period when the United Front
government led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was in power; private
enterprise was restricted and large parts of the economy were nationalized, including
much of the plantation sector. Bureaucracy increased, as did patronage and corruption,
while economic performance declined further.
The Jayawardene government, reversing the policies of its predecessor,
introduced a liberal, open economic policy aimed at creating conditions for sustained
economic growth, higher employment, and a shift in resources from consumption into
investment. Early measures included the abolition of import restrictions, the easing of
price controls, a cutback in food subsidies, the opening up to the private sector of areas
previously reserved for the public sector, and active encouragement of foreign
investment. These measures were coupled with a massive increase in public investment.
A public investment construction boom, whose centerpiece was the Mahaweli
Development Program-a huge power, irrigation, and agricultural development and
settlement project-fueled GDP growth at an annual average rate of 6% in the period
1978-83, more than double the 2.9% achieved in the previous seven years (1971-77).
While the reforms introduced since 1977 were successful in boosting growth,
development, and investment, the economy was still hampered by excessive
bureaucracy and state involvement. Around 50% of industry remained in the public
sector and two large state corporations: the Janatha Estates Development Board and the
State Plantations Corporation accounted for approximately two-thirds of tea
17 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.13
production, 32% of rubber, and 10% of coconut. Returns on public investment projects
were low. Government and semi-government institutions accounted for over a fifth of
total employment; the civil service was generally considered to be overstaffed although
underpaid although salaries were substantially upgraded in 1988 and 1993.
Government revenue and expenditure were 22% and 32% of GDP-higher proportions
than in most developing countries. Finally the tax system, despite considerable
simplification, remained complex and counterproductive.
In 1989 a new and rigorous liberalization program was introduced by the former
United National Party (UNP) government, the main elements of which have been
retained by the new People's Alliance administration. This privatization program will
be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
The ethnic conflict has had only a limited effect on the Sri Lankan economy since
the main fighting has been in the north and east, away from the economic heartland of
the south and west. Apart from the tourism sector, which was badly hit in the late
1980s, the main impact at that time was probably the drying up of foreign investment
flows, especially in the north and east. More crucially, the disturbances inspired by the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, or People's Liberation Front) in 1988-89 had a serious
effect on the economy because the organization's sphere of operation was close to the
country's economic heartland. Nevertheless, after the JVP was crushed at the end of
1989 growth picked up.
As the war in the North and East has dragged on into the 1990s, the government
has had to spend increasing amounts of scarce foreign exchange on buying costly
armaments. The crowding out of productive investment due to high interest rates
brought about by heavy domestic borrowing by the government is estimated to be
billions of dollars. The economy is also adversely affected by the high rates of return
foreign investors demand because of the general uncertainty in the country.
2.2 The Energy Sector
The International Energy Agency (IEA), published the following energy
indicators on Sri Lanka, in its 1989-1990 Report on Energy Statistics and Balances of
Non-OECD countries:
Tot. Primary Energy Supply (Mtoe)
Oil requirements (Mtoe)
Electricity generated (GWh)
Population (Millions)
GDP (Billion 1985 $US)
TPES/GDP (Toe per 000 $US)
TPES/Pop. (Toe per capita)
Oil Req./GDP (Toe per 000 $US)
Oil Req./Pop. (Toe per capita)
Elec. gen./GDP (kWh per $US)
Elec. gen./Pop. (kWh per capita)
1.590
1.485
2114
15.42
5.55
0.29
0.10
0.27
0.10
0.38
137
1.497
1.316
2261
15.60
5.54
0.27
0.10
0.24
0.08
0.41
145
1.405
1.197
2464
15.84
6.08
0.23
0.09
0.20
0.08
0.41
156
1.453
1.225
2652
16.12
6.35
0.23
0.09
0.19
0.08
0.42
165
1.548
1.361
2707
16.36
6.39
0.24
0.08
021
0.08
0.42
155
1.401
1.178
2799
16.59
6.57
0.21
0.09
0.18
0.07
0.43
169
1.529
1.301
2858
16.81
6.71
0.23
0.09
0.19
0.08
0.43
170
1.621
The Central Bank Report published the following cata about fuel import
quantities and prices in its 1994 annual report (the data is presented in Table 2.11):
' International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics and Balances of Non-OECD Countries 1989-1990 Publications
Service, OECD (Paris, France: 1992), p.251
1.351
3150
17.00
7.13
0.23
0.10
0.19
0.08
0.44
185
10
II
(uantwty ot Exports
Value of Exports
Quantity Exported
Crude Oil
Refined Products
L.P. Gas
Value of Imports (C&F)
Crude Oil
Refined Products
L.P. Gas
Average Price of Crude
Oil (C&F)
Local Sales
Super Petrol
Auto Diesel
Heavy Diesel
Super Diesel
Kerosene
Furnace Oil
Aviation Turbine Fuel
Aviation Gas
L.P. Gas
Local Price
Super Petrol
Auto Diesel
Heavy Diesel
Super Diesel
Kerosene
Bitumen
L.P. Gas
Rs. Million
MT
MT
MT
Rs. Million
Rs. Million
Rs. Million
Rs. /Barrel
US$/ Barrel
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
Rs./liter
Rs./liter
Rs./liter
Rs./liter
Rs./liter
Rs./liter
Rs./kg
3,801.0
1,799,597
294,090
37,560
11,222.37
2,553.63
545.00
842.71
17.47
1,417,712
172,812
666,513
18,020
23,216
191,629
219,918
72,563
164
52,877
35.00
12.20
11.60
15.00
11.80
15.15
20.00
19 Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Statistics Department, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka, p.66
37.2 3,958.9 i 4.2
38.8 1,897,629 5.4
-55.5 288,328 i -2.0
19.7 50,193 33.6
46.4 11,407.45 1.6
-53.8 161.24 -4.2
10.0 704.00 29.2
4.9 806.11 -4.3
-4.6 16.31 -6.6
-4.6 1,567,918 10.6
4.8 183,680 6.3
9.9 727,923 9.2
-85.6 53,902 199.1
2.2 24,274 4.6
12 206,929 8.0
-12.6 228,345 3.8
-11.0 78,443 8.1
-128 165 0.6
18.3 64,257 21.5
6.1 35.00
4.7 11.40 -6.6
4.0 10.70 -7.8
3.1 14.20 -5.3
34.1 9.50 -19.5
- -15.15
20.9 19.23 -3.9
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2.2.1 Energy Supply
The main sources used to provide energy needs in Sri Lanka are petroleum
products, fuelwood and other types of biomass, and hydro-electricity. The relative
proportions of these sectors are summarized in the table below:
Table 2.1220
Fuelwood and other biomass resources 4.642 70.92
Petroleum products 1.230 18.79
Hydro-electricity 0.672 10.27
Coal and coal products 0.001 0.02
Total 6.545 100.00
Fuelwood and other biomass resources
According to national sources, 70% (about 5 million tons of oil equivalent) of the
island's total energy is provided by firewood, agricultural residues and animal waste
mostly for household use21 . The biggest share of the biomass (inclusive of fuelwood)
usage is in the domestic sector (83%), and the industrial sector uses most of the balance
(17%). Sri Lanka has no coal, and its only indigenous energy source, apart from
firewood and biological sources, is hydropower.
Petroleum products
Oil, all of which is imported, though much of it is refined domestically, is the
largest source of commercial energy supply. However, the country's hydroelectric
generating capacity has expanded in recent years, and hydropower accounted for 29%
of commercial needs in 1990. Oil imports accounted for 7.7% of total imports in 199322.
20 Perera, K.K.Y.W, Energy Status in Sri Lanka: Issues, Policy and Suggestions, Institute of Policy Studies
(Colombo, Sri Lanka: March 1992), p.5
21 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.24
22 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.24
Hydro-electricity
Sri Lanka's electricity sector, (and hydro-electricity in particular) will be
discussed in the next chapter.
2.2.2 Energy Demand
Energy demand in Sri Lanka can be divided into the following sectors: (1)
industry and agro-industry; (2) transport; (3) household and agriculture; (4) and
government, commercial, and others.
(1) Industry and Agro-industry
The industrial sector accounts for more than 50% of the electricity, about 33% of
the petroleum, and about 25% of the fuelwood used in the country. In 1990, eighteen
large organizations in the public sector accounted for more than 35% of total electricity
sales, while 10 large companies accounted for over half of the sector's petroleum
consumption. Fuelwood remains an important source of energy for agro-industry in
rural areas23.
(2) Transport
The transport sector which depends entirely on petroleum products for energy,
accounts for more than half of the total demand for these products. Diesel, the
predominant transport fuel, contributed toward 75% of total petroleum sales. This
figure reflects the extensive public transport network, and the government policy of
pricing diesel well below gasoline. As a result of the latter price differential, the
proportion of diesel car registration rose dramatically. To reverse this trend, the
23 Munasinghe, Mohan, Energy Analysis and Policy, Butterworth and Co (Publishers) Ltd. (Cornwall,
United Kingdom: 1990), pp.78-79
government raised the price of diesel to 60% the price of gasoline in 1980, and increased
the license fees of diesel cars to three times that of gasoline cars24.
(3) Household and Agriculture
While Sri Lanka's per capita energy consumption of 0.1 tons of oil equivalent
(toe) per capita 25 is low by international standards, and most households use energy
only for cooking and lighting, the energy requirements in the household sector account
for nearly half of the country's primary energy consumption. The bulk of household
energy requirements are still met by fuelwood. Only 13% of households have access to
electricity, and the consumption of kerosene, which is mainly used for lighting, has
been declining over the past decade in response to increasing prices26. The demand for
energy in the household/agricultural sector will continue to grow with the increase in
population and the rising standards of living.
(4) Government, Commercial, and Others
This sector consumes about 1% of the total demand of energy in the economy.
2.2.3 Energy Policy
Government Agencies Responsible for Energy Policy
The broad energy sector falls under the jurisdiction of several government
agencies and corporations.
The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), a statutory corporation under the Ministry
of Power and Energy, is responsible for all aspects of electric power from investment to
distribution. The Mahaweli Ministry, and its subsidiary body, the Mahaweli Authority
24 Munasinghe, Mohan, Energy Analysis and Policy, pp.78-79
25 International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics and Balances of Non-OECD Countries 1989-1990, p.251
26 Munasinghe, Mohan, Energy Analysis and Policy, pp.78-79
(MA), also have some responsibility in electricity generation, especially in the case of
hydroelectric power.
The Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC), under the Ministry of Industries and
Scientific Affairs, is responsible for the nation's petroleum supply. Until 1993 the CPC
was the state oil company responsible for importing, refining, and distributing all
petroleum products except liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), which is marketed by
Colombo Gas and Water Company (also state-owned). In 1993 certain marketing and
distribution activities of CPC were privatized, and in 1994 a 51% stake in its lubricants
subsidiary was sold 27.
Fuelwood is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Land and Land
Development and its subsidiary body, the Forest Department (FD). The Natural
Resources, Energy and Science Authority (NARESA) is responsible for "overall science
and energy policy and research and development " 28.
Until mid-1982 inadequate coordination among the various ministries and
agencies involved in different energy subsectors was a major barrier to effective
integrated energy planning. Recognizing this problem, the government established an
effective organizational framework for overall energy coordination and integrated
national energy planning during the period 1982-1984. In 1982 President Jayawardene
set up an Energy Coordinating Team (ECT), under a senior energy advisor. Its objective
was to coordinate and facilitate the work of relevant ministries and existing agencies,
prevent duplication of effort, supplement weak or neglected areas in the energy sector,
and provide direct advisory inputs to the President.
27 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.24
28 Munasinghe, Mohan, Energy Analysis and Policy p. 79
Recent Government Initiatives in the Energy Sector
Under the leadership of the ECT, a number of urgently needed steps were taken.
These included the preparing of a national energy strategy (NES), and implementing
programs such as the national energy demand management and conservation program
(NEDMCP) and the national fuelwood conservation program (NFCP).
The government has taken some measures to diversify its sources of power
generation because with the completion of the Mahaweli project much of the country's
potential hydroelectric capacity has been tapped. To meet increasing demand, the
government has decided to turn to coal, and an agreement has been reached to build Sri
Lanka's first coal power plant at Trincomalee, in the Eastern Province. A Canadian
consortium is supplying the plant which will generate 300 MW of power an year, on a
build-operate-transfer basis. Several diesel plants are also planned. More details about
this process will be provided in subsequent chapters. In addition, the CPC is also
currently implementing a major development project to increase the output of diesel,
bitumen, and LPG, as well as to increase its storage capacity. The search for oil
continues at a low level; two new exploration contracts were signed in 1990 and 1991.
Energy Policy Guidelines
A draft of Energy Policy Guidelines was initially prepared by the Ministry of
Power and Energy during 1984. This was thereafter studied by NARESA and submitted
with slight modifications to the President in 1985. The finally approved policy
guidelines are as follows:
1. Providing the basic human energy needs.
2. Choosing the optimum mix of energy resources to meet energy requirements at the
minimum cost to the national economy.
3. Optimizing of available energy resources (hydro-electricity, biomass, solar, wind
and petroleum) to promote socio-economic development.
4. Conserving energy resources and eliminating wasteful consumption in the
production of energy and the use of energy.
5. Developing and managing forest and non-forest wood fuel resources.
6. Reducing dependence on foreign energy resources and diversifying the sources of
energy imports.
7. Adopting a pricing policy which enables the financing of energy sector
development.
8. Ensuring continuity of energy supply and price stability.
9. Establishing the capability to develop and manage the energy sector.
2.2.4 Policy Recommendations
Given Sri Lanka's precarious balance of payments position, its absence of fossil
fuels, and the critical fuelwood situation, many measures should to be taken to
revitalize its energy sector. Indeed, in several areas, useful policy initiatives have
already been launched. Increasing the efficiency of energy use, pricing energy more
efficiently, and reducing the country's vulnerability to energy shocks are among the
main policy goals which should be further pursued 29.
Increasing the Efficiency of Energy Use
Sri Lanka lacks indigenous fossil resources, and for the next few decades the bulk
of its incremental energy must come from imported fossil fuels. Without a sustained
effort to maximize the efficiency of fossil fuel use, the country's development objectives
will inevitably be compromised. Furthermore, available domestic resources must be
utilized more effectively. The bulk of the population still depends on fuelwood for basic
energy needs, and inefficient use of this resource will result in catastrophic long-term
29 Munasinghe, Mohan, Energy Analysis and Policy, p. 84
consequences. Therefore, the national energy demand and conservation program (for
commercial fuels), and the national fuelwood conservation program (for improved
domestic cooking stoves), must be expanded rapidly and pursued vigorously by the
relevant task forces.
Efficient Pricing
Recent changes in both electricity and oil prices have brought average
commercial fuel prices close to economically-efficient levels. These favorable trends
must be maintained to ensure good demand management. While average prices are
reasonable, some petroleum product prices need to be further revised. The price of
kerosene and diesel fuel relative to that of gasoline, for example, should be changed.
Reducing the Vulnerability to External Shocks
Over the past decade Sri Lanka has experienced numerous external shocks which
have affected both the energy sector and the economy as a whole. These include the two
oil shocks of the 1970s and the 1983-1984 drought. In order to reduce this vulnerability,
the government should diversify both the type and source of energy by measures such
as purchasing petroleum products and crude oil from a variety of sources and exploring
alternative domestic sources of electricity generation. The renewable technologies
which were discussed earlier are particularly important in this context.
2.2.5 Outlook for the Future
On the whole, the prospects for Sri Lanka to provide for its growing energy
needs are favorable. The many far-sighted government programs and policies of the
1980s have put the nation on a path toward achieving this goal. It is important,
however, that these initiatives be continued by successive regimes, and that the political
process does not hinder careful planning in the energy sector.
As the country develops, the mix of energy use will gradually change. The
fuelwood component is expected to become less important while the consumption of
more versatile, efficient sources such as electricity will increase dramatically. In
subsequent chapters I will explore the structure and future requirements of this
important sector: so vital to Sri Lanka's transition to a middle-income economy.
CHAPTER 3
Sri Lanka's Power Sector
Sri Lanka's electricity demand increased rapidly in the 1980s as a result of the
growth introduced by the government's economic liberalization policies. The
country's projected economic and social development and the rapid growth of its
industrial sector will place additional demands on its power sector. The adequate
provision of this vital infrastructure service has become a major challenge for the
new People's Alliance government as it charts the development course of the nation.
3.1 The Evolution of Sri Lanka's Power Sector
Sri Lanka's electric power sector was initially a mix of private and municipal
generating systems with localized distribution networks operating in isolation. The
gradual development of a national grid and the construction of large hydroelectric
power stations led to the centralized ownership and management of the system by a
single utility by the 1950s.
Initially, the national generation and transmission system, together with some
of the distribution networks, were owned and operated by the Department of
Government Electrical Undertakings (DGEU). The DGEU was transformed into the
Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) in 1969. However, until about 1984, the distribution
of electricity in most local authority (City and Village Councils) areas was owned
and managed by the respective councils. There were over 200 such bulk purchasers
from the CEB for retail sales, mostly to households'.
'Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 1, Institute of
Policy Studies (Colombo, Sri Lanka: December 1994), pp.1-4
Since 1969, the CEB has continued to further develop the distribution
network, expanding into areas which were not covered by the local authority
networks. By 1982, nearly 70% of the nation's electricity was sold directly by the
CEB. The distribution networks managed by the local authorities became
increasingly outdated, with the rapid expansion of population and increased
commercial activity in urban areas. Furthermore, most of the local systems were
poorly managed, and hence resulted in loss of revenue to both the councils and the
CEB. The technical performance of most of the networks were also well below
national standards, and were plagued with problems such as poor voltage
regulation, excessive energy losses, and poor reliability. All major towns were
supplied by such local authority networks except Colombo, which had been
transferred to the CEB several decades ago.
In 1983, the government formed the Lanka Electricity Company (LECO),
jointly owned by the CEB and the Urban Development Authority (UDA), with the
objective of transferring ownership of distribution networks from the local
authorities to this new company. Both CEB and LECO acquired the local authority
networks according to an agreed program; by 1993 LECO had acquired 30 local
authority networks while the CEB took over the remainder. Except for the city of
Kandy, the town of Beruwela, and the councils in the North and East, all other
networks had been taken over by 1993. LECO concentrated on the councils in the
more populous coastal areas of the Western and Southern Provinces, while the CEB
was entrusted with the remaining networks, mostly in the interior of the country.
The generation and transmission system continued to be developed, owned,
and operated by the CEB. Currently, the share of electricity directly sold by the CEB
exceeds 80%2. The networks taken over by both LECO and CEB have mostly been
rehabilitated with loan facilities from the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
3.2 Multi-Purpose Irrigation and Power Generating Schemes
A large proportion of Sri Lanka's hydroelectric resources have been
developed as part of large multi-purpose projects which provide not only irrigation
and power, but facilities for inland fishery, industry, and tourism. At present, there
are three such projects: the Gal Oya Scheme, the Uda Walawe Reservoir Project, and
the Mahaweli Development Program3 .
The third of these projects, which is constructed on the Mahaweli river (the
longest river in the island), is by far the most ambitious multi-purpose irrigation
development project undertaken by the government. Originally, it was to be
completed over a period of 30 years. But, in 1977, the government decided to
accelerate the Development Program and implement as much of it as possible
during a six year period. The "Accelerated Mahaweli Program" (AMP) as it came to
be called, is based on the master plan jointly prepared by UNDP/FAO, and local
authorities. The AMP was started in 1977 with financial assistance from friendly
donor countries, such as the UK and Canada, and consists of the following major
projects: Maduru Oya, Victoria, Kotmale, and Randenigala and Rantambe. Reservoir
parameters of the specific projects are given in Appendix 1.
The AMP provided irrigation facilities to 265,000 hectares of new land,
improved irrigation facilities to 100,000 hectares of existing land, produced an
energy output of 2032 GWh annually, and increased the installed capacity by 660
2 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 1, pp. 1-4
3 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: An Economic, Financial and Investment Guide, p.64
MW. With these developments, installed hydro capacity was more than doubled
while land under irrigation was increased by more than 70% 4 .
3.3 The Present Power Generating System
The electricity generating system in Sri Lanka has rapidly developed since the
implementation of the Kelani River hydroelectric system in the 1950s. Presently,
there are 15 grid-connected hydroelectric generating stations and 3 medium sized
thermal generating stations in operation. Hydroelectric potential in the three major
rivers - Mahaweli, Kelani, and Walawe - for the most part has been developed, but
more potential remains on those rivers as well as on the other major river basins.
The total generating capacity is 1410 MW and the expected generation from
the combined hydro-thermal system is 4364 GWh/yr. In this estimate, the
generation figures for hydro are calculated assuming average hydrological (rainfall)
conditions, while thermal plants have been assumed to operate under the maximum
possible number of hours, allowing sufficient time for maintenance and unplanned
outages. Electricity demand in the year 1994 was 4363 GWh and the maximum
demand was 911 MW. Thus, the present generating system has an apparent excess
capacity of 474 MW and 1053 GWh/yr of energy5.
Yet, the apparent excess capacity and energy are of little significance for a
predominantly hydroelectric generating system like that of Sri Lanka, because there
are seasonal variations of hydro availability and restrictions in water releases owing
to irrigation demands. If the wettest year in recent history (1971) occurs again, the
system should provide 4500 GWh/yr; if the driest year (1983) occurs again, hydro
energy will only be 2545 GWh/yr6. The overriding operating constraint on the
4 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: An Economic, Financial and Investment Guide, p.64
5 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, Institute of
Policy Studies (Colombo, Sri Lanka: December 1994), p.3
6 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, p.6
system is minimizing thermal electricity generation, which increases operating costs
and complicates the planning process.
Table 3.1
Existing Generating Stations7
2. Wimalasurendra
3. Polpitiva
4. New Laxapana
5. Canyon
SUB TOTAL
6. Ukuwela
7. Bowatenna
8. Victoria
9. Kotmale
10. Randenigala
11. Rantambe
SUB TOTAL
12. Inginiyagala
13. Uda Walawe
14. Nilambe
SUB TOTAL
15. Samanalawewa
SUB TOTAL
16. Kelenitissa Steam
17. Kelenitissa Gas
Turbine
18. Sapugaskande diesel
SUB TOTAL
TOTAL
Kelani
Kelani
Kelani
Kelani
Kelani
Mahaweli
Mahaweli/Sudu Ganga
Mahaweli
Mahaweli
Mahaweli
Mahaweli
Mahaweli
Irrigation Reservoir
Irrigation Reservoir
Mahaweli
Small Hydro
Walawe
All Hydro
Furnace Oil
Heavy Diesel
Residual Oil
All Thermal
All Stations
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1958
1965
1969
1974
1983
1988
1976
1981
1984-86
1985-88
1986
1990
1963
1969
1988
1993
1962-63
1980-82
1984
25
50
75
100
30
30
335
38
40
210
201
122
49
660
11
6
3
20
120
1135
50
120
80
250
1385
289
112
427
491
161
1480
177
53
726
482
378
216
2032
27
8
12
47
357
3916
312
749
439
1500
5416
A
I
3.4 Electricity Output and Consumption
The following tables indicate how electricity is generated and consumed in
Sri Lanka. The first table gives the hydroelectric and thermal components of power
generation in the Sri Lankan system. The second one gives an indication of how this
power is consumed among the various sectors. More details about these issues are
given in the charts and tables after the appendices, where the actual figures are
tabulated, and the data are presented graphically.
Table 3.2
rr "e 1 mr'l~
Hydro and 
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of the Sri 
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*
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Installed Capacity (MW)
Hydroelectric
Thermal
Power Generated (GWh)
Table 3.3
Power Sold (GWh)
Domestic
Commercial
Industrial
Local Authorities
Street Lighting
8 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.25
9 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.25
1,241
968
272
2,858
1,290
1,017
272
3,149
1,290
1,017
272
3,377
1,410
1,137
272
3,540
1,410
1,137
272
3,979
1,410
1,137
272
4,364
2,347
421
441
844
624
17
2,608
514
509
910
657
18
2,742
644
547
958
572
22
2,916
704
581
1,058
545
29
3,270
826
641
1,223
536
43
3,582
933
593
1,404
612
40
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3.5 Characteristics of the System
Technical
The technical characteristics of the Sri Lanka power generating system and
their expected patterns of change are of primary concern to both system planners
and private developers.
Reserve Margin
This factor, which indicates the extra megawatt capacity available in the
power generating system after meeting the maximum demand of the consumers,
was 74.1% in 1993. It is usual for a predominantly hydroelectric system to have a
high reserve margin because the generator megawatt rating usually caters to
between 2 to 3 times the average river flow.
For a predominantly hydroelectric system like that of Sri Lanka, the reserve
margin does not convey any idea about the reliability of the generating system. This
is because the generating system is energy (fuel)-constrained and not capacity-
constrained. This situation will change and the reserve margin will drop steadily in
the future as the Sri Lankan system moves towards the mixed hydro-thermal
system, which is expected in the future. The reserve margin is expected to drop from
74% in 1993 to 18% in 2006, when thermal sources will account for about 52% of
generation 1O.
Spinning Reserve
The spinning reserve is the additional capacity of generation available to be
immediately loaded if the system demand suddenly increases, or if one or more
generators trip out due to a malfunction. In Sri Lanka's generating system, the
10 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, p.20
spinning reserve is usually kept at a low level because of the high proportion of
hydro generators, which can be started at very short notice in the event of an
unexpected shortfall. By contrast, countries that have a predominantly thermal
system where coal, oil, or nuclear plants carry the base load, usually maintain a
higher spinning reserve, of the order of about 15%, because large thermal generating
plants require longer start-up times".
It is expensive to maintain spinning reserve because the generators which not
fully loaded (because of this requirement) usually operate at poor efficiency levels.
System Stability
Unlike most other energy sources, such as petroleum products, electricity
cannot be stored in large quantities. However, consumers require electrical energy at
a flip of a switch. Since electricity must be generated at the same moment it is
needed, this requires that the electrical energy system always be in dynamic
equilibrium. In other words, the energy input to the system in the form of water at
high elevation, and as fuel fed into thermal stations, should be exactly equal to the
energy demand of all consumers at that instant plus all energy losses (in the
conversion, transmission and distribution systems).
If the demand on power stations is too high, their generators will accelerate
beyond their safe limits, and their automatic protection systems will trip them out of
the system to prevent damage. This response causes a further deficit in generation,
placing heavy demand on the remaining generators in the system. Unless there is
excess capacity and enough fuel (especially water), this process may even lead to a
total system blackout.
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For the system stability to be maintained in such emergency situations, it is
desirable that no single generator carries a disproportionate share of the system
load. A rule of thumb used in the industry (in Sri Lanka), specifies that no single
generator should deliver more than 10% of the load (although more rigorous
methods are available to determine this factor more accurately). In the present Sri
Lankan system the largest single generating station is the 70 MW one at Victoria.
Since the system demand varies between 350 MW and 911 MW, if Victoria operates
at peak time, it is within the 10% limit, but it would violate this rule during off-peak
hours12. Although adherence to the 10% limit throughout the day will yield higher
reliability levels, unfortunately, these system dynamic stability considerations do
not always coincide with the economics of power generation. For example, it would
be economical to add a coal-fired generator of 150 MW in the year 2000, when the
system's peak demand is expected to be only 1371 MW, although this will cause the
10% rule to be violated all the time, throughout the day' 3.
The relative locations of the generating plants and the load centers are also
important for stability. A large generator, feeding the load center through a long
transmission line, is generally not favored because long overhead transmission
systems are more liable to be affected by lightening, birds, and sabotage, than are
shorter ones.
12 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, p.23
13 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, p.2 3
Energy Losses in Transmission and Distribution
The following table indicates the huge energy losses in the Sri Lankan system
despite efforts made to reduce them.
Losses in T&D (GWh) 374.7 391.4 409.3 441.3 414.2 505.9 541.6
Losses as a percentage of generation 16.6 15.8 15.4 16.3 14.8 17.7 17.2
3.6 Electricity Tariffs
Electricity tariffs were revised by the CEB on two occasions in 1994. In
February, tariff rates applicable to the domestic category were raised within a range
of 1 percent to 183 percent, depending on the level of consumption. Tariffs in other
categories rose by about 30 percent. However, in May 1994, the tariff rate on the first
100 units in respect to the domestic category was brought down to the level that
prevailed in July 1993, reducing the rates by a range of 29 percent to 65 percent.
Consequent to these tariff revisions, the average tariff rate per unit increased by 39
percent to Rs. 3.68 in 1994, from Rs. 2.64 in 1993. The revised electricity rates and the
previous rates are shown in Table 3.5.
14 Perera, K.K.Y.W, Energy Status in Sri Lanka: Issues, Policy and Suggestions, p.162
Table 3.515
Domestic Purposes
Units 0-10
11-50
51-100
101-450
>450
Industrial Activities
Small
Medium
Large
General Purposes
Small
Medium
Large
Hotels
Small
Medium
Large
0.60
1.20
2.40
3.90
5.20
3.05
2.90
2.80
4.05
4.00
3.85
4.05
4.00
3.85
1.70 (0-60 units)
4.40 (61-180 units)
5.25 (>180 units)
4.00
3.80
3.65
5.30
5.20
5.00
Same as before
0.60 (0-10 units)
1.20 (11-50 units)
2.40 (51-100 units)
4.40 (101-180 units)
5.25 (> 180 units)
4.00
3.80
3.65
5.30
5.20
5.00
Same as before
Note:
Small: Supply of electricity at 400/230 volts and contract demand is less than 50KVA.
Medium: Supply of electricity at 400/230 volts and contract demand is equal or more than
50KVA
Large: Supply of electricity at 11KV, 33KV and 132 KV
Time of Day Tariff is applicable only to the industrial and hotel categories. Peak rates and off-
peak rates were revised upward by 30-31 percent. From February, 1994 onwards the industrial sector
tariff is applicable to hotels
5 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 1994, (Colombo, Sri Lanka: April 1995), p.67
Pricing Distortions
The many cross subsidies and other pricing distortions in the system are
important to both CEB planners and potential independent power producers. Some
of these include 16:
(a) Cross subsidies between households in low and high consumer groups. This is
equivalent to a cross subsidy between the interior provinces which have a high share
of lower bracket consumers and the western coastal belt which has more affluent
customers.
(b) The highly dispersed nature of household consumers in the interior provinces
causes higher network losses and maintenance costs thus adding to the total cost of
providing electricity to these areas.
(c) Low-consuming households demand electricity at the peak hours of 6-8 p.m., at
which time the generating cost is highest, a further reason supplying power to them
is extremely expensive.
(d) The irrational tariff policy of the CEB has also distorted the price of electricity.
(e) Finally, the lack of true decentralization of the existing system, as well as the lack
of clear identification of transfer prices from generation and transmission to the
provinces has made it difficult for the CEB to make proper estimates of the costs
effectiveness of various portions of the network.
3.7 Expected Demand Growth
The average annual demand growth for the 20-year period from 1972 to 1992
was 6.8% per year. However, this figure includes periods of relatively high growth
(8% per year from 1978-83) and those of low growth (4% per year from 1972-77).
This irregular demand pattern has various economic, social, and political causes, but
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it can be attributed mainly to the changing structure of demand (among regions)
and to changes in energy intensities within the different sectors of the economy.
The expected future growth of electricity is extremely difficult to predict.
While econometric and time trend analyses are useful for the overall development of
the forecast, they ignore many important but unpredictable factors (such as radical
government policy changes, and developments in the global economy), which may
drastically affect the results. In 1994 the forecast which the CEB used for its
investment planning work predicted an annual average electricity demand growth
rate of 7.9% in the long term (20 years). It also estimated that the energy losses in the
transmission and distribution system, which are presently about 18% of generation,
would be reduced to 12% by 2004, and the system load factor (the technical
parameter specifying the ratio between the maximum load and the average load)
would improve from the present value of 56% to 58% by the year 200517.
General Planning Methodology
Sri Lanka's predominantly hydroelectric system is difficult to model because
irrigation demands usually have priority over generation, and the country has a
highly variable rainfall pattern.
Extensive work has been done in the past under various Mahaweli projects,
and the CEB's own regular planning studies, to develop and refine the modeling of
the cascaded reservoir/power station network, irrigation diversions/releases and
the integrated operation of the hydroelectric system with the backup thermal
generating system. This modeling process is then used to minimize the combined
cost of operating the existing thermal generating plants and investing in and
operating new generating plants. Therefore, the planning process adopted is
17 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, p.6
designed to meet a specified future demand for electricity at a given reliability level
(subject to the constraints of plant construction times and other technical limitations)
at minimum cost.
This process differs from a traditional cost-benefit analysis because its aim is
to meet the demand for electricity at any cost, subject to declared reliability levels.
Sensitivity of demand to cost of electricihy is analyzed outside the planning models,
and these studies are conducted with a given set of information about plant capital
costs and fuel price forecasts 18.
"8 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, p.7
Table 3.619
Results of CEB's Generation Expansion Planning Studies 1993
Kukule 70 MW
Upper Kotmale 123 MW
Gin Ganga 49 MW
Gas Turbine 66 MW
Diesel 40 MW (Ext)
Diesel 110 MW
Diesel 40 MW
Coal Trance Unit 1: 150 MW
Coal Trinco Unit 2: 150 MW
Refurbished GT 3x20 MW
Refurbished GT 3x20 MW
Coal Trinco Unit 1:300 MW
Gas Turbine 22 MW
Coal Trinco Unit 2:300 MW
Gas Turbine 22 MW
KPS Oil Steam 2x22
MW
Gas Turbine 3x18 MW
(for refurbishment)
Gas Turbine 3x18 MW
(for refurbishment)
Sapu Diesel 2x16 MW
Saou Diesel 2x16 MW
Total PV cost up to 2013 = US$ 1598.2 million (Rs. 76,711.9 million)
Long term average generation cost = 6.03 US cts./kWh (2.89 Rs./kWh)
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1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
5.678
8.182
4.444
0.726
1.794
3.302
3.025
1.890
1.659
4.6958
0.418
4.045
1.069
3.253
3.8 The Future Generating System
The previous table shows the August 1993 least-cost generation expansion
plan of the CEB. The immediate and medium-term new plant requirements are
expected to be met with diesel generating plants, and 110 MW of diesel as well as 66
MW of gas turbine generating capacity will be added before the year 2000. Kukule is
the only feasible hydroelectric project slated for commissioning before the turn of
the century. If hydroelectric plants are delayed, other thermal plants would be
required. A coal plant at Trincomalee is an economically- and technically-feasible
generating option scheduled to be added to the system by 2001. Unfortunately, since
financing for the plant has not yet been finalized, it will not be available on schedule
given its minimum required construction time of four years.
The figure on the previous page shows the expected hydro-thermal share in
the generating system of the future. Uncertainties regarding the plant mix before the
year 2000 may alter slightly the pattern of relative shares shown in the diagram.
However, it is extremely likely that the power generating system in Sri Lanka will
remain a predominantly hydroelectric system until at least the year 2005, when the
share of thermally-generated electricity exceeds 50% of the total. In the present
planning horizon of the CEB (until 2013), the hydro share in generation is expected
to drop to 29% twenty years hence, but will still be large enough to exert a
significant influence on the power supply system.
3.9 Investment Required in Power Generation
The CEB estimated capital costs for the new generation projects in its
generation expansion plan, and calculated that the country would require about US$
1100 million (in constant 1993 dollars) for investment in power generation between
1994 and 2000. The significant feature about these funds is that 70% will have to be
met with foreign exchange20.
The above costs are for power generating facilities alone. Further investment
will be required for transmission as well as distribution system development and
rehabilitation. Although I will not discuss these costs here, the CEB has stated that,
according to past experience, investment on new transmission and distribution
facilities have usually accounted for another 20-40% of the generating costs21.
3.9.1 Past Investments on Power Generation
Loans and grants from various agencies were the main source of finance for
power generation over the last two decades. The degree of participation of CEB in
project development and construction varied according to project type. In the case of
power projects developed under the Accelerated Mahaweli Scheme, generating
stations were handed over to the CEB after construction. However, the recently
completed Samanalawewa project was handled entirely by the CEB.
The costs of the projects (even when measured per installed unit of capacity)
varied significantly from each other as shown in the table below. This variance is not
unusual for hydroelectric projects, because of the vast differences between plant
location, reservoir size and capacity, and characteristics of the associated dams.
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Table 3.722
Ukuwela Hydro
Bowatenna Hydro
Victoria Hydro
Kotmale Hydro
Randenigala Hydro
Rantambe Hydro
Kelanitissa Gas Turbines
Sapugaskanda Diesel
Samanalawewa Hydro
1976
1981
1985-86
1988
1986
1990
1980-82
1984
1992
155
293
3306
4006
3500
5500
530
1066
16,516
Locally
OPEC, ADB
UK grant
Swedish grant and Comm.
Loan
Soft Loan
Germany
Local and Loans
IBRD
UK, Japan Loans
3.9.2 Cost to the Economy and the Power Sector
Funds for most of the projects have been secured at nominal interest rates -
in some instances as low as 0.75% per year. This factor and the generous grace
periods (typically 5 to 10 years before repayment) of many loans resulted in very
low costs to the national economy. The government of Sri Lanka has continued to
practice a policy of re-lending funds to the CEB at an interest rate of 10% per year23,
while international lending agencies, particularly the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, have continued to insist that the CEB yield an annual return of
8% on assets.
It is doubtful, however, that the CEB will continue to be able to obtain funds
for future projects at the above generous terms, because of a variety of reasons
which will be discussed in the next chapter.
22 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 2, p.14
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CHAPTER 4
Financing Future Investments
The means used to finance future investments in power generation will
depend on the organization and ownership of the power sector in the near future.
The new government elected in August 1994 promised to speed up the nation's
privatization program: and the power sector was one of the areas targeted for this
effort.
Since the government, however, is concentrating on addressing more
immediate problems such as the ongoing ethnic conflict, it has for the most part
neglected its election pledge. Although it has set up a Public Enterprise Reform
Commission (PERC) to restructure nine state companies and sell off a further ten, no
single major privatization initiative has yet been completed. While privatization
managers complain that the stock market is too flat to launch new state sell-offs,
brokers say the government's lack of economic initiatives, particularly regarding
privatization, has been a leading factor in depressing the stock market'.
The current uncertainty in the whole liberalization effort makes it difficult to
predict the outcome of future reforms in the Sri Lankan power sector. Therefore, I
will examine several possible ownership scenarios and discuss how the needed US$
1100 million could be financed under each of them.
1 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 4th Quarter 1995: Sri Lanka, Electronic Publishing
Services (London, United Kingdom: 1995), p.11
4.1 Possible Ways of Reforming the Sri Lankan Power Generating Sector
The potential for improving performance in power generation in Sri Lanka is
substantial. Yet, such amelioration will require three broad actions: applying
commercial principles to infrastructure operation, encouraging competition from
appropriately-regulated private sector providers, and increasing the involvement of
users and other stakeholders in planning, providing, and monitoring of services.
Four main options (which implement the above three actions to various degrees) are
available for restructuring the power sector:
(1) Public Ownership and Public Operation
(2) Public Ownership and Private Operation
(3) Private Ownership and Private Operation
(4) Community and User Provision
I will only discuss the first two of the above four options in detail because I
believe that the third and fourth will not be feasible in the Sri Lankan power
generating sector within the time frame I am considering. I will focus mainly on the
BOT method of privatization, when discussing "public ownership and private
operation," because BOT is feasible in Sri Lanka under certain conditions, and
because it is one of the main options currently being considered by the government.
More details about the general features of the four options are presented in
Appendix 2.
4.2 Public ownership and public operation
This option allows the present setup to continue with some minor changes. A
number of rapidly developing countries have retained a public ownership structure
with varying degrees of success. A case worth examining is the Republic of Korea,
which still manages all electricity supply through a single State-owned electricity
authority. A very high degree of autonomy, coupled with complete freedom in
decision-making has made the Korean Electric Power Co. (KEPCO) one of the most
successful state-owned electricity authorities in the world. It has also been able to
maintain electricity prices at very competitive rates, a factor which is deemed vital
for the rapid development of the its economy.
A similar model may be possible in Sri Lanka, but this would require
substantial changes to the current system. In Sri Lanka, the power sector has been
traditionally used to implement state policy, particularly rural electrification, largely
at the expense of the financial stability of the state-owned utility. Although some
electrification projects in Sri Lanka have been financed thorough ADB loans which
have been transferred to the CEB, the agency has poured more than Rs. 3000 million
(US$ 600 million) over the last 5 years into rural electrification because of direct
government requests, usually on an ad-hoc basis2.
If complete financial and operational freedom is granted to the CEB, it could,
theoretically, operate as a fully commercial concern; however, the government
would have to provide certain guarantees regarding concessionary financing
secured by the CEB from international agencies. This autonomy, coupled with the
implementation of financial accountability in the operating units of the CEB (by
mechanisms such as transfer prices), should enable the agency to offer electricity at
competitive prices to the consumers. In addition, the government should also
restructure electricity tariffs, which should be moved progressively from a subsidy-
oriented structure to a more market-oriented system.
Within this system, the government may, as done in other countries, continue
to oversee the electricity tariff issues, and it would remain the final authority making
informed decisions about the essential subsidies to be provided to specific groups of
consumers. It probably would have to establish a separate agency, however, to fulfill
2 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Ownership Issues: Part 1, p.7
specific state objectives such as providing electricity to most households by the year
2000.
4.2.1 How the Government Will Raise Funds
The raising and disbursement of US$ 1100 million between now and the year
2000 is undoubtedly a monumental task for policy makers, financiers, and for the
utility itself. In addition to the US$ 1100 million, there will be the required interest
payments during construction, cost escalation and inflation-factors which cannot
be forecast with much reliability for such a long period into the future.
Unfortunately, capital for such infrastructure development projects may no
longer be available in sufficient quantities from the traditional sources of financing
such as the international lending institutions, bi-lateral, and multi-lateral agencies as
there are increasing demands for scarce capital from the newly re-structured East
European economies and from newly liberalized economies such as Vietnam.
Therefore, a large proportion of the enormous investment in power, which will be
crucial for Sri Lanka's drive for industrialization and its declared social objective of
rural electrification by the year 2000- may have to be financed through non-
conventional, innovative mechanisms. If the current pattern of state ownership and
operation is continued, the government may be forced to obtain the required funds
directly from international capital markets.
Tapping International Capital Markets
Several channels exist for tapping international capital markets. The larger
private utilities in developing countries have direct access to debt and equity
markets. In October 1993, for example, Telecom Argentina placed much of its US$
500 million, seven-year bond issue with US and Asian investors; and Argentina's
Telefonika has also used bond market placements to raise expansion funds3.
Such foreign direct investment opens another route into international equity
markets. General Electric Corporation, an international conglomerate, has an active
interest in promoting infrastructure projects within developing countries. Its
subsidiary, the General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC), issues securities on US
and European markets and invests the funds in selected projects. GECC has
participated as an equity investor, for instance, in the Northern Mindanao power
project-a 108 MW diesel power project in the Philippines. Backed by the group's
total operations, the placement of securities issued by GECC is easier than it would
be for developing nations or private groups who try to do so independently.
An instrument widely used to tap resources in the US capital market is the
American depository receipt (ADR). ADRs are certificates of deposit that enable
foreign companies to raise equity on US markets without the need for a listing on a
US stock exchange and without complex settlement and transfer mechanisms. They
are issued by a US depository bank, and the underlying shares of the company are
held in trust by a custodian bank in the home country. In 1990 Compania de
Telefonos de Chile (CTC) raised US$ 92 million on the New York Stock Exchange
through an issue of equity in the form of ADRs - the first major equity issue from
Latin America in three decades4 .
3 World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, p.93
4 World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, p.93
In April 1990 the US Securities and Exchange Commission approved rule
144a, facilitating private placement of securities, including those placed as ADRs.
Before then, privately-placed securities held by qualified buyers (institutions that
manage assets worth at least US$ 100 million) could be traded only after a two- or
three-year holding period. Rule 144a allows trading to occur immediately, provided
that the new buyer is also qualified. Moreover, after three years the securities can be
sold to all buyers. Rule 144a was used in 1992 to enable a US$ 207.5 million
international bond issue for the Mexican City-Tolcua Toll Road5. Since then, other
Mexican toll roads and the Subic Bay power plant in the Philippines have raised
funds using rule 144a. Therefore, this revision of US securities law has given
governments of developing nations another way to raise badly needed capital for
infrastructure development.
There are many other private sources of funds available to developing
country governments for financing their infrastructure needs. Some of these are
presented in Table 4.1:
s World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, p.93
Table 4.16
investments V
investments
AIG Asian
Infrastructure Fund
Asian Infrastructure
Fund
Inter-privatization
fund
Cons. Electric Power
Asia Ltd.
1.2
1.0
6.0
1.8
% .. L jJL#LL L YW e jJ., ý A = .ý
Management International Finance
Corp.
American International Group Inc.,
Singapore's Temasek Holdings Ltd.,
Government of Singapore's
Investment Corp.
Peregrine Investments Holdings,
George Soros, Frank Russell Co.,
International Finance Corp., Asian
Development Bank
Lehman Brothers, KPMG and
Russian Partners
Public Listed Company in Hong Kong
projects
Invests in all types of
infrastructure
Invests in all
infrastructure sectors
throughout Asia
Infrastructure in the
Soviet Bloc
Power stations in Asia
4.2.2 Limits to Government Finance
The main advantage of state infrastructure provision is that in most
countries the government is the most creditworthy entity and is able to borrow at
the lowest rates, making possible projects that might not otherwise be financially
viable. Balanced against this advantage has been the difficulty of maintaining
accountability (because of the endemic corruption and wastage in the public sectors
of many developing nations), leading often to high costs of provision to the
consumer. The World Bank gives the following example to illustrate the
countervailing benefits and costs of state-sponsored infrastructure provision:
For a power generation plant, with construction costs accounting for 70% of all costs and
a 10% interest rate, construction cost overruns of 20% and delays in construction of two years
6 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach. p.47
each lead to a 15% increase in unit costs of power produced. The track record for publicly sponsored
projects shows that such cost overruns and time delays are common, leading to a cumulative cost
increase of about 35%. Compare this with an interest rate advantage for government, which can
borrow at, for example, 10% rather than 13% available to private investors. This 3 percentage-point
advantage translates into a cost reduction of 20%. In other words, it would take almost a 6
percentage-point interest rate advantage to negate the inefficiencies described 7.
Consumers would undoubtedly benefit if it were possible to combine low
interest rates and efficient provision. But the goal of a free lunch may be illusory.
Even credit-worthy governments cannot borrow unlimited amounts at low cost,
because governments' cost of raising funds rise with the level of borrowing - high
levels of borrowing at a particular time increase debt levels and limit the amount
that can be borrowed later, thereby reducing government liquidity. These are
further reasons why governments may be well-advised to entrust to private
sponsorship those infrastructure investments that can be undertaken by private
entrepreneurs.
4.3 Private Sector Participation in the Power Sector
The severe budgetary problems many governments in developing nations are
faced with, has increasingly led them to turn to the private sector for infrastructure
provision. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the electricity generating
sectors of many countries.
According to the World Bank8, the potential for competition in the power
sector is greatest for thermal generation and distribution, because these activities can
be unbundled from existing vertically- integrated power utilities and operated
under concession. However, in virtually all countries, large-scale hydroelectric
generation (because of unique environmental and risk features) is likely to remain
publicly owned but can be operated on commercial principles -for example under
management contracts. Small scale hydro-electric projects can be privately owned.
7 World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, p.91
8 World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, p.116
Sector policies that take advantage of opportunities for competition in the
generation of power can improve efficiency and lower costs. Concessions are an
established means of increasing sectoral efficiency. In order to foster competition,
the government must ensure that all private power producers have access to the
national grid. The entire system should be coordinated by a network manager, to
ensure system-wide efficiency.
Institutional change is needed to provide incentives for suppliers to seek
economic tariffs, which are necessary to promote the self-financing of investment,
conservation of energy, and more efficient use of existing capacity. Tariffs must also
incorporate any environmental charges paid by power companies, in line with the
principle that the polluter pays for any environmental costs it imposes on society.
These necessary institutional reforms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
4.3.1 Modes of Private Sector Participation
Various modes of private power generation have been adopted or proposed
in nations around the globe. In the USA, electric power utilities are privately owned
and are supervised by a state regulatory agency with wide-ranging powers. The
large British utility - the Central Electricity Generating Board - has been privatized,
and it now operates in the form of two power generating utilities. One company
manages the national transmission grid, while the state still operates and owns the
nuclear power generating stations. In the developing world too, fully private
utilities exist in countries such as the Philippines, while more recently, faster
growing economies such as Malaysia, have privatized their once state-owned
electricity boards.
In some power generating systems that are fully privately owned, short term
bidding is now being practiced, typically for the day ahead. In the UK, the National
Grid Company prepares the load forecast for the day ahead and accepts offers from
Generating Companies and from other installations with large generating capacities
to supply the predicted load. The generating projects themselves operate on a free-
market basis, where, in most cases, the private developer meets the full cost of the
project and assumes most of the risks.
It is often argued that such mechanisms are not yet appropriate for
developing countries where the perceived risks are higher and therefore the
expected returns are insufficient for project viability. More specifically, abrupt
changes in government policies, excessive taxation, nationalization, and poor overall
performance of some of these economies, add to the risks of private developers.
Moreover, many developing countries still restrict direct foreign investment in the
development of infrastructure and utilities. Hence, most attention is currently
directed toward private-public partnership in the development of the infrastructure,
which results in the sharing of risks, responsibility, and reward between the
developer and the utility (or the state).
4.3.2 Pros and Cons of Privatization
Privatization is a policy decision which has wide repercussions on the
political and social arena. The pros and cons of this process may be viewed
differently by different entities. The advantages and disadvantages of privatization
according to both the government, and the general public, are presented in this
section.
Government Viewpoint9
Advantages
a) It can relieve the financial and administrative burden of the government in
constructing and maintaining the much needed infrastructure.
b) The introduction of commercial discipline and possibly, competition, the
economic efficiency and productivity of the projects are enhanced.
c) A vigorous cost benefit analysis and viability study will usually be carried out by
the private sector to ensure profitability. Positive results add justification to the
need for the facilities, whereas poor response from the private sector reflects an
uncertain demand for the proposed facilities.
d) A shorter time for realizing the completion facilities is more probable as early
income is desired by the private sector,
e) The public sector establishment size can be reduced, as the expertise of the
private sector can be utilized
f) Economic growth can usually be expected to accelerate, because privatization
stimulates private entreprenuership and investment,
g) Some of the risks of finance, construction, and operation are transferred to the
private sector.
Disadvantages
a) There is trade-off in allowing the private sector to operate facilities and receive
income since long-term revenue to the government is reduced or postponed in
return for reduced risk taking.
b) The traditional state control of infrastructure is diluted, with a possibility of the
government monopoly position being shifted to the private sector. An effective
legal framework is, therefore, necessary to protect the public interest.
c) The quality of products produced or services rendered may be difficult to
guarantee. This potential drawback can be mitigated by competent monitoring of
9 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.188
the private sector's work. Usually, users of facilities have a certain power of
influence over the quality standards, especially if cheaper alternatives exist.
d) The imposition of toll charges on previously free facilities may bring about
public objection, which may be politically undesirable.
e) In order to attract investment, governments may have to provide incentives in
the form of relaxation of taxation requirements and similar measures which may
violate the consistency of established policy. Relaxation of foreign exchange
regulation may undermine the country's balance-of-payment positions and
credit rating.
f) Government may have to take over unsuccessful ventures before maturity of the
franchise.
The General Public Perspective'o
Advantages
Privatization may:
a) Relieve the otherwise probable imposition of tax burden for the development of
needed infrastructure
b) Provide needed infrastructure in shorter time and relieve congestion, electricity
blackout or overcrowding
c) Provide more efficient services
d) Create job opportunities which are not possible without private initiative in a
sluggish economy.
10 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.188
Disadvantages
On the other hand, privatization may:
a) Give rise to a possible monopoly situation
b) Create unemployment or loss of security benefits in the public sector if
privatization involves the transfer of management and ownership to private
operators
c) Create hardship to users, especially those in the lower income group.
The following table compares the government "design and build" system of
infrastructure provision to the privatized BOT method.
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4.3.3 Variants of the Privatized Approach
Although the BOT method of privatization is the most commonly considered
system, other variations of this method have been proposed, and even implemented on
occasion. The main methods such as BOOT, BOO, DBFO, BLT, LROT and BTO are
presented below.
Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) Method
BOT is probably the most widely applied model, in which a private developer
receives a license from the government to build a facility and to operate it for a specified
period of time. At the end of this period, plant ownership reverts to the state. The
duration of private ownership is intended to be sufficient to recover the capital, debt
service and operating costs, in addition to allowing a reasonable profit for the private
developer. The government and/or the utility guarantees the purchase of energy from
the developer over the period of private ownership at an agreed price. In most cases,
the risks are borne by the state.
The BOT scheme, and how it can be implemented in Sri Lanka will be discussed
in more detail in the next chapter.
Build, Own, Operate, and Transfer (BOOT)
In a BOOT project, the government grants a private-sector organization a
concession to build a facility, own it, operate it during the concession period, and then
transfer it back to government. It differs from BOT in the ownership element, but the
distinction is blurred in many cases because the two names are used almost
interchangeably on the premise that transfer would eventually take place. A typical
example of a BOOT contract is the Dartford Crossing, a toll bridge across River Thames
in the UK12.
12 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.191
Build, Own, Operate (BOO)
This type of project differs from BOT in that the promoting group designs,
finances, constructs, and operates a project, with a plan to syndicate all or a portion of
its equity after completion. Thus, the concession company retains ownership and
operates the project indefinitely, continuing to derive revenue from it. A BOO scheme
might provide more incentive for the project sponsor (hence the owners) to maintain
the facilities during the concession period. Yet, except for the scenario that a lower user
charge might result from the perpetual ownership, a BOO scheme is not generally
welcome by host governments. The BOT arrangement offers more flexibility in that the
host government can negotiate a new agreement for continued operation and
maintenance with the original operator.
Design, Build, Finance, Operate (DBFO)
This acronym has been proposed for eight major road construction projects in the
UK. One such project is a US$ 380 million contract for the Al-M1 link road and
associated works in West Yorkshire' 3 . The arrangement is BOT in essence, but the
promoters' remuneration is paid through a shadow toll instead of direct tolling of
motorists. This shadow toll is paid by the UK government based on traffic flow
measured by sensing cables stretched across the road. This practice gives a much better
guarantee of return to promoters as traffic would otherwise tend to switch to
alternative untolled routes, given the existence of a great number of interconnecting
roads in the UK. Although the shadow tolling would mean that the government would
eventually have to foot the bill, the Treasury, in initiating this proposal, claimed that the
scheme would result in a substantial transfer of risk to the private sector.
Build, Lease, Transfer (BLT)
In the BLT method, the private sector investors finance, design, build, and retain
legal ownership of a facility for a stipulated period of time, but the host government
13 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.194
leases it back for operation. This concept has been used successfully by the Standard
Chartered Bank to procure its new headquarters building in Hong Kong at no cost (the
bank's role was analogous to that of the government in most projects).
The Standard Chartered Bank owns the lease of a prime site in the Central
Business District of Hong Kong, where its previous headquarters stood. In 1986, the
bank awarded a 25-year sub-lease to Nishimatsu Property (Hong Kong), a subsidiary of
the Japanese construction company Nishimatsu. In return, Nishimatsu financed the
reconstruction of the Bank's new headquarters which was built on this property. Upon
completion, Standard Chartered has the exclusive right to lease back 70% of the new
floor areas at a fixed rental until expiry of the 25-year sub-lease, when the bank takes
back the entire development at no cost. Nishimatsu covers its costs by renting out 30%
of the commercial floor space on the open market14.
Lease, Renovate, Operate, Transfer (LROT)
The LROT method can be illustrated with the following example15: A Japanese
consortium consisting of Kobe Steel Ltd. and some trading companies leased a disused
iron reduction plant from the Venezuelan government for eleven years, renovated and
converted it to use a modern production process. The Japanese consortium financed the
improvement cost, and also paid a fee per ton of product produced, which varied
according to the selling price of the product. The government supplied the raw
materials and assistance in obtaining necessary licenses. The Japanese consortium
overcame foreign exchange restrictions by operating an offshore escrow account, into
which foreign currencies generated by the exports of the products were paid. At the
completion of the lease, the government will receive the renovated plant in good
operating conditions free of charge.
14 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.194
'5 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.195
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Build, Transfer, Operate (BTO)
This model originated in France and is being used throughout Africa, Central
and Eastern Europe. According to the BTO method, public facilities such as water and
power are financed and built by the public sector, leaving maintenance and operation to
the private sector. The Ivory Coast government constructed a power station, and signed
a 15-year concessionary agreement with a private group, which is entrusted with the
operation, maintenance and repair of all facilities related to power generation
transmission and distribution throughout the Ivory Coast.
Similarly, several existing land tunnels in Hong Kong have recently been
awarded by tender to the private sector following the government's decision to
privatize their management and operations. Furthermore, the first chemical waste
treatment center in Hong Kong has been developed under a BTO agreement, in which a
private consortium obtained a 15-year franchise to operate the facility after its
completion. The design and construction costs were initially borne by the consortium
with deferred payment from the government within five years of completion. The
center is designed to treat 100,000 tons of chemical waste per year, and the government
intends to recover the costs (at least partially) from charging registered waste producers
for the treatment16 .
4.3.4 Risk Allocation
At the heart of project financing is a contract that allocates risks associated with a
project and defines the claims on rewards. Although it is often the cause of delay and
heavy legal costs, efficient risk allocation has been central to making projects financable
and has been critical to maintaining incentives to perform efficiently. Risks are divided
not only between public and private entities, but also among the various private parties
involved. Four kinds of risks can be distinguished-currency, commercial, policy-
16 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.196
induced and country-although the distinctions among them are not always clear-cut 17.
I will give a brief explanation of these categories of risk here, and further discuss the
particular risks associated with BOT projects in Chapter 5.
Currency Risk
Much recent, privately-financed infrastructure has drawn on foreign capital, and
therefore faces the risk of local currency devaluation. International lenders rarely
assume such risk, preferring instead to denominate their repayments in foreign
currency terms. In the past, public enterprises or governments have borne the currency
risk, but with the growing move to private finance, the risk of currency depreciation
falls on the project sponsor, and ultimately on the consumers of the service. In many
recent private projects, service prices have been linked to an international currency.
Commercial Risk
Two types of commercial risk may be distinguished: those relating to costs of
production and those arising from uncertainties in demand for services. Substantial
progress has been made in shifting cost-related risks onto private sponsors and other
private parties. Typically, contracts include bonuses for early completion and penalties
for late completion.
In telecommunications projects, the market risk is typically borne by the sponsor.
In the electric power and water sectors, on the other hand, limitations on assumption of
market risk arise because payments to cover costs are not assured. Also, governments
need to be decisive in eliminating the prospect that investors will be bailed out if
circumstances are unfavorable.
1 World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, p.98
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Sector Policy-Induced Risk
In the power sector, project sponsors focus on the credibility and solvency of
their buyer, typically a government utility that transmits and distributes power. The
instrument that protects the power supplier is the "take-or-pay" contract, or power
purchase agreement. Under such a contract, the buyer agrees to pay a specified amount
regardless of whether or not the service is used. The government usually provides this
assistance in the form of a contract compliance guarantee - a useful transitional
measure while the long-term goal of sector reform is being addressed.
Country Risks
Even if governments do provide guarantees against sector policy or even
commercial risks, these assurances may not always be acceptable to private
international lenders, who may look instead for guarantees from creditor countries or
from multilateral banks to insure against "country" risks. In any case, the role of the
government does not disappear in such situations since counter-guarantees are
typically required.
Multilateral Agency Participation in Risk Assessment and Mitigation
To attract international private capital to developing countries, several
multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and ADB, have developed
guarantee schemes. The World Bank's capital-market guarantees are used to facilitate
the access of developing countries to international capital markets by lengthening the
maturity of related borrowing. The proceeds from such loans can be used for
infrastructure investments. The World Bank also issues guarantees for project
financing - under the Extended Co-financing Facility (ECO) - to cover sovereign risks
associated with infrastructure projects. This facility, designed to improve developing
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country access to international markets, has been used, for example, with the Hub River
Project in Pakistan and a thermal power project in China.
4.3.5 The BOT Method: the Most Common Privatization Scheme
In spite of the existence of the various alternative privatization methods
described above, the BOT method remains the most common scheme in use.
Furthermore, when enacted, the other methods are usually merely variations on BOT.
Given this propensity, I focus my discussion in the next chapter primarily on BOT,
specifically exploring its relevance to the Sri Lankan power sector.
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CHAPTER 5
The BOT Approach to Privatization: its Application to Sri
Lanka's Power Sector
The Build, Operate, Transfer scheme is probably the most widely applied
model of privatization, especially in the newly-developing Asian nations. Such
projects are entirely financed by private groups, giving governments with
budgetary problems a way to construct much needed infrastructure. Furthermore,
the eventual reversion of the assets to state control makes the process more
politically feasible. Several developing countries have opted for this scheme. For
example, the Philippines (National Power Corporation), has one BOT power
generating project presently in operation, and two more under construction. Once
completed, these projects will represent 15% of the total installed generating
capacity of the Philippines grid'.
Pakistan is another country which has experimented with this scheme, but
with considerably less success. It has issued letters of intent for seven power
projects, both thermal and hydroelectric, with capacities ranging from 6 MW to 1300
MW2. The proposed Hab River Project (oil-fired steam; 1300 MW) has been under
negotiation since 1987. After the feasibility study, government approval was granted
in 1989. Unfortunately, several partners in the private sector consortium involved
have withdrawn from time to time, seriously delaying the implementation of the
project. The experience of Pakistan emphasizes that BOT and other similar schemes
are still mainly in the experimental stage, and still need considerable refining.
1 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Private Power Generation: Part 2, p.19
2 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Private Power Generation: Part 2, p.19
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The following table gives an overview of known BOT projects which are
currently being planned, or already in operation:
Collie Power Station (300 MW)
Shajiao 'B' Power Station
Shaliao 'C' Power Station
Huaneng Power Project
Coal and nuclear power plants
Paiton Swata I/Coal
Champasac Hydro Dam
Manah gas turbine power plant
Hab river power plant
Fauji foundation power plant
Habibullah-Siemans Consortium Power Plant
Various Metro-Manila power plants
Several large coal fired power plants
Walbrzyeh power plant
Akkuyu nuclear power plant
1000 MW coal fired power plant
Additional coal fired power plants
Hydro power plants
Power plants (10 by year 2000)
Under construction
Operational (debt repaid March 1994)
Under construction
Unknown
Proposed
Under construction
Under construction
Proposed
Contracts signed
Letter of Intent
Letter of Intent
Operating and under construction
Under construction
Abandoned
Contracts signed
Propsed
Under construction
In negotiation
3 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer arproach. p.27
China
Indonesia
Laos
Oman
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
Turkey
Vietnam
I
5.1 The BOT Concept
The Build Operate Transfer scheme has been described as follows:
The technique that characterizes a Build Operate Transfer (BOT) arrangement, is the
granting of a concession which empowers the right to operate and profit from the entity created by
that concession. On expiration of the concession, the entity, bridge, canal, etc. transfers at no cost to
those who granted the concession -for infrastructure projects this is most often the government. BOT
concessions are typically 5 to 30 year terms 4.
The figure below shows the schematic layout of the relationship of the
principal parties to a BOT.
Figure 5. 1
Government
CIncessinn Ipreement
The above figure describes a scheme in which lenders look solely to the cash
flows of a project to repay debt service, and where they have no recourse to other
assets of the project participants if things go wrong; hence BOT's characterization as
"non-recourse financing". Given its drawbacks, this approach is only used in cases
where the project is clearly capable of supporting the debt6.
4 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.6
5 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.5
6 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.5
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5.1.1 Contractual Arrangements
As the development and execution of any major project is often a difficult and
uncertain process, the formalized risk relationships between government, lenders,
investors, and contractors form the crux of all BOTs. These crucial ties should be
addressed, arranged, documented, and regulated by the promoter/developer who
must bring them into a workable formula that gives all involved parties the
confidence that no single group is taking unreasonable risk or benefiting from
unentitled reward 7.
The contractual arrangements in a typical BOT scheme is summarized in
Figure 5.2.
7 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.6
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Figure 5.28
Host Government Advisors.
I Sponsers
Advisors
Equity
Investment bankers, investment Concession agreement
Invlegal counsel shareholder's approvals, authorizations,
legal counsel agreements guarantees, possible equity
Investment bankers,
legal counsel,
technical advisors
Passive equity
investors
Equity investme
Escrow agreement
Long-term.
debt/Escrow agent
Payments
I
Lenders
Guarantees Ex
guara
loans, stand-by commitments
Insuranc
policies In-
I Tnnalrerc I
Project Company
Dee
of trust
juarantee
agreement
I
*Operating
management
contract
Operator
Fixed price turnkey
construction contract
Construction consortium/
equipment suppliers
port credit
mty agencies
' Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.10
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5.1.2 Legal Framework
BOT concepts depend largely upon the willingness of entrepreneurs to risk
developing an enterprise, hoping it will meet the needs of enough customers to
ensure its viability 9. The willingness of entrepreneurs as well as those who lend
them money to take these risks, depends very much on the legal environment in
which they operate. If the law does not contain strong protection for sanctity of
contracts backed by an impartial, judicial system, then entrepreneurship becomes
restricted, and very high rates of return are demanded (because it is then assumed
that a large percentage of such projects undertaken will be unprofitable).
The functions of a legal framework includeo0 :
a) The definition of the overall concept and structure of the project (including
project finance and taxation issues)
b) Establishment of enabling legislation and regulatory systems on environmental
protection, planning, and user charges
c) Control of undue competition
d) Oversight of the negotiation of the respective rights and obligations and
preparation of the associated documentation; allocating risks and identifying
insurance requirements
e) Establishment of procedure for the resolution of disputes
5.2 Risks and Their Mitigation
In any BOT arrangement the contracted parties must acknowledge the
conventional wisdom that risk should be assumed by the party within whose
control the risk most lies. A major function of the BOT arrangement is, therefore, to
recognize and provide a mechanism for the assignment and management of those
risks 1 .
9 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.17
10 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.172
" Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.6
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The risks inherent in a BOT project have been grouped under three headings:
financing risks, political risks and technical risks12.
5.2.1 Financing Risks
Foreign exchange risks and interest rate fluctuations
Foreign exchange risk is especially relevant to developing countries, which
have to import substantial amounts of equipment and materials using foreign
currencies for settlement. Furthermore, repayment of foreign loans usually has to be
in foreign currencies, even though the income arising from the use of the completed
facilities or the sale of products (electricity, for example), are in local currency. As a
result, if the local currency depreciates, the profitability of the project is drastically
reduced (conversely, if it appreciates, the profitability is increased).
Project sponsors usually have to seek remittance and convertibility
guarantees from the host government in order that the necessary transactions can be
effected and project revenues can be remitted freely. Reluctance on the part of
governments to give these guarantees inevitably discourages foreign investment in a
country's infrastructure.
Fortunately, alternate solutions other than guarantees have evolved. For
example, in the Shajiao 'B' coal-fired power station project in China, the Hong Kong
developer is being paid fifty percent in the local currency, Renminbi (RMB), and fifty
percent in foreign currency converted from RMB at predetermined exchange rates
(thus partially mitigating currency risk). The developer uses the local currency to
purchase coal from China at predetermined prices'3 . In other cases, an offshore
"escrow account", effectively a trust fund established and funded by the proceeds
generated by the venture, can be set up to which all project revenues and foreign
loans are paid.
12 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.143
13 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.144
Market Risks
Changes in market price, demand, and sources of raw material supply will
inevitably affect the construction and operation of projects. In industrial projects,
lenders want to ensure the sale of the product so that there are sufficient revenues to
repay their loans. Suppliers, therefore, are required to guarantee supply quantities
and prices and even to secure the promise of alternative supply sources.
Furthermore, the government, or more usually, the wholesale purchasers (such as
utility companies), could guarantee their obligations by agreements to purchase the
product on defined terms and prices.
Power stations offer common examples of these supply and "offtake"
agreements. In its various BOT power projects in China and the Philippines, the
Hopewell Group secures its fuel supply from the utility or joint venture partner
associated with the projects during the "co-operation period"14. In the case of the
Philippine projects, the local utility company supplies fuel at no charge, while in the
Chinese projects, fuel is supplied at a fixed price or on terms which effectively
protect the group from the extra costs incurred by any increases in the cost of fuel.
On the offtake side, the local equity or cooperative joint venture partners of the
project companies established by the Hopewell Group in China and the Philippines
either pay a charge based on the available capacity of the plants, or purchase at a
pre-agreed price a specified minimum amount of the electricity generated by the
plants during the cooperation periods. Such contractual obligations have been
guaranteed by state entities or governmental authorities for at least the period
during which the project financing is available.
Income Risks
Income risk is often inherent in BOT transport projects, in which initial traffic
forecasts may be overly optimistic, due to wrong assumptions, the availability of
alternative routes, or an insufficient connecting road network. Income from direct
14 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.144
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tolls may then fall short of expectations, thereby jeopardizing the cash flow of the
sponsor.
To mitigate this risk, the UK government encourages private financing by
reimbursing project companies with "shadow tolls" based on recorded traffic flow
rather than from tolls directly charged to road users. This practice gives a much
better guarantee of return to funders because direct toll collection is complicated due
to the great number of interconnecting roads which make switching to alternative
routes easy for drivers.
Cost overrun risk
When construction costs exceed original estimates, either due to inflation or
excessive design changes, it may be difficult to pay contractors from the original
budget and additional sources of finance may have to be sought. These problems
may also cause lenders to question the continued viability of the project. The
Channel Tunnel project, with an estimated final project cost of US$ 15 billion, (more
than double the initial estimate of US$ 7.4 billion), is an example 15 . These huge cost
overruns caused the financing banks to threaten to take over the franchise before the
project was eventually opened in May 1994.
Cost overrun risks can be mitigated by schemes which provide, for instance:
as additional capital injected by project sponsors, standby credit facilities from
original lenders, fixed price contracts from contractors, and sponsors' escrow funds
for completion.
5.2.2 Political Risks
Political risk is often the most significant risk faced by foreign investors in the
developing world, where there is the significant likelihood of dramatic overnight
political change, which can jeopardize projects at a critical stage. Sovereign risks and
instability risks are the two main types of risk in this category.
15 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.149
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Sovereign Risks
These risks are usually due to a change of government composition. One of
the main reasons for the abandonment of the Channel Tunnel project in 1975 was the
1974 change of government in UK from Conservative to Labor, which left the project
without any effective political sponsorship. Another example is a Thai rail and
highway project awarded to Hopewell Holdings which was delayed by a military
coup in Thailand in 199116.
A further sovereign risk involves the possible change of legislation.
Governments may amend or repeal legislation because of purely domestic
considerations, such as changes in economic policy, or as part of wider
constitutional issues. Sponsors of BOT projects sometimes manage to obtain
agreements from the host governments to restrict such changes but the value of such
agreements are doubtful against a government which is determined to change the
ground rules. Nevertheless, most governments are interested in having more than
one infrastructure project supported by the private sector, and usually act in a
manner which will not deter future investment.
A more subtle form of sovereign risk (especially relevant to developing
countries), is the volatility of promises given under strong personal influence. An
example is the uncertainty which faced the Bangkok rail and highway project when
top officials in the ousted government were removed following the 1991 coup.
Instability Risk
Instability risk can range from labor unrest and embargo of construction
equipment to outright expropriation. Construction companies could be forced into
bankruptcy by a political decision to stop work. This risk can also arise when there is
war or hostility between countries. Major political uprisings can likewise take away
financiers' interest in otherwise lucrative projects, at least temporarily. For example,
16 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.151
the Tiananmen Square incident in China in June 1989 caused the syndication of loans
for the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai superhighway to be delayed until 199117.
Therefore, investors should address the possible instability risks associated with
countries they plan to invest in.
Taing and Nevitti s suggest the following ways in which protection can be
sought by investors in BOT projects in potentially unstable countries:
a) Obtain the government's agreement to allow the project sponsors to exploit the
particular investment for a given period of time. However, if investors rely too
much on this sort of agreement, they are betting heavily on the long-term
stability and consistency of the policies of the host government.
b) Form a consortium of international investors and lenders so that expropriation of
the project facility, will result in default of a number of international loans and
jeopardize the country's credit rating to an unacceptable degree.
c) Take out a political risks insurance policy. Government agencies such as the
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) in the UK or other multilateral
development agencies such as the World Bank (through an affiliate called the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency - MIGA) offer various guarantee
schemes. In the United States, agencies such as the Overseas Private Insurance
Corporation (OPIC) provide coverage for investment abroad.
d) Negotiate for a financial undertaking by the host government. Lenders normally
insist that host governments provide some coverage for outstanding debt and
other financial obligations for uninsurable force majeure events. Both the Bangkok
Second Stage Expressway and the Gazi power project in Turkey have concession
agreements containing these protective features.
17 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.151
' Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.151
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5.2.3 Technical Risks
Risks in this category include construction difficulties, completion delays, and
operation risks.
Construction Difficulties
Unforeseen soil conditions and breakdown in equipment are common
occurrences on any construction site, especially in the case of large civil engineering
projects. Usually, these will have repercussions on cost and time, but they are
usually surmountable with today's technology.
For example, during the construction of the Eastern Harbor Crossing in Hong
Kong, unexpected weakness in the harbor bed caused severe flooding and erosion of
the tunnel's foundation. This resulted in some interim delay but engineers and
contractors were able to overcome the problem and actually finished ahead of
schedule. Construction contracts under BOT arrangement are usually of the Design
and Build type, which do not provide redress for contractors against adverse
geological conditions. Contractors usually either include a substantial risk allowance
in the price or simply gamble and hope for the best when faced with the constraints
of lump-sum fixed-price contracts.
Completion Delays
Projects can be delayed for many reasons, among which poor interface
coordination and late design changes are the most common. The Channel Tunnel
project for example, was allegedly delayed by the late changes in the signaling
system specification and the shuttle design. There was a delay of an entire year out
of the seven year construction contract. As BOT projects rely on the income of the
completed facilities to service their debts, the accumulated interest from a delayed
project can be substantial and can seriously damage the project's profitability.
Accordingly, financiers of the Channel Tunnel were reluctant to commit further
loans when considerable delay resulted in substantial cost increase.
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Project sponsors should take positive steps to make sure that projects are
completed on time. In particular they need to design and implement appropriate
organization structures, especially those concerning project management. They can
also commit contractors to lump sum contracts, using proven technology and agreed
milestone schedules, which define contractually the timing and relationship of
critical stages of the projects with payment incentives. Less positive measures
include imposing of heavy liquidated damages based on expected loss. Contractors
could also be required to provide completion guarantees and performance bonds. In
the latter case the risk of cost increases due to late completion is borne by insurance
companies or banks, who charge a premium for this service.
Operation Risks
During their operation, the revenue-generating capability of facilities may be
hindered by equipment breakdown or other similar causes. As a countermeasure,
local staff involved in operation and maintenance should be given adequate training
in power system operation. Contractors should also be required to provide maintain
and correct defects in the equipment they installed. Maintenance bonds will further
provide a source of funds for remedial work. Other more positive steps include, the
careful choice of an operator, and involvement of this operator in the design and
commissioning phases.
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5.3 Significant components of BOT Projects
The following table summarizes the various risks outlined above, and
possible ways for their mitigation.
Table 5.2: Construction Phase' 9
Completion delays
Cost overruns
Force majeure
Political risk
Infrastructure
Experienced turnkey operator
Penalties, liquidated damages, performance bonus
Completion/performance guarantees
Proven technology
* Fixed-price/lump-sum contracts
* Standby credit
* Increased equity
* Government indemnities
* Insurance
* Insurance
* Export credit agency cover
* Government assurances
Table 5.3: Operation Phase20
Revenue Stream * Market study/traffic growth etc.
* Proven technology
* Performance guarantees
Contractor's equity
* Contractor/licenser involvement
* Experienced operator
* Flexible price formula
* Central bank assurances
* Swaps
* Escrow accounts
* Government support
* Covenants
'9 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.720 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.7
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Performance/technical
Operation/maintenance
Foreign exchange
Other contingencies
5.4 Measures of Project Viability
Although there is no single criterion by which a banker or investor expects to
judge the financial viability of a project, there are a considerable number of
recognized measuring tools which can be used. The sponsoring group usually
makes figures, generated from the financial model, which indicate the project's
likely financial characteristics for both lenders and investors to review, verify, or
amend.
Some of these important measures include the following:
Return of Investment (ROI)
The return on investment refers to the internal rate of return for the
unleveraged projected cashflows to be generated by the project. The project is
usually deemed feasible, and therefore fundable, if ROI is sufficiently high, ideally
eight to ten points above the prime borrowing rate21.
Return on Equity (ROE)
The ROE is the internal rate of return for the leveraged cash flows projected
to be generated by a project. The project is usually considered to be attractive if ROE
is at least ten points above the prime rate. In Sri Lanka, the prime lending rate (by
commercial banks), is about 20% (Table 2.7). This will result in a required ROE of
30% - the figure which I used in the analysis, later in the chapter.
Net Present Value (after taxes) (NPV)
The NPV of a project is the difference between the present value of annual
residual cashflows after debt amortization, interest, and income taxes, and the
present value of equity investment at a specified discount rate. The project is only
considered feasible if the NPV is positive and yields an acceptable return on
21 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.39
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investment compared with other alternatives. I will discuss how to choose the
"right" discount rate, at the end of this section.
Payback Period (PP)
The payback period refers to the amount of time required to recover initial
investment. This may be measured as unleveraged returns against total cost
(excluding construction, interest, and fees), or on dividends against equity
disbursements. This measure is very much a function of the project's size but it is
obviously desirable for the payback period to be as short as possible, particularly if
country and sovereign risks are high.
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR)
The DSCR is usually expressed as a percentage ratio of the project's net
cashflow from operation to its debt service due in any period as shown below22:
revenue - operating costs - taxes - increase in working capital
principal + interest
The project will usually be considered viable only if the minimum DSCR is in excess
of 125% (or 1.25).
2 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.39
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Actual values of the above measures for some current projects
Published historical statistics on the above five measures are not commonly
available because of commercial sensitivities. However, the World Bank's
(Augenblick and Scott-Custer) 1990 paper, cited the ROE shown in Table 5.4:
Table 5.4"
(* These are the figures for the base case assumptions. The 3% return is for the first 10 years, it becomes
21% over the 31-year life of the concession.)
The Equity/Debt mix
The equity/debt mix of the project is highly case specific, and depends largely
on the nature of the project and who is sponsoring it. Nevertheless, as my
subsequent analysis will indicate, it is possible to increase ROE and DSCR values by
optimizing equity disbursement.
Equity/debt values for some existing BOT projects are given in Table 5.5:
23Smith and Walker. Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer approach, p.40
Table 5.524
UK
Hong Kong
Channel Tunnel
Dartford Bridge Crossing
Second Severn Bridge
Midlands Expressway
Skye Bridge
Original Cross Harbor Tunnel
Eastern Harbor Crossing
Tate's Cairn Tunnel
Western Harbor Crossing
20:80
0:100
0:100
25:75*
0:100
0:100
25:75
28:75
30:70
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zuhai Highway 20:80*
Malaysia North-South Highway 10:90
Thailand 2nd Stage Expressway 20:80
Bangkok Elevated Transport System 7:93
*Estimates
Choosing the "Right" Discount Rate
The discount rate used in project valuation, is an extremely important value,
because a choice of figure alone can drastically change the profitability of a project
(this will be evident in my subsequent analysis). Walker and Smith say the
following about choosing the "right" discount rate.
Life cycle cost predictions are frequently made net of inflation, with the discount rate
taking into account of both future inflation and interest rates. Choice of the correct discount rate is,
therefore, of fundamental importance. Long-term interest rates are very difficult to predict with any
degree of accuracy, but there is generally considered to be a relationship, usually roughly stable,
between the inflation rate and market investment rates from which a real rate of interest (i.e. a
positive rate of return net of inflation) can be calculated. In the absence of any other information this is
the value usually used as the
In the following section I will give a short overview of the main
characteristics of each of the three proposed plants.
2 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate and Transfer aproach, p.41
UK
discount rate in DCF calculations. It is important to keep n mind, however, that the
relationship between interest and inflation rates may vary over time25.
The "real" discount rate (d) which takes into accoun: of both inflation and the
prevailing interest rate (usually the bank base rate), can be calculated from the following
formula:
where: d= [(1+b)/(1+i)-1] x 100
b= bank base rate
i = prevailing inflation rate
The proof for the derivation of the formula may be founa _n Kelly and Male 26.
Although the above formula may give a rough measure of the discount rate,
the value suitable for calculating cash flows is a matter ci individual professional
judgment and may vary from project to project dependi-b z upon the way the
venture is to be financed. In the case of projects financed largely by debt, the
appropriate rate is usually the actual cost of borrowing -.e money, net of inflation.
However, different criteria may apply in the case of equ-:.- finance.
25 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate a-r Transfer approach, p.141
26 Smith and Walker, Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate a-7i Transfer approach, p.141
40 MW Diesel Generatine Plant
This plant will be developed and operated by a private organization, over a
period of 10 years for the first case, and 15 years for the second case after which the
assets will be turned over to the government. The intricate details of investment,
power purchase and asset transfer, which usually occur in such a situation, have
been left out in the analysis for simplicity.
The specifics of the project are summarized in the table below:
Table 5.627
Net Present Value of Total Disbursement (Equity, Loan and Rs. 3 billion (10 year BOT)
Interest) Rs. 2.5 billion (15 year BOT)
(constant 1995 prices)
Financing Basis
Developer's Equity 30%
Loan Basis
Annual Interest Rate 15%
Repayment period (equal annual payments) 10 and 15 years (for the two cases)
Tax Basis Investments are tax and duty free
Fuel Details
Cost of residual oil excluding tax and duty 3.83 Rs/l
Heat content of fuel 9952.2 kCal/l
Thermal efficiency 39.6%
Specific fuel consumption 0.218 1/kWh
Specific fuel cost 0.84 Rs/kWh
Project details
* The plant will be constructed on the BOT concept
* The lant can be constructed at the same cost as that estimated by theCEW
* It will be transferred to the government ownership after the 10th and
15th years respectively, for first and second cases
* Energy output is based on system merit order dispatch (no purchase
guarantee)
70 MW Hydroelectric Plant
In this case, I will consider the development of the proposed Kukule
hydroelectric plant according to the BOT method. The project, which is located on
the Kalu Ganga (river), has 70 MW of installed capacity, and an annual energy
capability of 305 GWh/year. It is estimated to cost Rs. 6.7 billion (US$ 135 million) in
constant 1993 prices, and will be commissioned in 1999.
The specifics of the project are summarized in the table below:
" Siyambalapitiya, Tilak. Power Sector Development Issues: Private Power Generation: Part 2. p.39
5.5 The Possible Use of the BOT Concept in Sri Lanka
According to the CEB generation expansion plan (presented in Table 3.6),
many new power generating plants must be constructed within the next ten years in
order to meet the rapidly growing (10% per annum) demand for electricity in the
country. Unfortunately, the government is facing severe budgetary shortfalls, partly
because of its increased defense spending due to the civil war in the north and east,
and has not been able to finance this additional generating capacity. As a result, the
CEB has been forced to introduce widespread power cuts which in turn have
adversely affected the country's economic growth.
In response to this problem, the government has been actively exploring the
possibility of financing the required power stations by using BOT schemes, but so
far, has not been successful in its efforts. It is important to understand the reasons
for the government's lack of success, and determine the conditions that will attract
private investment. The government will then be able to determine whether BOT
schemes can be used to provide electricity at reasonable prices to consumers.
In this section, I will examine the feasibility of adding three different power
plants, built under the BOT concept, to the national grid, and try to determine under
which conditions they will be feasible for the private developer. The cases I will
examine are:
* 40 MW diesel plant (10 year BOT)
* 40 MW diesel plant (15 year BOT)
* 70 MW Kukule hydroelectric plant (15 year BOT)
* 300 MW coal plant (15 year BOT)
The above plants are among those to be constructed according to the CEB's 1993
generation expansion plan. The diesel plant, the Kukule hydro plant, and the 300
MW coal plant were supposed to be commissioned in 1998,1999, and 2001
respectively. However, since the whole schedule has been delayed, it is extremely
likely that each plant will be constructed three years behind schedule. This change is
reflected in my subsequent analysis.
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300 MW Coal Plant
The proposed development of a coal-fired power station is the largest single
investment planned in Sri Lanka's power sector. This project is estimated to cost Rs.
23.2 billion (US$ 464 million) in constant 1993 prices. The initial 150 MW will be
completed in 2001, and the second 150 MW unit will follow in 2002. Supplies of low
sulfur coal need to be secured from either Australia or South Africa at the projected
prices of US$ 50/MT.
The specifics of the project are summarized in the table below:
Table 5.829
Net Present Value of Total Disbursement (Equity, Loan and Interest) Rs. 25 billion
(constant 1995 prices)
Financing Basis
Developer's Equity 30%
Loan Basis
Annual Interest Rate 15%
Repayment period (equal annual payments) 15 years
Tax Basis The investments are tax
and duty free
Fuel Details
Cost of coal excluding tax and duty 2208 Rs/MT
Heat content of fuel 6660 kCal/kg
Thermal efficiency 33.6%
Specific fuel consumption 0.384 kg/kWh
Specific fuel cost 0.85 Rs/kWh
Project details
* The plant will be constructed on the BOT concept
* The plant can be constructed at the same cost as that estimated by theCEI9
* It will be transferred to the government ownership after the 15th year
* Energy output is based on system merit order dispatch (no purchase
guarantee)
29 Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Private Power Generation: Part 2. p.4 2
Table 5.728
Net Present Value of Total Disbursement (Equity, Loan and Interest) Rs. 7.5 billion
(constant 1995 prices)
Financing Basis
Developer's Equity 30%
Loan Basis
Annual Interest Rate 15%
Repayment period (equal annual payments) 15 years
Tax Basis The investments are tax
and duty free
Project details
* The plant will be constructed on the BOT concept
* The plant can be constructed at the same cost as that estimated by the CEB
* It will be transferred to the government ownership after the 15th year
Siyambalapitiya, Tilak, Power Sector Development Issues: Private Power Generation: Part 2. p.4 1
5.6 Assumptions
The following assumptions are implicit in the model I used for my analysis:
a) The plants will be built at the same cost as that estimated by the CEB.
b) Calculations are done in constant 1993 terms and hence exclude inflation and
exchange rate increases.
c) There will be 30% equity participation by the developer.
d) The principal with accumulated interest during construction will be paid by the
developer in equal annual installments, beginning in the first year of plant
operation. Annual interest payments will be on the remaining balance.
e) The projects will be transferred to public (state utility) ownership at the end of
the specified period with no compensation paid (more details about this transfer
period are found in the notes at the end of each table).
f) Interest on debt is taken as 15% per year. This is also the opportunity cost of
capital which is used for the discounted cash flow calculations.
g) The utility's purchase is on a one-part tariff based only on energy, fixed at 2.89
Rs./kWh (this value was used because, according to CEB forecasts, this is the
long term (20-year) average incremental economic cost of generation for the Sri
Lanka Power System)30.
h) Except for the second case involving the diesel plant, no purchase guarantees
will be given to the operator, who will the operate the plant to meet system merit
order dispatch.
i) All investments, imports and profits are free of customs duty and income tax.
30 Ceylon Electricity Board: Generation Planning Branch, Report on Long Term Generation Expansion
Planning Studies 1995-2009 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: October 1994), p.8-3
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5.7 Project Performance Indicators
Of the various performance indicators I described in the previous section, I
chose two, return on equity (ROE), and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), to
determine the feasibility of the particular project. For the purpose of my analysis,
these two measures are defined as follows:
Return on Equity (ROE):
Internal rate of return calculated on net cash-flows before debt service
Debt Services Coverage Ratio (DSCR):
(Present Value of cash-flows before debt service) / ( Total accumulated debt before
project
commissioning)
I have assumed that in order to attract financiers, the ROE must be over 30%
and the DSCR must be over 1.5. The ROE value was chosen because of the standard
practice of adding 10 percentage points to the prime borrowing rate (20% for Sri
Lanka in 1995), and the DSCR value is that which is commonly used for similar
projects.
5.8 Variables
The discount rate (initially 15%), the purchase price (initially 2.89 Rs./kWh)
and the equity participation rate (initially 30%), are the values I varied in my
analysis. I examined the resulting ROE and DSCR values obtained by changing the
above variables in order to determine the conditions under which the various
projects being considered will become feasible.
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5.9 Models Used
I used the following cash flow models (on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet) to
calculate the ROE and DCSR values of the projects under various conditions. The
feasible scenarios were those which produced ROE values of over 30% and DCSR
values of over 1.5.
The results shown in Tables 5.9 to 5.12 are those obtained for the base case for
each project (discount rate=15%, equity participation level=30%, and selling price=
2.89 Rs./kWh).
130
C.
0(3
o
DV) NCD
Coow fl-C- c <r-
(D CD O 0 0 N LO 0() CD N 0) cN000CDCDNCD0~-~- L? CDLN9DC 0'- T
000CO CD N 0 C
000~ý CD 0) (N '- CD CD 01 -1000 C C 0 0CDCDC ~0 C0'--'cD'-OONOooo aDL~L~3
ooo~0 Q~~
Or9r999007
000 CD '- O) CD'-O)O) C') O)
3t')YPCC)
'-0 -
N ~ ¶ '~ C C' C) N ý N ý NN
N C W) O W C )
'-N N N N '-~
- CD
a.
Us
.)00000000000
M O CD N N N N N N N N N.
0 CD0000000000
N) CC)4
CVO-
D N- CD 0 a V- N M * 10 CD N- C
~0) O) O)0000 0 0
'-'-'-'-NNNNNNNNN(
00222
0 0 0C) .)(.
0
00)0
00
0
=,
e-
,o
0
0L0
c
c0eIIo
C
0P
C)
NOC
c,_Co
r-
AaEaEa
80
0
00, w
V)
CV)
OO)O0 00
C-4
0ocdj
0
0, 0
CE 0 c
eC L ag.
02 0 cc- 0 8
> C 0.L 0
<r-0)C 0 I-(D~ CL)cr eg w u t o
illi::ii
&&&& Bie·2
ii Ii
w
OL
Cu
E
aa~4 ) .,
0Q,C
tsti2 26
u U) 0-
S E•
4)~
Cuc~c
clcr
0.0....
4) (D .
(DC) CDCD'-' N CDC)CD V)CV 0 D C
000~~~g ~ CD0  C -NCDC D -C C DC
CO CDCDC CDNC r=O) D~CD
W-000CDCoog D-g* VD(CD0 V LO N LO C TV 0'- CD LO 0 r- CV)
r- tr- t- r- 0 P- r- C) C(D r(- It D Co CO CO
000 C W 0 W M M W - w
000 Go Go in 0 TCN- 0 D
0- CD CD0- CD MV CD 0 CD MV - V
O LO t0D-' - N
0oo0 or-0 CVCDC C
0 CD 0- CD - C CD CV) CC - C
CV) 0 O CD N CDD DC) 0 1- V 0 0 CDM CD CD M
0 CD V4 I- U)CDN 0 CD CD Cw) v- CD) CD V NM CD - CD
NM N 0C C? C ) 1 -1-1-T-~gg ~~~~
04r- CD N N CD CD M 0 P- I T.-C CDW N 0 CD MV 0
*N W I-.NC14 - LO M0 CD COC) IM CD9 IT* 'NCV NNNNN'-'-'- '
r~~~IIIIIII
6
C
0.
U
V) V) V) V) V) V V) CV ) ) CV) V V) .- V)V em-e m CD0 CDe em e em e
CD C0000000000000
N'-a u
'-0 CD000000000000000
CN MV'
N CV)n -CU(3
CDL-CDC O'-N V)'4 DC r- D O'-N
CDOCD DOO O 00 00'--'CDC D D0000006000000
CD t- CV
0 CM-
CDNC
C, 4 ,N C"N N CM
cr
--s4)
L.-0
o
4)
'a0
0CU
CV)o
0
r-
00,
U)1
0,
0
CII
0
0
CU
E
0 i
C
a0 C
" -
e Np ') )
'O C LO
" - Cý N
CM
0
0
Co
0 CU
*0 0 =
4) 0..
M
8 8a 4)~c
CC 0Do ED
E5 E
ro- N14
-a
2 2 S 0~
4) 4)
CL
0mB
cc m >
'& 7& cm
0
0
Cc
r
E mCcB0x
cr b C(D 4 0-0
I- 0 E.
0 E8i 2, m
CL = 4)
a 4) Cr
0 w CUC
C
0
.2
E
CU)8 8
CL
*l3 .l
C'',
CE
aeCUI:C
0Ii I
ii*ji
C
2a,
0EaE
ot5oC
** 6ii
06L
---- --- - -- -- --
(N
a
cc
.C
3
C
0.ii@1
c
mEcnC
C
LL0
0
0
U
I'
I-
0
U
C
0
*1r
0
.2
0.
(.
(I
0
0I
C
0
ooGoo o co coz 00 00000000000 00coc c c 000 0
0
o o o 0O(
U30
0 W 0 MC W(0(0 )N000N0000000000U
c0 ) 0 0 ( U, N
0*lrr
uJ
0
0 CL
0
O. 85 5EC o 0
ag a,LO M 0- 4 4801..
0 4)0 E
'a -5 0
,o 4) ,cr.V
to cn 0 cor
r, 0.800
N) r
E 0E0 w0 0 Q
0r--- CLg. 04
a
rE
0
C
C
C
'IC
C
CE
AI w . 0 a -
ui
0i
C
0E
(U0a
Mf.
-L. a = aaF Cc a
90 > m m 2 S or~ 00 §
4) o m 4-I-4) c r 0 ) aw CO CO w~
ii ii I
0*
0,
a
,o
0 0 "'
0'-
> U,(D
I7
C
10 -( E ,
2-, V
4) (D
m C
u,
0
r-O0O~ 4 0CM r M N
0000 0 0r m0m - -r 0 w) mv cE rN NrN N
W0000 In GoNwV NNeNNM MN
~CE)cE)~w-- AA- -- - r A w
r- Cf) CO) cnC) Cn cn M M
000000c ooC 0 M 0 0odo
wOoc~e 3 u e re om qeq ommqaM0 0S 0 4o0 oG
cooooo mano mme enoenecc 1041m0 D m 1 0 0 M 101D1010
000000 Gm 4014.r-r-%- C t 0 0 inO ~ 0)0 00~~~0)r
0000 O~~~t~00CE 0~1 E 0OE400%c nC) 0 .0 V-4 10 NO M
M- GoGoI-. G0 o r N co o l - co'- lI-P
000 000101 1-1 N N 0)0 Nn X -O CE) C(n It ) WEM 10CV) r-0It V0 "ONCE rN Nvr- 1%-0 0 10410 10110 10101010
000000CE) T C C)CC C
1-(I C)CE C) C ?)C)C)()C)C C? C E)CE CE)C)
N C)4 N 4 1oIV
4 10 N(og0s-0 mN0) 0) 0) v0) Cc r- 
0 N 0M) 0I I . .Tc . rý-
0 N c V N r- * " r V41 00I 0
(Y~e~40)40)40)4
'-10N 0) CE)4. )N )-4 0
'-'-NN CE) CE NNNý 'i I
40'-0)(000000000000(000N - E r 0 01000000(0(00( 00
N I* V N V-V- V-V- V-V- V-T- V-T- V-V- I- V- V.-I I I I I I I I I I
( c0 cm
SCE) M r-
000000000000000
o00000000000000
0Dt-.0M0)T-N" M a 0 0 t- M0)n- N MV001-.00)0)00000000000000
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
0
o
I )3'0
E
toEU
E)
cm
I
N N-0CO cCM
Ee
Ea
8E8
1 U
ao
IP g
ass
CE)* * W)co, Yd
& 00
g'I
o C
gE0 0.
C CL c
I .2 "M 8gzcaE8vcSB1
ii 1I
=
=
0o
a
c
f3fCL
E
r EU0
0 c1
~8 8
U)C
co 0I
EEi a
repEr3 ~
s 9
LD 322 c
5.10 Structure of Analysis
I performed my analysis by varying certain values, and keeping others
constant in the following manner:
(A) Changing One Variable at a Time
I. Varying the Selling Price
A. Holding Discount Rate=15%, and Equity Participation=30% constant
II. Varying the Discount Rate
A. Holding Selling Price=2.89 Rs/kWh, and Equity Participation=30%
constant
B. Holding Selling Price=3.50 Rs/kWh, and Equity Participation=30%
constant
III. Varying the Equity Participation Level
A. Holding Selling Price=2.89 Rs/kWh, and Discount Rate=15% constant
B. Holding Selling Price=3.50 Rs/kWh, and Discount Rate=15% constant
(B) Changing Two Variables at a Time
I. Discount Rate and Selling Price
A. Holding Equity Participation=30% constant
II. Selling Price and Equity Participation
A. Holding Discount Rate=30% constant
III. Discount Rate and Equity Participation
A. Holding Selling Price=2.89 Rs./kWh constant
B. Holding Selling Price=3.00 Rs./kWh constant
C. Holding Selling Price=3.50 Rs./kWh constant
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5.10.1 Changing One Variable at a Time
(I) Varying Selling Price
According to my analysis, the selling price (the price at which the CEB
purchases power from the private developer), is the most crucial variable
determining the viability of the project. Keeping equity participation and the
discount rate constant at 30% and 15% respectively, I varied the selling price from
2.89 Rs./kWh to 7.00 Rs./kWh. As expected, both ROE and DSCR values show a
steady upward trend as selling price has increased. The results of my analysis are
presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
At 2.89 Rs./kWh, all four projects are clearly not feasible - the hydro and coal
projects actually showing negative ROE values. At 4.00 Rs./kWh, the diesel plants
become feasible, while the hydro and coal plants are feasible only at 6.50 Rs./kWh
and 5.50 Rs./kWh, respectively.
(II) Varying the Discount Rate
I first varied the discount rate from 8% to 22%, holding the selling price and
equity participation constant at 2.89 Rs./kWh, and 30% respectively. As expected,
the ROE and DSCR values show a steady decrease with increasing discount rates. As
evident from the results presented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, none of the plants are
feasible within this range of values.
Given these results, I repeated the above analysis, increasing the selling price
to 3.50 Rs./kWh (still holding equity participation at 30%). Now, the first diesel
plant became feasible for discount rates between 8% and 12%, and the second one
became feasible for discount rates between 8% and 14%. The hydro and coal plants
were not feasible for the range of values under consideration.
(III) Varying the Level of Equity Participation
The level of equity participation did not have as much impact on the
feasibility of the projects as the other two variables, but this set of results were the
136
most interesting. I first varied this level, holding the selling price and discount rate
constant at 2.89 Rs./kWh, and 15% respectively. Although none of the plants were
feasible within this range, the ROE and DSCR values showed an upward trend
(which was much less dramatic than when the selling price and the discount rate
were varied), as shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8
Consequently, I repeated the analysis by using a constant selling price of 3.50
Rs./kWh (still holding equity participation at 30%). At this selling price the diesel
plants showed a downward trend with increasing levels of equity participation (in
direct contrast to the upward trend it showed for the lower selling price). The hydro
and coal plants still showed the upward trend they had displayed for the lower
selling price.
Now, the first diesel plant became feasible for equity participation levels
between 20% and 50%, and the second one became feasible for equity participation
levels between the whole range under consideration (20% and 60%). The hydro and
coal plants were not feasible for the range of values under consideration.
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5.10.2 Changing Two Variables at a Time
(I) Discount Rate and Selling Price
Holding the equity participation level at 30%, I varied the discount rate and
the selling prices from 8% to 20%, and 2.50 to 5.00 Rs./kWh. The results of this
analyses are presented in the matrices in Tables 5.13 and 5.14 which show the
respective ROEs and DSCR values.
This analysis gives a better indication of the sets of conditions that must be
satisfied, in order for the various plants to be feasible for the private developer (the
feasible ROE and DSCR values have been shaded in the respective matrices). For
example, the 40 MW, 10 year Diesel plant gradually becomes feasible in the upper-
right hand corner of the matrix (as expected, due to increasing selling prices, and
reducing discount rates).
All the other plants show the same tendency of becoming more feasible
(measured by both ROE and DSCR) at the upper right hand corner of the matrices.
The diesel and coal plants become feasible for the discount rate-selling price
combinations under consideration, but the hydro plant does not.
(II) Selling Price and Equity Participation
In this analysis, I obtained ROE and DSCR values for different selling price
and equity participation rate combinations, holding the discount rate constant at
15%. I varied the selling price from 2.50 to 5.00 Rs./kWh, and the equity
participation rates from 20% to 50%. The results are presented in Tables 5.15 and
5.16 where the feasible ROE and DCSR values have been shaded.
In this case (as in the previous case), the projects become increasingly feasible
(measured by both ROE and DSCR) as the selling prices and the equity participation
rates increase (in the upper right hand corner of the matrices).
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(III) Discount Rate and Equity Participation
Here, I varied the discount rate and equity participation levels from 8% to
18% and 20% to 50%, holding the selling price constant (the results are presented in
Tables 5.17 and 5.18). Since there are few feasible scenarios at the base selling price
of 2.89 Rs./kWh, I repeated the analysis for selling prices of 3.00 and 3.50 Rs./kWh
(which increased the number of feasible scenarios).
In this analysis, surprisingly, the ROE and DSCR values became increasingly
feasible according to two entirely different patterns (the results are presented in
Appendix 6). For all three selling prices, the ROE values became increasingly
feasible with decreasing discount rates and decreasing equity participation rates (in
the upper left hand corner of the matrices). In contrast, the DSCR values became
more feasible for decreasing ROE values and increasing equity participation rates (in
the lozwer left hand corner of the matrices). Therefore, the feasible projects, would be
where the shaded portions of both sets of matrices (for both ROE values and DSCR
values) overlapped.
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Table.5JA
ROEs for Different Discount Rates and Sellina Prices (Eauity ParticiMation W 30
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
--
Table 5.14
DSCRs for Different Discount Rates and Selling Prices (Eauity Participation: 30%)
Diesel 40 MW. 10 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
8% 1.32
10% 1.17
12% 1.05 1.40
14% 0.95 1.26
16% 0.86 1.14 1.42
18% 0.78 1.03 1.29
20% 0.71 0.94 1.18 1.41
Diesel 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
8% 3
10% 1.42
12% 1.24
14% 1.09 1.46
16% 0.97 1.29
18% 0.87 1.15 1.44
20% 0.78 1.04 1.29
Hydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
8% 1.19 1.44
10% 1.02 1.23 1.43
12% 0.88 1.06 1.24 1.42
14% 0.77 0.92 1.08 1.23 1.39
16% 0.67 0.81 0.94 1.08 1.22 1.35
18% 0.59 0.71 0.83 0.95 1.07 1.19
20% 0.53 0.63 0.74 0.85 0.95 1.06
Coal 300 MW. 15 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
8% 1.18
10% 0.98 1.28
12% 0.83 1.08 1.34
14% 0.70 0.92 1.14 1.35
16% 0.60 0.79 0.97 1.16 1.35
18% 0.52 0.68 0.84 1.00 1.16 1.32
20% 0.46 0.60 0.74 0.88 1.02 1.16
NThe options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
TableA 5.
ROE for Different Selling Prices and Eouity prticiaon Rates (Dicount Rate:15%)
.ILId
options 
which 
meet the 
minimum 
requ
irements have been shade
Table 5.16
DSCRs for Different Selling Prices and Equity Participation Rates (Discount Rate:15%)
Diesel 40 MW. 10 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
20% 0.79 1.05 1.31
25% 0.84 1.12 1.40
30% 0.90 1.20
35% 0.97 1.29
40% 1.05 1.40
45% 1.14
50% 1.26
Diesel 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
20% 0.90 1.20
25% 0.98 1.28
30% 1.03 1. 1.370
35% 1.11 1.48 1.05 1.20 1.35
40% 1.205 1.41
45% 1.3182 0.98 1.
50% 0.86 1.03 1.20 1.38
Hydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
20% 0.66 0.80 0.93 1.07 1.20 1.34
25% 0.69 0.83 0.97 1.11 1.25 1.39
30% 0.72 0.86 1.01 1.25 1.30
35% 0.75 0.90 1.05 1.20 1.35
40% 0.78 0.94 1.10 1.25 1.41
45% 0.82 0.98 1.15 1.31 1.48
50% 0.86 1.03 1.20 1.38
Coal 300 MW .15 Year BOT
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
20% 0.57 0.75 0.92 1.09 1.27 1.44
25% 0.61 0.79 0.98 1.17 1.35
30% 0.65 0.85 1.05 1.25 1.45
35% 0.70 0.92 1.13 1.35
40% 0.76 0.99 1.23 1.46
48% 0.83 1.08 1.34
50% 0.91 1.19 1.47
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
ROEs for Different Discount Ratesd Eauty Particiation ate (Selling Price 2.89 Rs.lkWh)
sel 40 MW. 10 Year BOT
20%
28%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
8%
25%
22%
20%
19%
18%
17%
16%
10%
18%
17%
16%
16%
15%
15%
14%
ese 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10%
20%
25%
30%
28%
26%
24%
35% 25% 22%
40% 23% 21%
45% 22% 20%
50% 21% 19%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
22%
21%
20%
19%
19%
18%
18%
14%
5%
7%
8%
9%
9%
10%
10%
14%
16%
16%
16%
16%
16%
16%16%
16%
-1%
1%
3%
5%
6%
7%
8%
16%
10%
11%
12%
13%
13%
14%
14%
18%
-7%
-4%
-1%
1%
3%
5%
6%
18%
5%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
12%
lydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
8%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
Coal 300 MW. 18 Year BOT
8%
20% 12%
25% 11%
30% 11%
35% 11%
40% 11%
45% 11%
r0o% 11%
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
10%
4%
5%
5%
5%
6%
6%
6%
10%
6%
7%
7%
8%
8%
9%
9%
12%
0%
1%
1%
2%
3%
3%
4%
12%
0%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
14%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
14%
-5%
-3%
-1%
1%
2%
4%
5%
16%
-9%
-8%
-6%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
16%
-10%
-8%
-5%
-3%
-1%
1%
2%
18%
-13%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-7%
-6%
-5%
18%
-15%
-12%
-9%
-7%
-4%
-2%
0%
__I
vw .
DSCRs for Different Discount Rates and Equity Participation Rates (Selling Price 2.89 Rs.lkWh)
Diesel 40 MW. 10 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.45 1.29 1.16 1.04 0.94 0.86
25% 1.38 1.24 1.11 1.01 0.91
30% 1.48 1.32 1.19 1.08 0.98
36% 1.43 1.28 1.16 1.05
40% 1.39 1.26 1.14
45% 1.37 1.24
50% 1.37
Diesel 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.37 1.21 1.07 0.95
25% 1.46 1.29 1.14 1.02
30% 1.38 1.22 1.09
35% 1.48 1.32 1.17
40% 1.43 1.27
465% 0 1.39
50%
Hydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.28 1.09 0.94 0.82 0.72 0.64
25% 1.33 1.14 0.98 0.85 0.75 0.66
30% 1.38 1.18 1.02 0.89 0.78 0.69
35%
40%
45%
50%
1.23 1.06 0.92 0.81 0.72
1.29 1.11 0.97 0.85 0.75
1.34 1.16 1.01 0.89 0.78
1.41 1.22 1.06 0.93 0.82
Coal 300 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.28 1.07 0.90 0.76 0.66 0.57
25% 1.37 1.14 0.96 0.81 0.70 0.61
30% 1.46 1.22 1.03 0.87 0.75 0.65
35% 1.31 1.10 0.94 0.81 0.70
40% 1.42 1.20 1.02 0.87 0.76
45% 1 1.31 1.11 0.95 0.83
50% 1.44 1.22 1.05 0.91
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
CHAPTER 6
Recommendations
In the preceding chapters I explored some of the major problems concerning
the Sri Lankan government, its power planners, and policy makers in related areas.
The main issue which has to be addressed immediately is how essential capacity will
be constructed and funded. Although the government has considered the innovative
BOT scheme which has been gaining considerable attention in the region in recent
years, it is evident that there needs to be a much greater understanding of the
process as well as the essential steps that need to be taken to make this effort a
success. The fact that no single project is in progress, even though a few specific ones
have been talked about, is evidence of this. The recent power cuts that have been
introduced in Sri Lanka further underline the urgency for immediate action on the
part of the government.
In light of the discussion in the preceding chapters, I will now present some
recommendations for the Sri Lankan government and policy makers in the energy
sector. I will first outline some of my main observations about the country's power
sector, and then indicate what must be done to attract private power generation
while keeping the needs of consumers in mind. Finally, I will present approaches to
deal with the crisis, which do not focus exclusively on building additional
generating plants.
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6.1 Observations on the Sri Lankan Power Situation and Recommendations for
Power Planners
* Investment requirements between 1995 and 2000 for new power generating
facilities would exceed $1100 million if the demand for electricity develops at the
predicted rate of 7.9% per year.
* The mix of generating plants and their commissioning periods should closely
follow a carefully thought out optimum generation expansion plan. This plan
should, however, be flexible enough to deal with unexpected future events. (The
current CEB Long Term Generation Expansion Plan 1995-2009 is a good first
step, but this can be improved by more sophisticated modeling schemes which
explore more future scenarios).
* Financing of power generation projects through soft loans have been of overall
benefit to the economy. Therefore, maximum effort must be made to continue to
secure such finances for future projects.
* In the event that soft or concessionary terms for financing of power sector
projects are not forthcoming (as probably will be the case), or if the international
lending agencies would not participate in purely state-owned utility projects, it
would be necessary to establish utility-private sector partnerships to develop the
power generating system in the future.
* Joint projects, or solely private development of power generating capacity,
should continue to be based on overall system least-cost principles so that the
cost of electricity to the consumer will be maintained at the lowest possible level.
It is important to make sure that the private sector is neither subsidized nor
penalized.
* The predominantly hydroelectric power generating system in Sri Lanka should
be operated on least-cost principles with no generating plants operating as
"must-run" units (as is sometimes the case at present). Only the merit order
loading system, with a free hand to the system dispatcher, and with no
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restrictions imposed on generating plant operations, would guarantee the
maximum benefit of the hydro system to the national economy.
* As described earlier, many of the nation's hydroelectricity projects are part of
large multi-purpose schemes. The government should take further steps to
coordinate irrigation needs and power generation in order to reduce some of the
present inefficiencies that arise in these projects. It should also make concerted
efforts to reduce the huge losses in the system.
6.2 The Process of Privatization
The execution of privatization transactions is the last step in a long and often
complex process1 . When state assets are privatized, a variety of social and political
issues come to the surface. The transaction should be consciously pursued in a way
that addresses these competing interests and gains the support of important groups.
At the same time, privatization may also require substantial preparation,
particularly because the complex energy sector may often have to be substantially
restructured for the divestiture to be successful.
The essential first step in the privatization process is to define the goals of the
program as a whole and the political, economic, and social goals of each transaction.
By defining these goals early and incorporating them into the planning and
execution of each stage of the privatization process, the program can move forward
with direction and focus, increasing the likelihood that the goals will be achieved.
While formulating these goals, planners should identify the interests of the
main groups likely to be affected by the process. The following section outlines the
principle stakeholders as well as the interests expressed by the stakeholder groups
in the privatizations White & Case (a law firm involved in privatization of national
oil companies, mainly in the Middle East) have been involved 2:
1 Petroleum Economist Ltd. (in association with Andersen Consulting), The Guide to World Energy
Privatization (London, United Kingdom: March 1995), p.3
2 Petroleum Economist Ltd., The Guide to World Energy Privatization, p.30
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Government
* Prohibit monopolization/encourage sound growth of economy through
provision of competitively-priced electricity.
* Maximize earnings from the sale of existing utilities
* Create an economically viable entity (especially at the end of the lease of BOT
projects)
* Address environmental and pollution concerns
* Obtain access to world-class technology and marketing organizations, thereby
increasing the economic viability of the privatized entity and maximizing its
contribution to the national economy
Company Management
* Participate in the privatization decision-making process
* Maintain employment in the privatized company
* Negotiate a satisfactory salary and benefits package
* Participate in stock ownership plans
* Provide opportunity to participate in growth and success of privatized entity
Employees
* Maintain employment in the privatized company
* Negotiate a satisfactory salary and benefits package
* Participate in stock ownership plans
* Create opportunity to participate in growth and success of privatized entity
Trade Unions
* Ensure that union members do not lose their jobs
* Negotiate a satisfactory salary and benefits package for union members
* Maintain influence in privatized company
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Consumers
* Avoid price increases in electricity
* Create a consumer-oriented company that is responsive to the needs of
consumers
* Address concerns about foreign "control" or "domination" of a key industry
Strategic Investors
* Active management role (though not necessarily majority equity stake) in
company
* Limited regulation by government (e.g., price controls, strategic stocks, realistic
environmental objectives)
* Clearly defined regulatory framework
* Potential risk factors that may affect business and profitability (e.g., political
stability, foreign-exchange restrictions, level of government involvement).
* Anticipated return on investment, based on, among other things, overall energy
demand, market share of company, level of competition and structuring of
feedstock and product offtake arrangements
* Freedom from liability for pre-existing environmental conditions
* Commitment from government that import restrictions and/or tariffs will be
kept in place
* "Compatibility" issues, including corporate culture, management style, and
geographic considerations.
Minority shareholders
* Corporate structure that protects the rights of shareholders
Although power planners cannot satisfy all of the needs of the above
stakeholders, it is important that the planners be aware of the various views of the
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different interest groups. This attentiveness will enable the government to address
and deal with potential opposition to their privatization plans.
6.2.1 Barriers to Private Sector Participation in Sri Lanka
There are a couple of major barriers to private sector participation in the Sri
Lankan power generating sector. These include institutional deficiencies, CEB's
concerns, and uncertainties regarding cost recovery.
Institutional Deficiencies
Two main institutional deficiencies are evident in Sri Lanka's program to
attract and secure private participation: a straightforward and clearly defined
structure for gaining government approval, and a government entity with clear
authority to move projects forward. As a result, private developers may have to
approach as many as five government agencies or ministries to obtain approval for
letters of intent, directives on unsolicited proposals, and decisions on solicited
proposals3 (World Energy Privatization, p.75)
CEB's Concerns
As the purchaser of private power, and owner of the system that would
transmit this power, the CEB plays an instrumental role in the success of private-
sector participation. However, the agency is concerned that unsolicited and hastily-
evaluated proposals for smaller projects can have an adverse impact on long-range
electricity tariff requirements. As a result of the CEB's unenthusiastic support for
private power and the absence of a legally empowered government entity to
promote these projects, key studies to establish the "buy-back" rate or avoided cost
of energy for small- and intermediate-sized projects have been delayed.
3 Petroleum Economist Ltd., The Guide to World Energy Privatization, p.75
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Uncertainties Regarding Cost Recovery
Another significant obstacle to private participation is cost recovery. As the
decision by lenders to finance a non-recourse or limited-recourse project is based
primarily on the project's cash flows, tariff setting and collection should be
economically sound. Tariffs should reflect the real cost of generating and
transmitting electricity, and adjustment formulae should take into account changes
in operating costs, as well as inflation and the exchange rate for local currency vis-A-
vis a hard currency.
As stated before, power generation and transmission in Sri Lanka
traditionally has been financed with government loans containing "soft" terms and
conditions. Thus, existing tariffs do not reflect the actual cost of service. Like most
utilities in other developing countries, those in Sri Lanka usually recover operating
costs but only a very limited portion of capital costs. Compounding the tariff
disparity is the fact that new, private projects are financed with more traditional
lending terms, which include substantially higher interest rates and much shorter
amortization periods.
Taken together, these factors mean that the resulting tariff increases necessary
to support a commercially viable project can be prohibitive and politically
unacceptable. To address this problem, developers, lenders and the government of
Sri Lanka are looking at alternative sources for supplementary finance including:
public/private sector financing, local debt market participation, bridge finance to
mitigate construction risk, co-generation to spread costs, direct and indirect
guarantees from the host government, and indexing payments for inflation factors.
6.2.2 The Need to Balance Costs and Benefits of Private Power Generation
The higher financing costs associated with private power projects must be
balanced against the higher availability and reliability of the services these projects
provide. Reducing power cutbacks significantly increases industrial output (a study
in India has shown that the value of lost industrial output is roughly 18-times the
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value of lost power). The key to the superior performance of private power projects
lies in the stronger incentives generated when sponsors and lenders have their own
capital at risk and face performance-related incentives.
6.2.3 Government Efforts to Facilitate Foreign Investment
Recognizing the various barriers to private participation described above, the
Sri Lankan government has recently made significant efforts to address some of
these problems. Widespread regulatory reform and the establishment of financial
intermediaries with the assistance of international development agencies are among
the more important steps it has taken recently.
Regulatory Reform
The Sri Lankan Government set up the Board of Investment (BoI) as a "one-
stop shop" for foreign investors, and legally endowed it with powers normally
granted to other authorities (planning permission, for example) with respect to
foreign investment projects.
New guidelines clarifying foreign investment incentives and procedures were
published at the end of 1991. Foreign investment is now permitted in all sectors of
the economy except for money lending, retail trade (if the investment is less than $1
million), brokering, coastal fishing, and personal services (except for export or
tourism). There is a further list of regulated activities, including banking and
insurance, where approval is given on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate
regulatory authority.
Investment incentives, which are available to both domestic and foreign
investors, are administered by the BoI. Until recently the incentives included a
number of tax holidays, but these were criticized as unduly narrowing the tax base.
In 1994 the holidays were effectively replaced by a concessionary tax rate of 15% in a
move which also rationalized the incentive structure4.
4 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.48
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The minimum investment required for infrastructure is $25 million for most
projects. Concessions granted include: 15% preferential corporate tax rate for 20
years; duty-free import of project-related items; exemption from all exchange control
regulations; free transferability of shares; and free repatriation of profits and capital
proceeds s .
Financial Intermediaries
The International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan arm of the
World Bank, is assisting Sri Lanka in setting up a new financial intermediary, the
Infrastructure Investment Fund Company (IIFC). The new company will act as an
intermediary in the placement of long-term government guaranteed debt in suitable
private sector infrastructure projects, primarily using BOT and BOO arrangements.
The initial assets that the IIFC will manage will be in excess of US$ 100 million. The
IDA will support the IIFC for an initial period of four years, after which it is
expected to be self-supporting. The IIFC will have the responsibility of evaluating
projects and recommending the placement of IIFC funds6.
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which is affiliated
with the World Bank and provides guarantees against the risks of war, civil
disturbances, expropriation, breach of contract, and currency transfers, has also been
looking for opportunities in Sri Lanka. MIGA was formed in 1988 by 42 World Bank
member countries that subscribed to 53% of the agency's authorized capital of $1.08
billion7. Its aim is to encourage foreign investment in developing countries and offer
advice to would-be recipient countries on how to make themselves more attractive.
Of eight firms registering with the guarantee scheme, seven have been interested in
power projects.
5 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: Sri Lanka, p.48
6 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 4th Quarter 1995: Sri Lanka, p.21
7 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 4th Quarter 1995: Sri Lanka, p.22
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6.3 Further Steps Required to Encourage Private Generation, While Protecting
the Public Interest
Although the Sri Lankan government instituted the above basic measures to
encourage private investment and privatization, it still needs to do much in the
specific area of the privatization of generation. The lack of adequate incentives is
evident by the fact that the country still does not have even a single such scheme in
place. In order to attract private investors, the government needs to create a suitable
business environment by enacting both legislative and regulatory reform, as pointed
out by a recent World Bank reports.
6.3.1 Legislative Reform
Although it is not essential to have a comprehensive legal and regulatory
framework for private sector power in order for a country to undertake private
power projects9, some basic legal provisions must be in force to attract private
investors. These include basic provisions permitting private sector involvement in
the electric power industry, obligating the existing utility to purchase power from
private suppliers where it is economic to do so, and providing for the enforcement
of contracts and settlement of disputes. Disputes should be resolved by clearly
defined and equitable procedures or through binding arbitration. If the basic
enabling legislation exists, private projects can be structured, and obligations can be
clearly defined and established in contractual agreements among the power
producer, the purchaser of power, and the government.
The development of the first private power projects in a host country can set
the stage for the creation of a legal framework that is designed to attract investors
and lenders to private power development. As the private sector role evolves, a
S World Bank, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals for Private Power Generation Projects in
Developing Countries, (Washington DC, USA: 1994), p.8
9 World Bank, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals..., p.7
more comprehensive legal framework can be established. The laws should be simple
and designed to cover the following basic requirements'0 :
* Responsibilities of ministries and government agencies for private power sector
* Utilities and power companies that will be subject to the law
* Issue of licenses, power franchises and trade restrictions
* Responsibilities, obligations, and rights of power purchasers
* Mechanisms for resolving disputes between the power purchaser and the project
developer, owner, or operator
* Enforceability of contractual commitments
* Regulation and control of prices for sales of electricity
* Regulation of the terms and conditions of electric service
* Tax obligations of the private sector
* Objectives and scope of the law in terms of safety and environmental legislation
* Rights related to easements of land for power plants and transmission facilities
* Broad regulations for operation, labor relations, and management oversight
Even if basic in scope, the laws need to be clear. Legislation that gives
government regulators excessive flexibility in approving new projects creates
uncertainty for investors and developers, and this may deter or impede the
privatization process.
6.3.2 Regulatory Reform
As in the case of the legislative framework, an established regulatory
structure is not a requirement for the development of private power projects, but the
existence of one will probably accelerate the process. Normally in private power
projects, the conditions and obligations of the power producer, purchaser, and host
government are clearly defined in specific project documents, such as the
implementation agreement and power purchase agreement. These define the
relationship among the producer, purchaser, and host government and should
0o World Bank, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals..., p.6
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provide safeguards to protect the interests of all parties. The extent of these
safeguards should be determined during the earliest phase of the project. However,
the absence of clear regulations may prolong the negotiations, especially in countries
where government officials do not have a proven background in private power
development issues and where they may lack full authority to make decisions on
behalf of the government. An effective regulatory environment can help to promote
financially sound practices by utilities, and it can thereby increase investors' and
lenders' confidence.
Governments should eventually institutionalize the regulatory process to
reduce the number of conditions that need to be included in the contractual
agreements for private power projects. Governments should also provide published
procedures, including the specific steps and approvals needed for project
processing. These should identify the agency (or agencies) in charge of permit and
licensing procedures, as well as tariff policies, and should address other related
issues. The key features of a sound regulatory framework include the following":
* A transparent and open system
* Clearly articulated regulatory objectives, and wholesale and retail tariff setting
mechanisms
* Clearly stated conditions which enable the market entry and exit of private
companies
* A well-defined process for issuing private power project permits and licenses
Some countries may have an existing regulatory body that governs the
electric power sector, but that entity may not be equipped to handle the approval of
private power developments. Professional management, institutional independence,
and a predictable pricing mechanism are essential characteristics of an effective
regulatory function. The regulatory structure should ensure the financial viability
and creditworthiness of utilities that are to purchase power from private producers.
" World Bank, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals..., p.7
163
If this is not done, investors and lenders are compelled to look to governments to
provide assurances and guarantees.
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CONCLUSION
Sri Lanka's economy began developing rapidly after the introduction of the
liberal, open, economic policy by the Jayawardene government in 1977. The
country's growth rate of around 6 percent has been accompanied by a even higher
growth in demand for electricity of 8 percent. It crucial that the government
carefully plans how to meet this demand, because the World Bank and USAID
reports, and other studies I examined, indicate that provision of necessary
infrastructure (power in particular) is vital for a country's continued economic
progress.
Increased government spending on defense because of the ongoing civil war
in the north and east of the island, has put an enormous strain on the country's
treasury. As indicated in Table 2.9, Sri Lanka's current account deficit in 1994 was
ten percent of GDP. These budgetary difficulties, combined with increasing
worldwide demand for a shrinking pool of development funds available through
international lending agencies such as the World Bank, has made the raising and
disbursement of the US$ 1100 million required for investment in new power
generating capacity between now and the year 2000, a monumental task for Sri
Lanka's policy makers, financiers and its state-owned utility. Given the difficulties of
raising funds through conventional means, it is evident that a large proportion of
the enormous investment in power, which will be crucial for Sri Lanka's drive for
industrialization and its declared social objective of rural electrification by the year
2000, will have to financed through innovative mechanisms.
The means used to finance required investments in power generation will
depend on the organization and ownership of the power sector in the near future. If
the current pattern of state ownership and operation of the sector is continued, the
government may be forced to obtain the required funds directly from international
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capital markets. Countries such as Mexico and Chile have raised infrastructure
funds directly on the New York Stock Exchange, using instruments such as ADRs.
Other sources of funds which can be utilized for this purpose, such as Global Power
Investments and the Asian Infrastructure Fund, are described in Table 4.1.
Alternatively, Sri Lanka could turn to the private sector for infrastructure
provision. Although it can attempt to emulate the systems in place in western
industrialized countries such as the US or Britain, the Sri Lankan government is
considering more strongly, schemes such as BOT and its variants, which have been
introduced in rapidly growing countries in the Asian region. The eventual reversion
of the assets to state control in these models for privatization make them more
politically feasible.
The BOT method, a scheme used with considerable success in countries such
as the Philippines and China, can be characterized as a non-recourse method of
financing, because lenders look solely to the cash flows of the project to repay debt
service, and have no recourse to other assets of the project participants if things go
wrong. Therefore, it can used with success only in cases where the project is clearly
capable of supporting the debt incurred. Most BOT projects are extremely difficult
and uncertain undertakings, and the formalized risk relationships between
government, lenders, investors, and contractors form the crux all such projects.
These crucial ties should be addressed, arranged, documented, and regulated by the
government who must design a workable formula that gives all involved parties the
confidence that no single group is taking unreasonable risk or benefiting from
unentitled reward. As a result of the complexity of the BOT scheme, many projects
in Pakistan and even a few in Sri Lanka have failed at the negotiating stage.
However, countries such as the Philippines, which have a careful and methodical
planning process, have utilized the BOT model with considerable success.
The various forms of financial, political and technical risks I outlined in
chapter 5 increase the return on equity demanded by potential investors in BOT
schemes. The increase in the required ROE in turn raises the price at which the Sri
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Lanka government purchases power from private developers - a cost which it
subsequently passes on to domestic consumers. The whole economy of the country
is then adversely affected, because electricity is a vital input in most forms of
production, and rapid increases in its price will contribute to domestic inflation. This
series of events may result in a harmful vicious cycle, because foreign developers in
the power sector require their return in a major currency (usually dollars), and have
to be paid more in terms of these inflated rupees, resulting in even higher levels of
inflation. Therefore, it is vital that the government carefully examines the
relationships among the discount rates, selling prices, and equity participation rates
of the projects that are under consideration.
At the end of chapter 5, I examined the relationships among the above three
factors using cashflow models of four projects - diesel 40 MW (10 year BOT), diesel
40 MW (15 year BOT), hydro 70 MW (15 year BOT) and coal 300 MW (15 year
BOT)- and determined the viability of the projects from the investors' perspective
under various combinations of the variables. The crucial figure associated with each
viable project' is the "selling price" or the price at which the state would have to
purchase the privately generated electricity, and this value should be compared with
the long-term average price calculated by the CEB for its own 20-year generation
plan: 2.89 Rs./kWh. At a discount rate of 15% (a reasonable rate for the projects
under consideration), only the two diesel plants are viable at a selling prices of
around 3.50-4.00 Rs./kWh. The hydro and coal plants are not viable at even 5.00
Rs./kWh.
Therefore, my analysis suggests that for private generation by the BOT
method to be viable in Sri Lanka, the government should either be prepared to pay
vastly increased prices for electricity (and pass on this cost to consumers by massive
tariff increases), or take active measures to reduce the required ROE for projects in
Sri Lanka. Since the former strategy alone is clearly infeasible, the state should
actively pursue the latter. The required ROE for a project is directly tied to the
1 A "viable" project was defined as one which had ROE>30% and DSCR>1.5
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various risks associated with doing business in Sri Lanka, and in order to reduce it,
the government should examine each of the financial, political, and technical risks,
and take steps to mitigate it.
An extremely important first step is to bring peace and stability to the
country. The current high levels of domestic government borrowing (to finance its
defense expenditure) have pushed up interest rates. Since the ROE is usually set at
10 percentage points above the prime lending rate (as described in chapter 5),
reducing interest rates will lower required ROEs. The government should also
institute a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework, according to the
guidelines described in chapter 6. This will result in increased investor confidence in
the country, and hence reduce the required ROE for domestic projects. When
determining the course of power sector privatization in Sri Lanka, policy makers
should examine related experiences of nations in the region, and implement proven
measures that are compatible with the economic, political and social realities in the
country. I have briefly outlined the power situation (and private power generation)
in some neighboring countries, in Appendix 4, to give the reader an idea of how
other nations are dealing with problems similar to those faced by Sri Lanka.
As I stated at the outset, this thesis focuses mainly on how the government
will finance required investment for additional generation capacity to meet
projected demand growth rates of 8 percent per annum. In addition to using
innovative financing schemes for this purpose, policy makers in the power sector
should also implement measures which will reduce the demand growth rate without
compromising economic growth. I have outlined some possible approaches it may
consider are outlined in Appendix 5, to give the reader an idea of the larger
framework within which BOT and other privatization schemes should be
implemented.
The period from now till 2000 will be critical for the Sri Lankan economy.
Since many other nations in the region are growing at a rapid pace, Sri Lanka faces
the danger of falling behind in the race for attracting the crucial foreign investment
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required for further development. Proper infrastructure, especially a reliable and
adequate supply of electricity, is an important requirement for making the country
attractive to potential investors in other sectors of the economy. If the current civil
war in the north and east of the nation stops in the near future, there will be a host of
new growth opportunities, which will place additional strains on the nation's
existing generating capacity. It is crucial therefore, that the country develops a
flexible, realistic generation expansion plan which will meet future requirements,
while securing the capital necessary to implement it.
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APPENDIX 3
Ingredients of Good Performance Under Alternative
Institutional Forms
Public Ownership and Public Operation1
* Government roles as owner, regulator, an d operator clearly separated.
* No government interference in detailed management.
* Public enterprises subject to general commercial law and to general accounting and
auditing standards (operating on "level playing field" with private enterprises).
* Tariffs set to achieve cost recovery as appropriate, and enterprise subject to hard
budget.
* Public service operations, if any, targeted and compensated explicitly by
government transfers.
* Managers selected by professional qualifications and compensated appropriately.
* Appropriate mechanisms in place to obtain feedback from users.
* Discrete activities and functions that can be unbundled open to private entry (for
example through service contracts).
* Private management skills obtained as needed entry (for example through
management contracts).
* Ownership and control shared with the private sector (for example, as minority
shareholder).
Public Ownership and Private Operation
* Basic legal framework of contract law, including credible enforcement mechanisms
in place.
SWorld Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, p.111
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* Contracts clearly specify monitorable performance targets, responsibilities of owner
and operator, processes for periodic review (especially to account for unforeseen
changes in input costs), mechanisms to resolve disputes and sanctions for non
performance.
* Contracts awarded by transport selection process, preferably competitive bidding.
Private Ownership and Private Operation
* Appropriate competitive restructuring of subsector undertaken
* Practical and statutory barriers to private entry removed (for example, restrictions
on access to credit and foreign exchange).
* Regulation in place to protect public interest when competitive discipline is
insufficient and to ensure private entrants access to network facilities when relevant
Community and User Provision
* Participation of users or community members from earliest stage of program
preparation to ensure willingness to pay and ownership of scheme.
* Participation of beneficiaries ensured through appropriate organizational means,
and with contributions in kind or in cash.
* User group supported by access to training and technical assistance from sectoral
agency or non-governmental organizations.
* Appropriate consideration given to technical requirements for interconnection with
primary or secondary network infrastructure, if relevant.
* Service operators appropriately trained, compensated, and held accountable.
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APPENDIX 4
Case Studies from Other Developing Nations
The exceptionally rapid pace of growth in the Asian region has resulted in a
surge of infrastructure building among nations in the area2. In early 1994, the Asian
Development Bank estimated that the region would spend $1 trillion by the year 2000,
primarily on energy, telecommunications, and transportation. However, this estimate is
viewed as conservative by Hong Kong's Peregrine group which estimates that China,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the five biggest nations in Southeast Asia will
require US$ 1.9 trillion for this purpose. These Asian nations see infrastructure as a key
requirement to their continued growth as their cheap-labor advantage begins to
diminish as they move toward fully industrialized status.
Reliable electric power is necessary for economic development in the Third
World as it has been for developed countries3. Despite major changes since the Arab oil
embargo in the late 1970s, the overall relationship between energy growth and GDP
growth in industrial countries has been close to one-to-one.
Electricity use in the commercial and residential sectors of many nations is rising
sharply, and in some countries has even outstripped industrial sector consumption.
Furthermore, many of these countries have adopted aggressive plans for rural
electrification in an effort to decentralize their populations and to distribute the benefits
of economic growth. Therefore, the requirements for electric power in the region are
huge, and have been estimated at around 225 GW before the year 2000.
As a result of the inability of many Asian governments to invest adequately in
their power sectors, the demand for electric services has risen more rapidly than supply,
2 Business Week, "Building the New Asia", November 28,1994
3 USAID, Power Shortages in Developing Countries...., p.v
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and many countries now face critical power shortages of over 10 percent of their
generation capability. These power shortages and unmet demands for power present
significant economic problems. In Pakistan, for example, USAID estimated that load
shedding in the industrial sector alone has led to a 1.8 percent decrease in GDP and a
4.2 percent decrease in the country's foreign exchange earnings4. In India, the current 10
percent average supply cut to the industrial sector is estimated to cause an annual
production loss of over US$ 6 billion-equivalent to 12 percent of the country's
industrial output5. Consequently providing the required power for development has
become a major concern among Asian governments, who have adopted various
strategies for meeting this challenge.
In this appendix I will examine the electric power situation in some Asian
countries and explore the various steps they have taken to meet future demand. The
nations I will look at are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
Although these nations have had various degrees of success in meeting their goals of
electricity provision, and in some instances are faced with unique national
circumstances, their experiences still provide valuable insights to planners in the Sri
Lankan power sector.
4 USAID, Power Shortages in Developing Countries...., p.v
5 USAID, Power Shortages in Developing Countries...., p.v
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China
Basic Facts6
Land Area 3,696,100 sq mi (9,561,000 sq km)
Population 1,203,097,268
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 2.6 trillion
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 2,200
National Budget (1994 estimate) US$ 61.4 billion
Currency Yuan/Renminbi (Y/Rmb)
Exchange rate (May 1995) Rmb 8.3: US$ 1
Change in CPI (inflation) 17%
Electricity 740 billion kWh
The Power-Sector, and Privatization Efforts
In spite of China's rapid economic growth, which requires a substantial amount
of new power capacity, many project development teams are having problems with the
country's slow bureaucratic process. Estimates for the amount of new capacity needed
in China by the year 2000 range from between 80,000 MW to 137,000 MW7 . Even taking
the conservative estimate, this translates into 16,000 MW of new power plants each
year. These figures will be daunting even for a country with flexible and inviting
foreign investment laws, but in China, where the investment process is hampered by
excessive regulation and bureaucracy, the goal seems more difficult to attain.
China's provincial governments have been given freedom to approve power
projects that cost less than US$ 30 millions . Although these projects are small in size,
many foreign companies seem eager to get regulatory approval to build them. A
strategy some have pursued is to apply for several of these small plants. Once
permission is granted, the company can group the projects under one holding company,
and then get financial backing from the debt and equity markets. Structuring one
medium-sized financing is easier than doing so for several small deals, and the
regulatory process is accelerated by circumventing the cumbersome procedure of
6 World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, Funk and Wagnells Corporation (New Jersey, USA: 1995), and
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1995-96: China, Electronic Publishing Services (London,
United Kingdom: 1995).
7 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p.53
8 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p.54
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dealing with Beijing. The companies can thus continue to increase their generating
capacity, and hence the total power output each manages, so long as each new plant is
worth less than the US$ 30 million.
An example of this investment strategy is the financing of the Hui Lo power
plant in Luoding City, Guangdong Province. A six-year loan was signed in October
1995 by Finenco China Investment for US$ 20.5 million with a consortium of five Italian
banks, led by Banca Commerciale Italiana9. Another similar example is the Pan Jin Liao
He Thermal Power Company, which received debt financing to construct and develop a
power plant, located in Panjin City, Liaoning Province. The US$ 20 million loan was
arranged by CCIC Finance, with four other banks participating. Although this strategy
of building small power plants leaves many investment opportunities in China's power
sector untapped, some investors see it as a way around the bureaucratic nightmares of
dealing with the Beijing authorities.
Independent Power Producers- China 10
Jingyuan II - 600 MW
Status In Progress
Cost US$ 400 million
Sponsors CEA (30%), State Development Bank (50%), Gansu Electric Power, Gansu
Energy Construction Investment (10%)
Financing US$ 100 million equity
Nanhai Electric - 600 MW
Status In progress
Cost US$ 205 million
Sponsors Cheung Kong (30%), Nahai government (70%)
Financing US$ 90 million seven-year loan with Gitic guarantee; US$ 40 million four year loan
guarantee by Nanhai Itic
9 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p.54
to Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, pp.4 0-4 1
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Rizhao Project - 2x350 MW, coal-fired plant
Status 1999
Cost US$ 650 million
Sponsors China Power Investment Corporation, Shangdong Huaneng Power Development,
Shangdong International Trust & Investment Corporation, Rizhao Economic Development
Corporation, Shangdong, Electric Power, United Development Inc.
Financing Equity US$ 150 million, domestic loans US$ 150 million, export/commercial loans US$ 350
million
Shanjio B Power Station - 2x350 MW, coal-fired plant
Shanjio C Power Station - 3x660 MW, coal-fired plant
Status 1996 contract completion
Cost US$ 1.9 billion
Sponsors CEPA Energy (BVI) (CEPA's interest 27%), Cachelot, Bank of China Group Investment
Laito, Bank of China Group Insurance, Kanematsu Corp Nam Tung (Macao)
Investment, Fortune Wheel Investment, The Ming An Insurance Co (HK), Stenus Nisso
Iwai Hong Kong
Financing Syndicated loans 49%; early completion and shareholders' loans 51%
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Status 1997 contract completion
Cost HK$ 4.1 billion
Sponsors CEPA Power China (BVI) (CEPA's interest 50%), Bank of China, Group
Investment Kanematau Corp, Yue Xiu Enterprise (Holdings), Shum Yip Development
Equity 20%; syndicated loans 80%
India
Basic Facts"
Land Area 1,222,243 sq mi (9,561,000 sq kmin)
Population 936,545,814
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 1.7 trillion
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 1,300
National Budget (1994 estimate) US$ 45.1 billion
Currency Rupees (Rs.)
Exchange rate (May 1995) Rs. 31.42: US$1
Change in CPI (inflation) 10.2 %
Electricity 324 billion kWh
The Power-Sector, and Privatization Efforts
Power demand in India is growing rapidly with industrial development but the
(overwhelmingly) public sector generators are unable to meet it12. The total installed
electricity capacity in public utilities at the end of 1993/94 was 76,713 MW, following an
increment of 4,450 MW that year. Of the total, 22% was hydroelectric, 2% nuclear and
76% thermal' 3. There was also 10,200 MW capacity in non-utilities like the Tata station,
which supplies Bombay. Generation and transmission are inefficient, with an average
57% plant load factor in 1993/94 in thermal plants (although this is an enormous
improvement on the 44% in 1980/81). Power actually generated by utilities in 1993/94
was 324 billion kWh (356 billion kWh overall)14. The shortage of power at peak times is
close to 20% and is significantly worse in some states which have extensive "brown
outs".
· 1~Sm~ n~~f~~~~ln ~F~sI sR YMINI
20.4
54.3
2.0
10.2
86.9
70.4
247.8
5.4
32.1
355.6
" World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, and EIU Country Profile 1995-96: India
12 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: India, p.29
13 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: India, p.29
'4 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: India, p.29
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Hydro
Thermal
Nuclear
Non-utilities
Total
As India develops further, with domestic use of appliances growing and power
supplies extending to rural areas, demand will continue to grow rapidly, probably more
than the 8% per year of the last two decades. An official long-term forecast states that
465 billion kWh will be needed annually by the year 2000. These investment
requirements are far beyond the capacity of the public sector. Although, 5,000-7,000
MW of new capacity annually is needed, recent installation is below that level
(averaging 4,000 MW per year in the 1990s so far.)
In 1991 the government decided to welcome private companies into power
generation. It promised a minimum 16% rate of return (with a foreign exchange
guarantee) and various incentives to raise profits if the plant load factor rises above
68.5%. To provide comfort against non-payment by state electricity boards, the central
government has offered a counter guarantee to the most advanced projects (eight, with
a combined capacity of 5,000 MW). Some 140 proposals have been made including more
than 40 from foreign investors.
The above government effort suffered a setback in 1995, when the Maharashtra
state government put a freeze on a US$ 2.8 billion concession to build a 2,015 MW
project led by Enron Corp15. This happened even though most of the US$ 150 million
offshore commercial loan component of the US$ 1.2 billion financing has already been
drawn down. The reasons cited for the state government's action included capital costs,
payment terms, environmental protection. Its main assertion was that the cost of
electricity would be too high-- Enron was to receive 2.40 rupees or seven US cents per
kWh from the Maharashtra State Electricity Board. In November 1995, however, Enron
reached a compromise with the Maharashtra government which included a reduction in
the tariff price to reportedly six US cents. The project has been resumed, but the delay
has been extremely costly- US$ 250,000 a day, according to Enron.
While Enron may have saved its Maharashtra project, the north-western Indian
state of Rajasthan has rejected its offer to set up a 2,400 MW solar power plant and sell
15 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p.35
182
electricity at Rs. 5.12 per unit for 25 years16. Instead, it accepted the offer of Energen
International, a consortium of German and Sri Lankan companies, to provide energy at
Rs. 2.61 per unit for seven years. The electricity will be generated from a 200 MW solar
plant to be set up in Jaisalmer at an estimated cost of US$ 200 million. This project will
carry no state guarantees.
The Rajasthan government also signed a letter of intent with British Power
Industries to develop 10 naphtha-based power plants of 40 MW each. The company
secured the contract with an offer to sell electricity at Rs. 2.10 a unit. It was the lowest
bid of the 66 companies that submitted proposals.
Independent Power Producers - India 7 (Asia Money 40-41)
Ib Valle - 420 MW
Status Financing in Progress
Cost US$ 632 million
Sponsors AES
Financing US$ 100 million local bank loan; US$ 240 million offshore loan, backed by US-Exim; US$
75 million OPIC loan; US$ 20 million each from IFC and ADB
Jegrupadu power project - 235 MW
Status Financing in Progress
Cost US$ 300 million
Sponsors GVK, CMS, ABB
Financing Bank loan, equity; IFC: US$ 8 million equity, US$ 40 million A loan, US$ 70 million B
loan, in syndication
6 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p.69
7 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p.40-41
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Kakinada - 208 MW
Status In progress; PPA review
Cost US$ 247 million
Sponsors Spectrum technologies, Bambino
Financing US$ 79 million ECGD buyer credit; IDBI-arranged local debt
Orissa - coal-fired plant
Cost US$ 633 million
Sponsors AES
Financing Equity 28%; Debt 72%: ADB, IFC, OPIC, US-Exim
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Indonesia
Basic Facts'"
Land Area 741,052 sq mi (9,561,000 sq km)
Population 203,583,886
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 571 billion
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 2,900
National Budget (1994 estimate) US$ 32.8 billion
Currency Rupiah (Rp)
Exchange rate (May 1995) Rp 2,236: US$1
Change in CPI (inflation) 8.5 %
Electricity 45.8 billion kWh
The Power Generation Sector
The absence of adequate power generation and distribution capacity has long
been recognized as an important constraint to Indonesia's overall development; thus,
the government has made considerable efforts to address this problem since the early
1970s. The state-owned electricity company Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara (PLN) is
an integrated corporation responsible for generating, transmitting, and distributing
electricity throughout the country. It has undertaken large investments, involving
substantial financial assistance from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), and raised its generating capacity from 776 MW in 1973 to an estimated 13,569
MW in fiscal year 1993/9419.
Aware of the growing threat of a depletion of its exploitable oil reserves in the
coming years, the Indonesian government has sought to diversify the structure of the
power-generating industry and to increase the share of its capacity based on non-oil
energy sources. It has emphasized the establishment of gas and coal-based power plants
and taken steps to develop Indonesia's hydropower and geothermal energy resources.
In addition, the government has also announced a plan to establish a nuclear power-
generating capacity in the foreseeable future.
8 World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, and EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Indonesia
9 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Indonesia, p.37
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Distribution of energy production by source 20
Oil 11,169 51.8 19,515 47.7
Coal 4,920 22.8 10,438 25.5
Hydropower 4,457 20.7 8,788 21.5
Geothermal 719 3.3 1,084 2.7
Natural Gas 293 1.4 1,075 2.6
Total 21,559 100.0 40,900 100.0
Coal-based generation
Indonesia's first major coal-fired generating facility, the Suralaya power station
in West Java, became operational in 1985. The plant has since been expanded to four
units of 400 MW each, with a further three units with a total capacity of 1,800 MW
currently under construction and due to be completed between February 1997 and
February 1998. Additional coal-fired generating capacity is also being established at the
Paiton complex at Probolinggo in East Java which is due to come on steam in 1999. A
number of smaller projects for coal-based power generation are also in progress near
Bukit Asam and Ombilin coal mines in South Sumatra and West Sumatra respectively,
while negotiations are currently in progress for the establishment of another large-scale
privately operated plant at Tanjung Jati near the town of Jepara in Central Java.
Gas-fired plants
From 42,000 kW in 1973, Indonesia's gas-fired power generating capacity
increased to 1,243 MW in fiscal year 1993/94, in addition to which an additional
capacity of 1,817 MW of combined-cycle gas and coal fired capacity has been
established since 199121. The most important of these gas-fired and combined-cycle
plants are located in the industrial town of Gresik and at the Paiton power station in
East Java, and at the Muara Karang and Tanjung Priok power stations in Jakarta. Other
large-scale combined-cycle plants are being built, or planned, at Muara Tawar in West
20 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Indonesia, p.38
21EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Indonesia, p.38
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Java, Tambak Lorak in Central Java, Grati/Pasuruan in East Java, and the port city of
Belawan in North Sumatra.
Hydroelectric potential
Indonesia's potential exploitable capacity of hydroelectric power is estimated at
more than 75,600 MW per year, of which nearly a third is located in Irian Jaya. To date,
less than 3% of this potential capacity has been tapped, with total installed hydropower
capacity amounting to less than 2,200 MW in fiscal year 1993/9422. A number of large
hydroelectric plants are under construction in Sumatra.
Geothermal potential
Because of its volcanic geology, Indonesia has large geothermal reserves, and 217
sites have so far been identified throughout Indonesia with a total potential capacity of
about 16,000 MW of geothermal power. A significant further expansion of geothermal
power generating capacity is planned for the coming years, mainly by private investors.
Nuclear potential
Indonesia does not possess a commercial nuclear power generating capacity, but
research into the feasibility of installing such a capacity is in progress. The National
Atomic Energy Board (Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional, BATAN), has been granted the
exclusive right to explore and develop Indonesia's uranium resources. A major
technical research center has also been set up by BATAN at Serpong near Jakarta, where
a 30-MW research reactor and a plant for the production of fuel elements were
inaugurated in August 1987. A proposal to build a commercial nuclear power station
with a capacity of 600-1,000 MW at Mount Muria in Central Java is under consideration,
with construction expected to commence in 1996 despite strong public opposition
within Indonesia and abroad.
22 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Indonesia, p.38
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Private Participation
The role of private participation in generation is expected to increase
dramatically following the introduction of new government policies since September
1990 to encourage private investment under a variety of BOO and BOT arrangements.
This government action has resulted in a surge of investment interest from a number of
domestic business groups, several of which have entered into joint ventures with
foreign firms to establish plants by the end of the current decade or in the opening years
of the next.
Independent Power Projects- Indonesia23 (Asia Money 40-41)
Bumpi Serpong Damai - 200 MW
Status Financing in Progress
Cost US$ 500 million
Sponsors British Gas (56%), Bakerie (25%), AIG, PT Binatek Widiapratama (19%)
Financing Bank Loans; US-Exim Loan
PT Cikarang Listrindo (P2) - 140 MW
Status 1996
Cost Not Available
Sponsors PT Cikarang Listrindo
Financing Indonesian Bank Loans; US-Exim
Corridor Block Gas - gas plant
Status In Progress
Cost US$ 650 million
Sponsors Gulf Canada (54%), Talisman Energy (36%), Pertamina (10%)
Financing Equity; US$ 450 million debt
Jawa Power (Paiton II) - 1,120 MW
Status PPA signed; Financing in progress
Cost US$ 1.6 billion
Sponsors Siemens (50%), PowerGen (35%), PT Bumipertwi Tatapradipta (15%)
Financing Equity; US-Exim and Hermes cover; commercial loans
23 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p.40-4 1
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PT Paiton Energy - 1,230 MW, coal plant
Status 1999
Cost US$ 2.5 billion
Sponsors Mission Energy BV (32.5%), PT Batu Hitam Perkasa (15%)
Financing Equity 27%; JEXIM, US-Exim, OPIC, international banks with MI, commercial banks
Sengkang power proje - 135 MW
Status Negotiating PPA
Cost US$ 240m
Sponsors Energy Equity
Financing Equity, loan, export credits
Tanjung Jati Power Station- 2x660 MW
Status 1999 contract completion
Cost US$ 1.8 billion
Sponsors PT CEPA Indonesia, (CEPA's interest 100%)
Financing Exim credit 73%; multilateral agencies 21%; bank loans 6%
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Malaysia
Basic Facts24
Land Area 127,584 sq mi (9,561,000 sq km)
Population 19,723,587
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 141 billion
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 7,500
National Budget (1994 estimate) US$ 18.0 billion
Currency Malaysian dollar or Ringgit (M$ or RM)
Exchange rate (May 1995) M$ 2.47: US$1
Change in CPI (inflation) 3.7 %
Electricity 30.6 billion kWh
The Electricity Sector
The average annual growth in electricity demand for Peninsula Malaysia for the
past decade was 8.7 percent and since 1988, the growth rate has been greater than 12
percent. Electricity demand growth has consistently outpaced GDP growth and this
trend is expected to continue in the future25.
The Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications, and Posts is responsible for many
of the operational functions of the electric power sector 26. The three utilities in Malaysia,
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), Sabah Electricity Board (SEB), and Sarawak Electricity
Supply Corporation (SESCO), handle power planning within their respective regions.
Electricity Production27
Hydro (MW) 1,427 1,421 1,431 1,431
Diesel(MW) 574 557 495 444
Gas Turbine (MW) 381 384 384 486
Steam (MW) 2,230 2,530 2,490 2,490
Combine Cycle 870 870 870 870
Total 5,482 5,762 5,670 5,721
24 World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, and EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Malaysia
25 Muthiah, Shanthi, Privatization and Restructuring of the Electric Power Sector in Malaysia: Implications
of Pricing Policy (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge: September 1995), p.45
26 Muthiah, Shanthi, Privatization and Restructuring..., p.37
27 Muthiah, Shanthi, Privatization and Restructuring..., p.47
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Privatization
In 1987, the government commissioned a study which examined the possibility
of privatization of NEB in detail28. After much debate about the most efficient and
appropriate utility structure, and whether it should be fragmented by function or by
region, it was decided that the National Electricity Board would be privatized in total.
The objectives of privatization were determined to be as follows:
* To raise efficiency and productivity by making managers accountable for
performance; this was to be accomplished through employee incentives and the
freeing of the enterprise from political supervision and civil service rigidities
* To promote competition
* To relieve the financial and administrative burden of the government to leave the
government free to concentrate on maintaining law and order and ensuring
economic growth with equitable distribution
* To reduce the size and presence of the public sector
* To broaden the base of ownership and participation from the public, specifically
while meeting the targets of government plans
* To facilitate economic growth
The first step in the privatization process was taken by incorporating the NEB
into Tenaga Nasional Berhad in 1990. This involved the passage of enabling legislation,
a close examination and resolution of a large number of legal matters, including issues
of land tenure and rights-of-way that had to be transferred from the public to the
private domain, and provisions for the change of status of about 25,000 government
employees. Additionally, the regulatory framework was drastically altered, primarily
with the introduction of the Electricity Supply Act through which the Department of
Electricity Supply (DES) was created. All legal and regulatory provisions were
transferred to this department. Within this context, DES is responsible for ensuring
adequate electricity supply and quality for current and future needs, as well as
reasonable pricing and protection for customers. While DES was established through an
28Muthiah, Shanthi, Privatization and Restructuring..., p.47
act of parliament and is legally independent of the Ministry of Energy,
Telecommunications and Posts, there is considerable consultation and coordination
between the two departments.
Independent Power Producer Program
The IPP Program was born out of three primary needs - to alleviate the power
shortage problems, to induce competition, and to lessen the financial burden on the
government. The privatization of TNB had served as the initial step to prepare for
competition, and in 1992, the government (EPU) announced its interest in introducing
competition vis a vis the Independent Power Program. Thereafter, the private sector
provided unsolicited proposals, consistent with the guidelines of the Privatization
Masterplan. There has been a very loose framework for processing and accepting of
these proposals and to date, no concrete framework or set guidelines has been issued.
The entire process of IPP negotiations and approval has been very politically
sensitive. Two of the consortiums were explicitly invited by the government, while in
the others, the composition of shareholders and investors were influenced by political
connections and implicit government policy. The terms negotiated were very favorable
to the IPPs, who were faced with fairly low risks and were awarded high purchase
prices.
Despite the numerous applications received, only five IPPs were granted licenses
in the 1992-1993 period for a total generating capacity of 4500 MW. The plants are
expected to come on line by 1997 at which time the reserve margin capacity may reach
50 percent29. However, this margin will most likely reduce to the targeted 30 percent by
1999 or the year 2000 as a result of the rapid growth in demand.
Most of the IPPs use natural gas from small fields or associated oilfield gas
(which would otherwise be flared wastefully) in combined-cycle gas-turbine generators.
These provide cheap and reliable power with little net impact on the environment. The
World Bank has recommended maximum exploitation of this resource before Malaysia
29Muthiah, Shanthi, Privatization and Restructuring.... p.49
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builds any more large hydroelectric stations. Nevertheless, the government is
proceeding with two very large hydroelectric schemes which involve the displacement
of aboriginal families as well as the clearing and flooding of large areas of virgin
rainforest. These actions have been the subject of particular controversy.
One of these schemes, on the River Pergau in the north-east peninsular state of
Kelantan, is being built by British contractors who were awarded the tender for the
work because the UK government offered a heavily-subsidized loan out of aid funds to
finance it. The offer had originally been improperly linked to the sale of British military
aircraft and weaponry. In turn net economic benefit of the finished scheme to
Malaysians has been questioned. This complication prompted a UK court ruling that
the use of aid funds on the project was unlawful, and the UK government has had to
pay for the subsidy out of general funds.
The second of the large hydroelectric schemes, the 2,400 MW Bakun dam project
in Sarawak, is more ambitious and technically much more difficult. It requires the
flooding of an area of virgin forest larger than Singapore island. Power demand in
Sarawak and the adjacent area will be quite insufficient to absorb the output, and it is
proposed that power will be transmitted to Peninsular Malaysia via a 1,200 km cable,
650 km of which will run under the sea30 . States operate environmental controls over
such development sites in Malaysia, and development permission was granted last
year, allowing the local company responsible for the project to fell valuable timber.
There has been much criticism, within Malaysia as well as abroad, because the technical
feasibility study for the transmission line had yet to be completed, and Sarawak does
not provide for full public examination of the environmental impact assessment (EIA)
on which its approval of the development was based.
30 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Malaysia, p.29
193
Independent Power Projects - Malaysia 3'
Bakun - 2,400 MW
Cost US$ 4 billion
Sponsors Ekran (51%), Tenaga, EPF, Hicom
Financing 65:35 debt to equity expected, mostly by local banks
Genting Sanyen Power - 720 MW, gas-fired plant
Status 1996
Cost US$ 700 million
Sponsors Genting Sanyen Malaysia (40%), British Gas (20%), Tenaga (20%), Worldwide Holdings
(20%)
Financing Equity 25%; Maybank Bhd 75% (non recourse)
Port Dickson Power - 440 MW, gas & distillate
Status 1996
Cost Not available
Sponsors Sime Darby (40%), Malaysian Resources (30%), Hypergantics (20%), Tenaga (10%)
Financing Malaysian Bank loans, Malaysia EPF bonds
Powertek - 440 MW
Status In commission 1995
Cost M$ 700 million
Sponsors Cegas Unggul (35%), AMDB (30%), Malacca SEDC (20%), individuals (15%)
Segari- 1,300 MW
Cost M$ 4 billion
Sponsors Segari Energy Ventures, Malaysian Resources Corp, Tenaga, Perak government
Sikap Energy Ventures - 1,303 MW
Cost M$ 4 billion
Sponsors Malakoff (75%), Tenaga (20%), Malaysian Resources (5%)
YTL Power Generation - 1,212 MW
Status In commission 1997
Cost M$ 3.4 billion
Sponsors YTL (60%), Tenaga (20%), EPF (10%), Maybank (5%), John Liang (5%)
3 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p. 40-41
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Philippines
Basic Facts 32
Land Area 115,860 sq mi (9,561,000 sq km)
Population 73,265,584
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 171 billion
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 2,500
National Budget (1994 estimate) US$ 13.0 billion
Currency Peso (P)
Exchange rate (May 1995) P 26.02: US$ 1
Change in CPI (inflation) 9.1 %
Electricity 28 billion kWh
The Power-Sector
The power generating capacity of the Philippines was 6,927 MW at the end of
1993, of which 2,244 MW was from hydroelectric, 3,095 MW was from oil-fired and 550
MW was from coal-fired plants. Geothermal capacity was 1,038 MW3. There was no
major increase in capacity in the mid-1980s, and this, combined with the effect of
drought and the destruction of watershed areas in Mindanao produced a serious
shortage of power in 1991-93. In May 1992 the deficit on the Luzon grid had reached
1,000 MW. Around 620 MW of this was supposed to have been covered by the country's
nuclear power plant, Bataan, which was due to begin operation in 1986. The Aquino
government halted the project, largely for safety reasons, because the project-site is
located near a seismic fault line. The already severe power shortage was intensified
because the installation of coal-fired and combined plants also failed to materialize.
The Ramos government launched a fast-track program of electricity expansion to
eliminate the electricity shortage by the end of the 1993. Improved weather conditions
and additions to thermal capacity had reduced the deficiency in Minandao to about 10%
by the final quarter of 1993, and daily power cuts in Luzon had ceased by November.
By the end of 1994 power-generating capacity was about 9,000 MW. A substantial
contribution to the increase came from plants built under BOO agreements, and this
method of financing will grow in importance in order to meet the targets of the state
32 World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, and EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Philippines
33 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Philippines, p.27
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utility's power development program. An additional power capacity of 30,000 MW is
expected to be added by the year 2010, with coal-fired plant increasing its share of the
total to 63% and gas's share (supplied from the offshore fields), increasing to 10%34.
However, the greatest potential for expansion in Philippines' power generation
capacity, in the long term, lies in geothermal energy. Geothermal power generation on a
commercial scale began in 1979 and the level of production is now second in the world
only to that of the USA. Further expansion of generation is expected to arise out of the
major geothermal development program currently in progress.
Electricity Production (in kWh)35
Oil-fired 9,542 9,788 10,699 10,598 10,936
Hydro 6,212 6,473 6,051 5,097 4,236
Geothermal 4,842 5,316 5,463 5,760 5,700
Coal-fired 2,344 2,223 1,716 1,942 1,977
Gas turbine 0.0 287 851 2,023 2,701
Total 22,940 24,087 24,780 25,420 25,550
Privatization Schemes
The Philippines is aggressively promoting BOT schemes to finance the
infrastructure the country needs so urgently36 (Asian Business 04/94, 6). The
government has amended its laws to allow variations such as BOO and BTO, and a new
government fund, Philippine Strategic Holdings, will be started in order to raise money
for BOT projects from private sources. BOT has been managed under the country's
foreign aid umbrella, the Coordinating Council of the Philippines Assistance Program,
through which the government now allows foreign aid money to be used as loans in
BOT projects to cover as much as 25% of the bid price.
The country started its first BOT schemes in 1992 to develop fast-track power
projects in an effort to stop its crippling power failures. Enron Power Corp of the US,
34 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Philippines, p.27
35 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Philippines, p.27
36Asian Business, "Philippines: Open Arms for Investors", April 1994, p.6
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Switzerland's Asea Brown Boveri and Japan's Kawasaki and Marubeni were some of
the first companies to participate in BOT schemes.
One showcase for the BOT policy is a coal-fired power plant being built by
Hopewell Energy International of Hong Kong. The US$ 933 million, 700 MW station at
Pagbilao in Quezon province was the first project to be tendered internationally. The
plant, which was started in March 1993, is 10 months ahead of schedule, and is expected
to be operating by early 1996. Hopewell has also won a US$ 2 billion contract to build
the country's biggest power project, a 1,000 MW coal-fired power plant in Saul,
Pangasinan in the northern Philippines 37.
Independent Power Projects-Philippines38 (Asia Money 40-41)
Barge Plants - 270 MW, oil-fired plants
Status 1993
Cost Not available
Sponsors CEPA's interest (100%)
Financing Equity 100%
Malaya ROMM project - 650 MW, oil-fired plant
Status 1998 after rehabilitation
Cost US$ 250 million
Sponsors KEPCO 100%
Financing Equity 13%; KEPCO support, Korea Development Bank
Navatos I Power Station -3x70 MW, oil-fired plant
37 Asian Business, "Philippines: Open Arms for Investors", April 1994, p.7
3S Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p. 40-41
I 1991 contract completion
US$ 41 million
Hopewell Project Management (CEPA's interest 50.1%), Citicorp Vickers Power Facilitators
Ltd., Citicorp Vickers Energy Investments Ltd, Asian Development Bank, Commonwealth
Development Corp, International Finance Corp
Multilateral Agencies 91%; loans from shareholders 9%
IStatus
Navatos II Power Station - 100 MW, oil-fired plant
Status 1993 contract completion
Cost US$ 39 million
Sponsors Hopewell Tileman (Philippines) Corp (CEPA's interest 100%)
Financing Equity 25%; Bank Loans 75%
Pagbliao Power Station - 2x367 MW, coal-fired
Status 1996 contract completion
Cost US$ 933 million
Sponsors Hopewell Energy International (CEPA's interest 86.95%), Asian Development Bank,
Commonwealth Development Corp, International Finance Corp
Financing Exim credit 73%; multilateral agencies 21%; loans from banks and shareholders 6%
Quezon - 440 MW
Status PPA signed; in progress I
Cost US$ 725 million
Sponsors Ogden, Bechtel, PMR
Financing Export credits and multilateral debt from US-Exim and ERG; OPIC political risk insurance
Saul Power Station - 2x600 MW, coal-fired plant
I Status 1999 (contract completion; to be amended)
Cost I US$ 1.3 billion
I Sponsors I Panagasian Electric Corp (CEPA's interest 100%)
I Financing I Exim credit 74%; multilateral agencies 23%; bank loans 3%
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Thailand
Basic Facts39
Land Area 198,115 sq mi (9,561,000 sq km)
Population 60,271,300
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 323 billion
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 5,500
National Budget (1994 estimate) US$ 22.4 billion
Currency Baht (Bt)
Exchange rate (May 1995) Bt 24.63: US$1
Change in CPI (inflation) 5.3 %
Electricity 49.3 billion kWh
The Power Sector
Thailand's rapid development over the last 20 years has been extremely energy-
intensive. From 177 kg of oil equivalent per head in 1971, energy use rose to 614 kg per
head in 1992. The apparent absence of any significant supplies of petroleum left the
country as one of the largest importers of oil among developing countries at the end of
the 1970s. The foreign exchange bill for imported oil, which then accounted for over
80% of energy consumption, reached $2.98 billion in 1981, equal to 33% of all
merchandise imports40 . Thus there has been a major drive to develop indigenous
sources of energy in the last decade, notably natural gas, lignite and hydroelectricity.
Meanwhile, small deposits of petroleum have been discovered, offering some
encouragement for the future.
According to the ADB figures, 57.1 billion kWh of electricity were produced in
1992, and domestic consumption was 49.3 billion kWh. By 1992 the station of Mae Moh
had expanded its capacity to 2,025 MW, providing almost 12% of total generating
capacity41. The natural gas-fired power stations at Bangpakong and on the oilfield at
Larn Krubue will provide a further 1,500 MW, while new hydroelectric plants, notably
on the Mae Khlong river, will also increase generating capacity. Installed capacity has
risen to 14,622 MW at the end of 1993.
39 World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, and EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Thailand
40 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Thailand, p.21
4
' EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Thailand, p.23
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Privatization
In order to meet the growing demand for power, the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) plans to buy 4,180 MW of power under its Independent
Power Producer (IPP) scheme until the year 200242. This figure represents about 50% of
the capacity needed because Thailand wants to maintain a 50/50 split between private
and public power generation. When bidding for concessions closed in June 1995, thirty
two consortiums presented 50 separate proposals to generate a total of 39,000 MW. This
response far exceeded expectations of EGAT, which anticipated between 10 and 20
applicants. The bids will be assessed with a 60% weighting on tariff price and 40%
weighting on other factors such as supply, diversification and location. The
overwhelming response has delayed the selection process. Bidders were expecting a
shortlist to be drawn up by October 1995, but EGAT says negotiations for power
purchasing agreements (PPA) with the selected few will not begin until July 1996.
A successful and innovative financing structure was employed in late 1994 by the
Electricity Generating Public Company (EGCO)43 (Asia Money 47). The company set up
a subsidiary in mid-1994 called the Rayong Electricity Generating Company in order to
acquire and operate the Rayong power station, located 200 km south-east of Bangkok.
The station is a gas-fired, 1,180 MW plant, which represents approximately 10% of
Thailand's installed electricity generating capacity. EGCO raised roughly 45% of the
funds to buy the plant by issuing an IPO on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in late 1994.
A total of 204 million ordinary shares were offered at a price of Bt 22.00 (88 US cents)
per share, raising a total of Bt. 4.4 billion. In addition to the IPO, debt financing was
acquired from a number of sources. Onshore banks and debenture holders provided Bt.
7.0 billion and offshore banks while institutional lenders injected a further US$ 282
million. The issue was very well received by investors, many of whom were attracted
by the good pricing and a high internal rate of return of around 22%. The shares have
42 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p. 35
43 Asia Money, "Power in Asia", December 1995/January 1996, p. 4 7
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traded heavily and performed very strongly in the secondary market. One year after
listing, the issue is trading-- with the foreign share price at Bt 72 and the domestic share
price just slightly lower.
EGCO is now planning a second venture into the capital markets. The company
intends to raise capital for the purchase of another power plant EGAT, the 824 MW
Khanom plant. EGCO intends to finance the acquisition by raising Bt 21 billion through
a combination of new shares, bonds and bank loans. The equity offering is valued at Bt
6 billion. Originally planned for the end of 1995, the issue has been delayed until early
1996 because the government is disputing the tariff rates and wants to review the fee
structure. The rate structure is a critical component of the power purchase agreement
(PPA), and the equity offering will be postponed until the PPA has been signed.
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Vietnam
Basic Facts"
Land Area 127,246 sq mi (9,561,000 sq km)
Population 74,393,324
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 72 billion
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity Terms) US$ 1,000
National Budget (1994 estimate) US$ 2 billion
Currency Dong (D)
Exchange rate (May 1995) D 11,053: US$ 1
Electricity 9 billion kWh
The Power Sector
Vietnam's power sector has been receiving a large slice of public investment
funds in recent years, and output increased at an annua l average rate of 9.4% between
1985 and 1992. Major projects completed since the beginning of the 1980s have included
the Pha Lai thermal plant (440 MW) and the Hoa Binh hydroelectric project (1,760 MW)
in the North, and all four units of the Tri An hydroelectric project (400 MW) in the
South45. In spite of these additions, production of electricity still remains low: in 1992 it
was 141 kWh per head, about half of the level in Indonesia and one-sixth of Thailand's
(but twice Bangladesh's output per head).
Three separate, regionally-based companies are responsible for generation,
transmission and distribution: Power Company No 1 covering the North; Power
Company No 2 covering the South; and Power Company No 3 covering the Central
provinces. The electricity supply systems of the Southern and Central regions remain
particularly weak. Installed capacity in the Center is nominally 224 MW but less than
half of this is actually available. Per head consumption in the center is about 30 kWh,
less than a quarter of the national average. Power Company No 3, unlike the other two,
does not have an integrated supply system although it now receives about 60 MW of
capacity from Power Company No 1 through a 500-km, 220-kv transmission line. In the
South, the largest power generator, the Tri An dam, is an erratic source of supply. In
"World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, and EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Vietnam
45 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Vietnam, p.46
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1992, in the dry season (March-June), there were blackouts in Ho Chi Minh City for up
to three days a week. An additional 140 MW, raising output to 12m kWh/day, was
expected to ease the shortage to 500-520 kWh/day in 1993, cutting the number of days
without power to one during the dry season46.
To correct the imbalance in supplies between the North and the rest of the
country, the government decided in February 1992 to launch a 500 kv, 1,500 km power
line linking the Hoa Binh hydroelectric power station and other plants in the North to
the deficit regions to the South. The US$ 600 million scheme, described as the country's
most ambitious infrastructure project since the building of the Ho Chi Minh trail, was
completed more or less on target by mid-1994.
Installed Generating Capacity 199147
Hydro (MW) 1,847
Power Company No 1 1,280
Power Company No 2 563
Power Company No 3 5
Thermal (MW) 848
Power Company No 1 620
Power Company No 2 228
Power Company No 3 0.0
Gas Turbine (MW) 118
Power Company No 1 24
Power Company No 2 60
Power Company No 3 34
Diesel (MW) 446
Power Company No 1 10
Power Company No 2 250
Power Company No 3 185
Total 3,258
46 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Vietnam, p.47
47 EIU Country Profile 1995-96: Vietnam, p.47
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APPENDIX 5
Other Approaches for Improving the Power Situation
The traditional approach of power planners in developing countries has been to
focus almost exclusively on building additional generating plants in order to meet
growing power demands. There are, however, additional measures that can be taken to
improve power supply at substantially reduced costs48. These measures can be divided
into policy approaches, institutional approaches, and technical approaches, as discussed
below.
Policy Approaches
While government policies could play a major role in improving the quality of
electricity supply, increasing the efficiency of electricity use, and alleviating the
environmental impact of growing electricity consumption in developing countries, in
practice, energy and power-sector policies have often failed to achieve these objectives.
The Sri Lankan government should pursue policies such as proper pricing of electricity,
demand-side management and conservation, and reduction in the environmental
impact of power generation.
Proper Pricing of Electricity
An important area requiring reform is energy pricing. Rising energy costs during
the 1970s led many countries to introduce energy price controls or subsidies, especially
for electricity. As energy costs stabilized in the 1980s, many of these policy
interventions have stayed in place, such that energy continues to be supplied at a price
48 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.31
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well below its cost to the national economy. In this direct way, energy pricing policies in
many countries are encouraging an inefficient allocation of resources and imposing a
heavy economic burden on developing countries.
The impacts of such pricing policies are substantial on the energy sector alone.
Unrealistically low prices for particular energy delivery forms undermine the financial
viability of energy supply institutions. In many countries, pricing policies are major
contributors to the financial weakness of electric utilities. Furthermore, low prices
reduce the incentives for private sector entreprenuership in the energy sector, as they
slow the introduction and use of energy technologies that can contribute to job creation
and skill improvement.
In Sri Lanka, tariff setting has been influenced heavily by social factors such as
"ability to pay", which has resulted in substantial cross-subsidization within the sector.
The cost of supplying electricity to large consumers at a high voltage (33 kV) is
generally less per unit than to a low voltage domestic consumer in a rural area, because
of factors such as less transformation, transmission and distribution losses, less frequent
servicing, and lower meter reading costs when supplying electricity to the former.
However, the present tariff structure does not adequately take this into account, as is
evident by Table 3.5, and domestic supply has been substantially under-priced. Since
the government has been increasingly reluctant to bear the costs for such subsidized
sales to households, the CEB has financed its losses by charging large consumers (such
as businesses) more than their fair share (from the economic standpoint).
This policy has given domestic consumers fewer incentives to adopt energy
conservation measures such as using more efficient fluorescent lamps, while industry
has been penalized. The policy has not even had the desired effect of poverty
alleviation, since only 30% of the population have access to electricity. The other 70%,
who are generally poorer, are actually adversely affected by the higher prices of
domestic consumer goods resulting from industries having to pay more for electricity49.
49 Perera, K.K.Y.W, Energy Status in Sri Lanka, p.103
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Demand-Side Management and Conservation
Few developing countries have adequately considered the substantial impact
that energy conservation policies and strategies can have on the provision of additional
power while reducing the need for expensive new generation capacity. Government
policies could establish equipment standards, building codes, and import restriction or
promotion to increase electricity the efficiency of electricity use in the country.
Sri Lanka experimented with a "time-of-day" tariff in the 1980s, in an attempt
shifted electricity use from peak times to times when it can be generated more
cheaply5 0. The program shifted demand and flattened peaks but was hampered by the
inability of the government to institute such two-rate metering system on a wide scale.
Therefore, the program was limited to medium and large industries and hotels, and its
impact was lessened. Nonetheless the positive results of the experiment indicate that
the country can benefit substantially from expanding the use of time-of-day metering
and establishing different prices for different categories of customers.
Reducing the Environmental Impact of Power Generation
Power supply expansion in most developing countries has been accomplished
with very little concern for the environment. Electric utilities and most donor agencies
have traditionally favored large power plants, although smaller plants with cleaner
fuels, and lower emissions have less impact on the local environment. At the same time
though, a host of technologies and power generation options which minimize
environmental impacts are becoming available to most developing countries. Newer
technologies, such as fluidized bed combustion of coal, are commercially available and
allow developing countries to reduce the adverse impact of power supply on the
environment. Providing small hydroelectric facilities in rural areas, cogenerating heat
and electricity in industrial facilities, and, above all, using electricity more efficiently are
viable and effective options available to power planners. Developing countries need to
50 Perera, K.K.Y.W, Energy Status in Sri Lanka, p.103
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consider environmental impact as one of the major concerns in deciding on a power
supply strategy to ensure the widespread and effective use of these strategies.
Governments should adopt policies which define limits on combustion emissions
and which restrict the impact of power generation on water resources, air quality, and
lifestyle of the population, so that environmental impacts are integrated fully in power-
sector planning. In Sri Lanka's case, although the country has a separate Ministry of the
Environment, headed by a Cabinet Minster, the country does not have a comprehensive
framework for environmental protection nor effective laws for pollution control. A
recent World Bank study on the impact of Sri Lanka's power generation on its
environment will be a good starting point for the drafting of appropriate legislation.
Institutional Approaches
Once a sound policy is established - on which a sustainable power development
strategy can be built, institutions need to be created or improved to implement that
strategy. Existing institutional structures in most developing countries are not well-
matched to their present power predicament. Developing country power institutions
face uncertainty and capital shortage problems, and the political, economic, and
technological climate in which they operate is shifting rapidly. Traditional power-sector
institutions, however, are typically state controlled and thus designed to implement
publicly-financed additions to the power system and operate them using typical public
sector management methods. Such methods tend to be inefficient and rigid in adapting
to changing situations.
Approaches to institutional development in developing country power-sectors
can be categorized as follows5 1:
* Improving institutional structures for utility management, planning, and operations
* Developing capabilities for research and development in the power industry
* Supporting the institutions necessary for conservation and end-use efficiency
improvement
51 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.33
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Utility Management, Planning, and Operational Improvements
While many of the inefficiencies in the power sector of developing countries are
the direct result of ineffective and inappropriate policies, such as irrational prices and
other forms of subsidy, they are also caused simply by poor management, planning,
and operating practices. The most pressing problems include5 2:
* Lack of attention to manpower development
* Lack of management objectives needed to operate efficiently
* Lack of know-how to improve planning, operation, and management of utilities
Therefore, a new approach is needed to focus utility management systematically
on efficient operation. Human resource development is of crucial importance in such a
strategy. To achieve this, the government needs to institute a management
improvement program which will53:
* Review and improve each organization's or sub-organization's goals and plans, and
assess the human resources needed to achieve those goals
* Establish a detailed operating program to achieve determined efficiency targets
* Create comprehensive monitoring programs to assess progress towards efficiency
targets
* Develop recruitment and succession plans, career paths (including individual
training plans) and personnel data bases
Institutional Development in the Power R&D Industry
Traditional technologies will be insufficient to meet projected demand for
electricity services, and the widespread use of new technology will require indigenous
capacity for technological adaptation and innovation. Wide-ranging institutional
reforms are required to accelerate the pace of research and development. Even more
52 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.33
53 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.33
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technically advanced developing nations like India and Brazil devote a comparatively
small fraction of their budgets to relevant research and development in the power
sector, while those such as Sri Lanka perform very little local research. After a country
establishes the necessary facilities for local R&D, it should also implement the necessary
institutional mechanisms to transfer newly developed technologies to the marketplace.
Strengthening Institutional Related to End-Use Efficiency
Institutional needs related to achieving end-use efficiency improvements
include54:
* Development of institutions (both public and private) to develop and implement a
national electricity conservation program effectively
* Establishment of an integrated approach that combines engineering, management,
and financial aspects of electricity conservation into a unified process - in practical
terms, for example, utilities require demand management departments staffed with
specialists from a variety of disciplines including equipment performance, consumer
behavior, and end-use analysis
* Establishment of information and training programs to increase awareness of end-
use efficiency benefits
* Development of capability within local engineering firms to build a long-term
energy conservation services
* Development of equipment research and development, demonstrations, and
performance testing capabilities (in order to facilitate this, governments can assist
entrepreneurs who are attempting to manufacture and/or market energy-efficient
products and services by offering financing, training, and support for technology
transfer)
* Establishment of financing programs, including utility financing options, as well as
government and third-party financing incentives
54 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.34
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Technological Approaches
With proper policies and institutions in place, developing countries can take
advantage of a large variety of technical innovations that can lead to an improved
power situation. In this section, I will outline some options available to developing
countries to supplement their traditional generation capacity expansion in meeting their
burgeoning power demand in a sustainable fashion. Although many other options exist,
the six approaches presented below include the major elements of a successful power
development strategy:
* Power plant performance improvement
* Transmission and distribution loss reduction
* End-use efficiency improvement
* Load management
* Cogeneration
* New generation technologies
Power plant performance improvement
The majority of thermal power plants in developing countries operate below
their designed capacity and efficiency, and the amount of time they are unavailable for
operation is far greater than of plants in developed countries. In some developing
countries, aging plants operate below 80 percent of their rated capacity, and the
availability factor of many thermal power stations in these nations is under 60 percent,
compared with over 85 percent in the US. Moreover, they use over 13,000 Btu of fuel
per kWh of output, compared with 9,000-11,000 Btu per kWh for efficient plants.
The poor performance of thermal power plants is caused by unsatisfactory repair
and maintenance, unavailability of spare parts, improper operation management, and
poor fuel quality. Resolving these problems-through a combination of technical,
operational, and managerial measures-requires a concerted effort on the part of
electric utilities and power-sector planners to allocate sufficient to improving
performance of power plants.
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The positive impact of measures to improve power plants more than justify their
cost in many cases. A study of power plant performance improvement in Pakistan, for
example, indicates that it is possible to improve fuel use efficiency by 12 percent, and to
recover an additional generation capacity of 300 MW from the existing thermal power
plants of the Water and Power Development Authority. Since total costs of the process
would be approximately US$ 170 million, the payback period for this investment is
estimated at under three years55 .
While a comprehensive analysis of the total potential of power rehabilitation has
not been carried out for developing countries, the limited data available indicate that,
for an inefficiently run system, power plant rehabilitation can increase the available
generation capacity by 8 percent to 10 percent, and result in similar improvements in
generation efficiency.
The improvement possible through proper planning can be illustrated by the
Inginiyagala Power House, a small 10 MW hydro power plant in the Sri Lankan
system5 6. If the reservoir is operated at near-maximum level conditions, it is possible to
increase annual output by about 16 million kWh, compared to when the reservoir is
operated closer to the lowest levels. However, the latter case occurs much more
frequently due to constraints which are of a political nature. For example, when farmers
see higher water levels, they demand more releases, thus drastically reducing power
generating efficiency, costing the CEB about Rs. 30 million during a year with normal
rainfall. The unfortunate fact is that with more efficient and independent planning,
higher electricity output can be obtained without detriment to the quantity of water
released seasonally.
It is evident, however, that the optimum management of the much larger power
stations at Kotmale, Victoria, and Randenigala and the associated storage reservoirs are
of far greater importance. Since releases for agricultural purposes can be at variance
with requirements for optimum power generation, an independent party should have
25 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.36
56 Perera, K.K.Y.W, Energy Status in Sri Lanka, p.67
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the authority to make such decisions in a manner which optimizes both objectives.
Measures such as the desilting of reservoir beds can further increase the output of
currently operating plants.
Transmission and distribution loss reduction
While transmission and distribution (T&D) losses should be below 10 percent of
gross generation (economically optimal losses may be as low as 5 percent), in many
developing countries they are over 20 percent. In Pakistan, the Dominican Republic,
and Egypt, they are 27 percent, 34 percent, and 22 percent respectively57.
The potential for saving by reducing these losses is enormous. For example, in a
country like India with an annual electricity production of about 183 billion kWh (1985-
86) and T&D losses of 21 percent, assuming a value of US$ 0.06 per kWh, reducing the
losses to 15 percent of generation would yield and annual saving of over $650 million,
or about 12 percent of the country's annual power sector budget58 . These savings can be
realized through a modest expenditure in additional hardware.
The technical solutions to high T&D losses are straightforward and do not
require any advanced technologies. One of the major causes of high T&D losses in
developing countries is low power factor in primary distribution lines. Installation of
capacitors could easily remedy this problem. A World Bank study of power systems
loss reduction in Sudan (where T&D losses are 32 percent of generation), for example,
indicates that installation of static capacitors in the Blue Nile grid at a cost of under 1
million dollars will release 9.4 MW of generation capacity (about 5 percent of total
generation capacity in the grid) and about 4.8 GWh of electricity. The benefits from
generation capacity saving alone would be over $12 million59.
The losses in the Sri Lankan system are considerable as evident from Table 3.4.
The country's rapid growth in electricity demand could worsen the problem because, if
57 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.36
58 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.36
59 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.37
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conservation efforts are not maintained, the increasing demand will increase the
loading on transmission and distribution lines, and the losses can increase four-fold
because line losses are proportional to the square of the load (Energy 46). The Lanka
Electricity Company, which was one of the earliest utilities to launch a loss reduction
program, has already been able to reduce distribution losses from approximately 25% to
13%, even before the full rehabilitation has been completed. Although the CEB is
planning to reduce losses to 12%, many contend that 9% is a more feasible target.
End-use efficiency improvement
Despite the fact that industrialized countries have made major strides in using
electricity more efficiently over the last decade, developing countries have made little
progress in this area. The opportunities for improvements are tremendous, and the cost
is only a fraction of the generation expansion option.
Over 40 percent of electricity in developing countries is used by electric motors,
and use of more efficient motors and speed controls could dramatically reduce this
consumption. In the US, for example, the use of variable frequency drive controls in the
industrial sector is estimated to reduce electricity needs by 20 percent to 30 percent for
each motor and result in a 7 percent reduction in total electricity consumption in the
country6O. The overall savings potential is greater in developing countries where
industrial electricity use is of greater importance and many motors operate at partial
load. Similarly attractive opportunities for improving efficiency exist in air-
conditioning, water pumping, refrigeration, and other electricity end-use applications.
USAID Studies indicate that it is technically possible to increase electricity use
efficiency in developing countries by 30 percent at financially attractive terms. A study
of Pakistan's industrial and commercial sectors found that they have a cost-effective
savings potential of 30 percent of their projected electricity demand by the year 2005.
These savings translate into 25,000 GWh of avoided electricity generation and 3,000
60 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.37
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MW of avoided generation capacity-over 20 percent of the country's generation
capacity expansion requirements 61.
Although a number of energy auditing and energy saving schemes have been
instituted by the Sri Lanka Ministry of Power and Energy, this program has been
hampered by the lack of the necessary equipment, and adequately trained personnel. In
spite of these difficulties the CEB plans to launch a demand side management program
in 1996, which will replace regular light bulbs with compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs).
The projected electricity savings of the program are presented in the table below62:
Initial 400,000 1996 28
Additional 600,000 1997 70
Total 1,000,000 - 98
Note: It was assumed that lamps are operated 4 hours a day, and that lamps are in service for 5 years.
Professor K.K.Y.W. Perera63 has estimated that the following measures that
encourage conservation in the domestic sector will bring about a savings of 30 MW at
peak demand time and 30 million kWh units of electricity a year:
* Reduction of wasteful use (through good-housekeeping, and other measures)
* Use of more energy efficient devices (e.g. fluorescent lighting in place of ordinary
incandescent bulbs)
* Effective means of discouraging use of heavy domestic appliances (e.g. washing
machines) during hours of peak demand
* Encouraging an alternative to electric cooking
Bringing about such measures will require education of domestic electricity
users, and the establishment of various price incentives (such as time-of-day pricing)
61 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.3762 Ceylon Electricity Board: Generation Planning Branch, Report on Long Term Generation Expansion
Planning Studies 1995-2009 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: October 1994), p.A8-1
6' Perera, K.K.Y.W, Energy Status in Sri Lanka, p.102
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Load management
In developing countries where peak demand grows at considerably faster rates
than average load, load management-reduction of peak load (peak clipping), the
development of off-peak load (valley filling), and the transfer of load from on-peak to
off-periods (load shifting)- presents an attractive opportunity for reducing needed
additional generation capacity.
USAID studies suggest that there is considerable potential for reducing peak
load at attractive terms. In Costa Rica, for example, a study of 12 industrial plants
indicates that it is possible to reduce the peak load of these facilities by 21 percent (4,800
kW) at a cost of $50,000 to the utility and US$ 73,000 to the industrial plants. The
resulting savings to the utility would be over US$ 500,000, while industry would
recover its cost in less than one year".
Sri Lanka's limited attempts at load management were discussed earlier in the
section "Demand-Side Management and Conservation." As was evident in that
discussion, much can be gained by expanding such schemes.
Cogeneration
Cogeneration--the simultaneous production of electricity and useful thermal
energy - is an important power generation option that has not been fully utilized in
developing countries. This process allows industrial and large commercial users to use
the waste heat from power generation to reduce their total energy costs, increasing the
overall energy efficiency and reducing the need for generation capacity expansion.
A study of the cogeneration possibilities in Pakistan, sponsored by USAID,
estimates the potential in industrial plants at about 900 MW although only about 200
MW has been developed. A similar study in the Indian states of Gujarat and
Maharashtra estimates the economically and financially attractive cogeneration
potential over the next ten years at more than over 2,100 MW, compared with current
64 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.38
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generation capacity of about 10,000 MW65. Other studies in Indonesia, the Philippines,
Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic have indicated similarly sizable cogeneration
potential in those countries.
New generation technologies
There is a variety of new generation technologies which can be used in
developing countries to generate electricity more efficiently and to reduce its
environmental impact. Furthermore, some new technologies enable developing
countries to increase the use of their indigenous natural resources, thus reducing their
imported fuel requirements.
For example, some advanced gas turbines have overall energy conversion
efficiencies of 50 percent, requiring 20 percent less fuel than the most efficient
conventional large thermal power plants. These units combine modularity, short lead
times for planning and commissioning, and attractive costs. Recent advancements in
coal combustion technologies - in particular, atmospheric fluidized bed combustion
(AFBC) and integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) systems-combine superior
technical and environmental performance with modular design, and construction 66.
These characteristics are directly relevant to the needs of the power sector in many
developing countries.
There are also a wide range of indigenous renewable resources that can be used
in small power generation facilities that are suitable, in particular, to electricity needs in
rural areas. Low-head hydropower, biomass from agricultural residues, wind, and solar
systems are cost-effective methods that can be used for rural electrification. Although
there is considerable potential for such power generation options, they have been
largely ignored by power planners in most developing countries.
65 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages... p.38
66 US Agency for International Development, Power Shortages..., p.40
216
Sri Lanka has access to a variety of economically-viable renewable energy
resources which include solar, wind, biomass, and minihydro. Some of these could be
utilized to meet part of the country's increased energy demand.
Solar Energy
Sri Lanka's location close to the equator assures it of a relatively high and
uniform level of insolation. This resource can be harnessed for both water heating and
crop drying. Very few households currently use hot water, and the main market for the
above activities initially will lie in the commercial and tourist sectors. The use of solar
energy for crop drying is important because tea and other crop processing industries
consume over a million tons of fuelwood, or an estimated 20% of total consumption, per
year.
Minihydro
While the Sri Lankan government has emphasized large hydro-power schemes,
about 10 MW of small schemes (in the 5-250 kW range) have been operating in the tea
estates of the central region since 1925. However, many of these are being abandoned
because of the availability of cheap and reliable electricity from the national grid. In
addition to existing plants which could be rehabilitated, potential sites for minihydro
schemes exist in hilly areas and in the irrigation systems of the north central part of the
island.
The CEB estimated that 30 MW of small hydro potential exists in about 60
undeveloped sites, and that about 8 MW of potential exist in about 290 irrigation tanks
and reservoir sites67. A further 50 MW small hydro potential can be tapped in about 140
sites which can either be rehabilitated or redeveloped.
67 Ceylon Electricity Board, Report on Long Term...., p.5-11
217
Other Renezoables
Apart from solar and minihydro, a number of renewable energy applications are
worth exploring. These include generation of biogas from animal wastes, producer gas
from rice husks, and wind energy for water pumping and electricity generation in
isolated areas68.
The Energy unit of the CEB carried out a resource assessment study of wind
potential, which determined an overall potential of 8 MW/sq. km of open land area, or
an overall potential of approximately 200 MW in the south eastern quarter of the
island69. This region of the country is exposed to both south west and north east
monsoonal wind and hence wind plants located here can yield acceptable levels of plant
factor. A wind energy project of 10 MW commissioned in the year 2000 would provide
a benefit/cost ratio of only about 0.5 at a discount rate of 10%. Therefore, it is apparent
that wind energy can be considered only as a future option in economic terms.
Future Contributions of these Sources
While some of the above technologies appear promising, a concerted effort is
necessary to establish schemes to implement them. The NERSE task force was
established by the government of Sri Lanka for this purpose.
It is estimated, however, that even under an optimistic scenario, all of these non-
conventional sources will contribute only about 2% of total energy requirements in the
1990s and less than 5% by the year 200070. Nevertheless, even this modest contribution
will be useful because it will help reduce dependence on expensive imported oil and
scarce domestic fuelwood.
68 Munasinghe, Mohan, Energy Analysis and Policy, p.76
69 Ceylon Electricity Board, Report on Long Term...., p.5-10
70 Munasinghe, Mohan, Energy Analysis and Policy, pp.76 and 89
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Table A6-6
RO enDutRte an y Pi elLng PriceG 3.00 RAs1kWh
,sel 40MW. 10 Year BOT
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
8%
29%
26%
23%
22%
20%
19%
18%
10%
23%
21%
20%
19%
18%
17%
17%
12%
17%
16%
16%
15%
15%
15%
15%
14%
10%
11%
12%
12%
12%
13%
13%
16%
4%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
18%
-2%
1%
3%
5%
6%
8%
9%
esel 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
Ino 12%
26%
24%
23%
22%
23% 21%
22% 20%
21% 20%
14%
20%
19%
19%
19%
18%
18%
18%
iydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
12%
1%
2%
3%
3%
4%
4%
5%
14% 16%
-3% -7%
-2% -6%
-1% -5%
0% -3%
1% -2%
2% -1%
2% 0%
Coal 300 QMW. 15 Year SO
12%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
8%
14%
-3%
-1%
1%
3%
4%
5%
6%
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
20%A
25%
30%A
350A
40%
45%
50%
26%
24%
23%
16%
14%
15%
15%
15%15%
16%
16%
18%
9%
10%
11%
12%
13%
13%
14%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
8%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
6%
6%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
18%
-11%
-10%
-8%
-7%
-6%
-4%
-3%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%/
50%
8%
14%
13%
13%
13%
12%
12%
12%
10%
8%
9%
9%
10%
10%
10%
10%
16%
-8%
-5%
-3%
-1%
1%
2%
4%
18%
-13%
-10%
-7%
-5%
-2%
0%
1%
~I~
Table A6-8
DSCRs for Different Discount Rates and Equity Participation Rates (Selling Price 3.00 RsJkWh)
Diesel 40 MW. 10 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.37 1.23 1.10 1.00 0.90
25% 1.46 1.31 1.18 1.06 0.97
30% 1.40 1.28 1.14 1.03
35% 1.36 1.23 1.11
40% 1.47 1.33 1.21
45% 1.45 1.32
50% • . 1.45
Diesel 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.45 1.27 1.13 1.01
25% 1.36 1.21 1.08
30% 1.3 1 1.46 1.29 1.15
35% 1.39 1.24
40% 1.35
45% 1.47
50%
Hydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.33 1.14 0.98 0.85 0.75 0.66
25% 1.38 1.18 1.02 0.89 0.78 0.69
30% 144 123 106 93 1 Rl n 71
350%
40%A
45%
50n
I OG
1.28 1.10 0.96 0.84 0.74
1.34 1.15 1.00 0.88 0.78
1.40 1.21 1.05 0.92 0.81
1.46 1.26 1.10 0.96 0.85
Coal 300 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.35 1.12 0.95 0.80 0.69 0.60
25% 1.44 1.20 1.01 0.86 0.74 0.64
30% 1.28 1.08 0.92 0.79 0.68
35% 1.38 1.16 0.99 0.85 0.74
40% 6 1.26 1.07 0.92 0.80
45% 1.38 1.17 1.01 0.87
50% 1 1.29 1.11 0.96
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
Table A6-9
DSCRs for Different Discount Rates and Equity Participation Rates (Selling Price 3.50 Rs./kWh)
Diesel 40 MW. 10 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20%e 1.38 1.25 1.13
258% 10% 1 1.47 1.33 1.21
30% 1.42 1.29
38% 228 1.39
40% 256 22 4 18 16 1.51
48% 22228 1.64
60% 31.81
Diesel 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.3 1.1m 8 1.• 1.41 1.26
25% 1. 3 1.19 1 .30• 1 1.35
30% A .3 1. 0 1.44
35% .4 1292 1.12 0.•4 1.55
40% ,1 2. 135 1. 1 1.68
46% 1 23 : 1.83
50% 32 3 1.48 1.2,9 2.02
Hydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.33 1.15 1.00 0.87 0.77
25% 1.38 1.19 1.03 0.91 0.80
30% 1.43 1.24 1.08 0.94 0.83
35% 1.49 1.29 1.12 0.98 0.87
40% 11 1.35 1.17 1.03 0.91
45% i 13 1.41 1.23 1.08 0.95
50% 1.48 1.29 1.13 1.00
Coal 300 MW. 16 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
20% 1.39 1.17 0.99 0.85 0.74
26% 1.48 1.25 1.06 0.91 0.79
30% . 61.34 1.14 0.97 0.84
36% 1.44 1.22 1.05 0.91
40% 1.32 1.14 0.98
48% 1.24 1.07
50% 1.36 1.18
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
Table A6-7
ROEs. for Different Discount Rates and Egquit Participation Rates (Selinlg-Pric 3.50 RsAMh
sel 40 MW. 10 Year BOT
I 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%24% 18%28% 23% 18%26% 22% 18%28% 25% 22% 18%29% 26% 24% 21% 18%
29% 27% 25% 23% 21% 19%
27% 26% 24% 22% 21% 19%
esel 40 MW. 15 Year BOT
8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%25%
34% 29% 24%
31% 27% 24%
29% 26% 23%
28% 25% 23%
29% 27% 25% 23%
29% 28% 26% 24% 22%
ydro 70 MW. 15 Year BOT
8%
17%
16%
16%
15%
15%
14%
14%
10%
13%
13%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
8%
9%
9%
9%
9%
10%
10%
14%
4%
5%
5%
6%
6%
7%
7%
16%
0%
1%
2%
3%
3%
4%
5%
18%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
Coal 300 MW. 15 Year BOT
8%
23%
21%
20%
19%
18%
17%
17%
10%
18%
17%
17%
16%
16%
15%
15%
12%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%13%
14%
8%
9%
9%
10%
11%
11%
12%
16%
2%
4%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
18%
-3%
0%
2%
3%
5%
6%
8%
The options which meet the minimum requirements have been shaded
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
_ _ __
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